



(l. to r.) Former Director Gen. of Ministry of Defense David Iury, Mr. Ehud Ya'ari (Israeli Television), Prof. Edward Luttwak (CSIS), and Maj. Gen. Dr. Marouf Bakhit Nader (Univ. of Muftah, Amman).

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE

War in a Changing World

JCSS held a three-day international conference on war in a changing world, 5-7 November 1996. Participants included guest lecturers from Israel, the US, Jordan, China and Greece. The topics discussed included patterns of war in the modern era, global and regional

perspectives on war, dimensions of future warfare, and war and peace in the Middle East. The lectures included a mix of theoretical presentations together with assessments of specific aspects of war in particular areas of the world.

The opening lectures were largely theoretical. Prof. Edward Luttwak (CSIS) and Prof. Martin Van Creveld (Hebrew Univ.) provided two different views regarding the future of warfare. According to Luttwak,

the direction of future warfare is information warfare, whereby, due to technological innovations, states will be able to carry out special operations rather than frontal warfare. This type of warfare derives from the basic unwillingness of states and superpowers to tolerate huge casualties. An example of the difference between information warfare and conventional warfare is that whereas according to the latter approach, armies contemplated how to utilize the divisions at their ►

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MK Prof. Shlomo Ben-Ami addresses the conference. Seated (l. to r.) Brig. Gen. (res.) Aryeh Shalev (JCSS) and Prof. Amnon Yogev (Weizmann Institute of Science).

disposal, in information warfare emphasis is placed on the goal, and the means of achieving it. It is a type of warfare that is based on Intelligence.

Van Creveld claimed that states today would be more than willing to fight wars using their advanced technologies, but due to the

tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons they cannot afford to do so. Warfare has been transferred to organizations that lack territory, thus terrorism and guerrilla warfare will replace conventional warfare in the future. These wars will be carried out in close geographic proximity, where long-range weapon systems will be of no use. Nuclear

weapons may in fact be the single most important factor that accounts for this trend whereby warfare has taken on more primitive characteristics.

In light of these and other somewhat contradictory hypotheses regarding the direction of future warfare, Prof. Jack Levy (Rutgers Univ.) devoted his presentation to an attempt to place these debates in a broader historical context, in order to examine current trends and future scenarios in terms of long-term patterns and trends in war.



At the cocktail reception, (l.) Prof. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (Hoover Institute) and Prof. Jack S. Levy (Rutgers University).



Prof. Zeev Maoz, Head of JCSS
Dr. Ephraim Kam, Deputy Head of JCSS

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Chatting during a break (l. to r.) Dr. Ariel Levite (JCSS), Maj. Gen. Dr. Marouf Bakhit Nader and JCSS Head Prof. Zeev Maoz.

Prof. Bruce Bueno de Mesquita (Hoover Institution) presented a domestic theory of international conflict, discussing the impact of domestic institutional constraints on the manner in which politicians conceive of legitimate causes for going to war. Prof. Zeev Maoz (JCSS Head) presented research on national strategic behavior, drawing on an integrative approach that attempts to provide a comparative analysis of various approaches to this question.

Other lectures in the conference focused, among other topics, on the legality of war (Prof. Yoram Dinstein, Tel Aviv Univ.), nuclear proliferation

(Prof. Yair Evron, Tel Aviv Univ.), the future of war and peace in East and South Asia (Dr. Cheng Ruisheng, China Center for International Studies), terrorism (Prof. Ariel Merari, Tel Aviv Univ.), and grand strategy (Prof. Athanassios Platias, Institute of International Relations, Pantheon Univ., Greece).

The Middle East was also a focus of discussion at the conference, and presentations were devoted to different aspects of the future of warfare in this region. Dr. Zeev Bonen (BESA Center for Strategic Studies) discussed technology and strategy in the Middle East, Dr. Ephraim Kam (JCSS) lectured on the effect of global changes on war and peace in the Middle East, and Mr. Ehud Ya'ari (Israeli Television) focused on the social and economic

sources of insecurity in the Middle East.

Two views on the prospects for arms control in the Middle East were presented by Dr. Ariel Levite (JCSS) and Maj. Gen. Dr. Marouf Bakhit Nader (Univ. of Muftah, Amman). Nader also discussed Jordan's commitment to a Conference on Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME — modeled on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe — OSCE) in order to enhance regional cooperation, emphasizing that certain types of cooperation can spill over into other areas. Within such a security system, all concerns of all states in the region would have to be dealt with.

Other speakers at the conference were: Dr. Gil Merom (Tel Aviv Univ.), Dr. Azar Gat (Tel Aviv Univ.), Dr. Benjamin Miller (Hebrew Univ.), Prof. Amnon Yogev (Weizmann Institute of Science), Prof. Shlomo Ben-Ami (Tel Aviv Univ.), Dr. Gad Barzilai (Tel Aviv Univ.), Mr. Nahman Tal (Tel Aviv Univ.), and Dr. Shimon Naveh (Tel Aviv Univ.). ■

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Conference participants at the final session.

YARIV CONFERENCE

STATE OF THE NATION**JANUARY 1997**

The JCSS annual one-day conference in memory of founding head of JCSS, Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Yariv, was held this year on 28 January 1997. Devoted to

Maj. Gen. (res.) Yisrael Tal. This was followed by two lectures devoted to internal challenges that Israel faces, on the economic and social fronts. Minister of Finance, Dan Meridor,

today regarding the widely held view that Israeli-made products must be protected at all costs – Israel should work to become integrated in the international markets. Rabbi Yehuda

Amital, Head of “Har Etzion” Yeshiva, emphasized three social challenges that Israel faces today: the lack of a sense of duty or commitment, the impact of the media which has lead to simplified thinking on complex issues, and the growing impact of mysticism, in both secular and religious sectors of society. Regarding the first, Amital emphasized that placing individual rights and choice as our top priority has lead to a troubling decrease in individuals’ sense of duty to their nation, society, family, etc. The impact of the media in terms of



Participants in the second session of the day (l. to r.) Prof Gabriel Ben-Dor (Haifa University), Maj. Gen. Moshe Ya'alon, Dr. Ephraim Kam (JCSS), and Dr. Yossi Beilin at the podium.

assessments regarding the state of the nation, the conference included lectures on different aspects of Israel's national agenda in the internal realm, regarding Israel's relationship with the Arab world and with the United States, and regarding regional security and peace.

The conference opened with a tribute to Aharon Yariv delivered by

spoke about the relationship between security needs and the economy, and the importance of understanding the need to make cuts in the defense budget in order to deal with the national deficit. He cited Yitzhak Rabin, in his role as Defense Minister in 1985, as the first to make such cuts and slay the “holy cow” called the defense budget. Similar actions are necessary

simplifying issues has led to an increasing focus on the clearcut black and white extremes, whereas tolerance can only be fostered in the more complex grey areas that are necessarily glossed over. Each of these challenges has potentially disastrous implications for Israeli society.

In the second session of the day, three speakers provided different

perspectives on the peace process and Israel's relationship with the Arab world. MK Dr. Yossi Beilin spoke about the importance of Israel's relationship with the US. He claimed that US policy of dual containment regarding Iran and Iraq has proven ineffective. While the embargo on Iraq should not be lifted as long as the present government is in power, Israel should change its attitude toward Iran, and not treat this country as its number-one enemy. Beilin presented his view on the probable outcome of the negotiations with the Palestinians, and the situation regarding south Lebanon and Syria. He advocated unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon, i.e. without waiting for a signed agreement with Lebanon.

Head of IDF Intelligence, Maj. Gen. Moshe Ya'alon, focused on Israel's image in the eyes of the Arab states, claiming that the complexity of this image is one of the factors that contributes to the instability that characterizes our region. Regarding Syria, Ya'alon claimed that Asad today views the peace process as the preferred means for securing the return of the Golan Heights, which he views as a primary strategic goal. Prof. Gabriel Ben-Dor (Haifa University) focused in his lecture on the ideological dimension of "Arabism" and on inter-Arab relations in terms of the impact of these factors on the peace process.

The next session dealt with two aspects of Israeli-US relations. Prof. Itamar Rabinovich (Tel Aviv University) focused on some of the problems that confront the relationship between Israel and US Jewry. He pointed to the growing tendency of American Jews to involve themselves directly in Israeli

politics, whether by financing political parties, or by direct relay (via e-mail, fax, etc.) of information regarding political events in Israel, from youth spending time in Israel to their families in the US. Rabinovich also spoke about the faults in the organizational structure of American Jewry. The most crucial problem that Jews in the US face is their continued existence as Jews; in this realm Rabinovich believes that Israel can contribute positively through education and provision of the "Israeli experience" to youth that come to spend time in Israel. Prof. Abraham Ben-Zvi (Tel Aviv University) spoke about US-Israeli relations in a historical perspective, leading to the present. He focused on the evolving relationship between

the two major facets of these relations: the strategic realm of the US national interest, and the realm of the "special relationship" which finds expression in American public opinion, and especially in Congress.

The keynote address was delivered by Minister of National Infrastructures, Ariel Sharon. Sharon discussed the security challenges that Israel faces vis-a-vis Syria and the Palestinians, and set forth Israel's territorial requirements in terms of its security calculation. Sharon's assessment was made in light of his overall conviction that we have yet to see true willingness on the part of the Arab states to reconcile themselves to the existence of the state of Israel. ■

BOOK REVIEW

Security Threatened: Surveying Israeli Opinion on Peace and War Asher Arian

Cambridge Studies in Political Psychology and Public Opinion. Cambridge: Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, Tel Aviv University with Cambridge University Press, 1995.

"Asher Arian's work is a first-class study of stability and change in Israeli attitudes towards security issues. He weaves a complex and rich tapestry of the various dimensions of public opinion in Israel and presents a sober analysis with considerable policy relevant significance. [...] Arian's work is the most comprehensive study available on the relationship between Israeli attitudes towards national security and politics, and it will unquestionably become a reference source, as well as a point of departure for future research by Israeli analysts."

Survival, Vol. 38, No. 4 (Winter 1996-97)

YOM DADO

Coping with Terrorism

Ms. Anat Kurz addresses the conference.

The May 1996 annual conference held in memory of Lt. Gen. David Elazar ("Dado") focused this year on the means for coping with terrorism. In the first session, speakers focused on the nature of terrorism. Prof. Ariel Merari (TAU) discussed general trends and defining characteristics of terrorism, and Mr. Reuven Paz (Haifa University) discussed the ideological dimension of Islamic suicide operations. Mr. Nahman Tal (JCSS) focused on terrorism in Egypt, providing an overview of the different terrorist organizations, their long-term goals, and the targets of their terrorist acts. Egyptian security forces were at first ill-equipped to deal with terrorism, but by the end of 1993 they had developed a security strategy for coping with terrorism, which began to have effect in 1994. Although there are still intelligence problems to be overcome, Egypt has been relatively successful in dealing with terrorism over the past few years.

The second session was devoted to a look at the internal aspects of terrorism. Prof. Asa Kasher (TAU) focused on four major questions relevant to the developing image of the state of Israel, and the effect that terrorism has had on each. The four questions or processes are: the molding of the Israeli Jew; the face of Israeli society; the nature of the democratic regime; and Israel's place

in the region. In general, Kasher showed how terrorism has had a detrimental effect in terms of developments within each of these four processes. The greatest damage has been to Israeli society, with the strengthening of the ethos of the "hunted Jew". Mr. Carmi Gilon (former Head of GSS) discussed how Israel, a democratic Jewish state, has stood up to Islamic terrorism. He claimed that Israel has a much harder time dealing with terrorism than its neighbors; Israel's actions are scrutinized by the public, and even the activities of the GSS are part of the public debate in Israel. The final speaker in this session, Mr. Ron Ben-Yishai, a senior journalist, related to media coverage of terrorist attacks, pointing out that the major role of the media is to provide an amplifier for terrorism. While it must be clear that the "bad guy" in the media-terrorism debate is the terrorist (and not the media that reports on his actions), Ben-Yishai conceded that the media can preserve the public's right to know without stooping to the level of journalism that was characteristic following the February-March 1996 terrorist attacks. He concluded by

clarifying the positive role of the media, and added a number of suggestions for improving media coverage of terrorist events.

The closing session of the day was devoted to means of countering terrorism. Prof. Zeev Maoz (JCSS Head) presented an overview of some of the more salient characteristics of Israel's cumulative experience in dealing with terrorism over the years. In view of the lack of an overall strategy for dealing with terrorism, both within the security system as well as in academic studies, Maoz suggested some tentative ideas regarding what the components of such a strategy might be. Ms. Anat Kurz (JCSS) dealt with the determinants of international cooperation for dealing with terrorism in general, and with state-sponsorship of terrorism in particular, in an effort to explain why efforts to establish a broad international antiterrorism front have proven to be of limited success thus far. Maj. Gen. Ilan Biran (former head of Central Command) closed this session with a discussion of Israel's experience in dealing with Islamic terrorism. ■



Mr. Ron Ben-Yishai ("Yediot Ahronot") addresses the conference. On the panel (l. to r.) Former Head of GSS Mr. Carmi Gilon, Prof. Asa Kasher (Tel Aviv University), and Brig. Gen. (res.) Aryeh Shalev (JCSS).

**PUBLISHED IN
AL-AHRAM**

Israel, the Peace Process, and the Arab World by Zeev Maoz

الحوار القومي

١٨ ديسمبر ١٩٩٦

ما بال الزمان يضل علينا برجال يبنهون الناس ويرفعون الإلتباس
ويفكرون بحزم ويعملون بعزم ولا ينفكون حتى ينالوا ما يقصدون.
الكواكبي

وترشيد ثوابت التوجه الاسرائيلي (أرض الميعاد، الاستيطان،
رفض شمولية التسوية السلمية... الخ)، ورأى الكاتب أن المازق مع
نتنياهو هو يكمن في أنه النتيجة الحتمية للعقيدة الصهيونية، التي
احتكرت السلطة في إسرائيل، عندما وصلت إلى مرحلة
الاختيارات المصيرية.

ونواصل في الأرباء القادم نشر ما جاءه من مقالات أخرى

من واقع تجربته، يقدم كاتب مقال اليوم وجهة نظره في مسألة
الحوار بين أنصار السلام على الجانبين الإسرائيلي والعربي... التي
طرحها مقال زئيف ماعوز ونشره، الحوار القومي، (٢٧ نوفمبر
١٩٩٦)، ونواصل حوله النقاش الأسبوعي الماضين.
ويعزى الكاتب رأي في افتقار الحوار للجدي والاستمرارية، إلا
أن أنصار السلام الإسرائيليين لم يتصدروا بعد لمسئولية تصويب

إسرائيل.. وعملية السلام..
والعالم العربي

حوار الالتفاف.. وحوار التعميل.. وحوار التصويب

بدور القوة المرتزقة للشركاء
الأقوياء عينا على كل الأطراف،
واكتارا لحق تقرير المصير
واسترداد الأرض والسيادة.
إن مجابهة ضرورات التصويب
والترشيد، الذي يمكن أن يكون
الأساس لأي حوار مجد وفعال،
يجب أن تبدأ مع الذات وليس مع
الطرف الآخر. ومن الذات يجب أن
تتغلغل في أعماق الحوار القومي
حتى تستوعب مغزاها كل التيارات
القومية حتى له

من السذاجة أو عناصر مقاومة
حاولت أن تسحق مسحة إنسانية
على واقع الثوابت المبررة وتشدب
من نزواته وقد عانى من تبعات
مثل هذه التيارات ابرياء من أنصار
كسلج في الترويج وحكومة فئسي
في فرنسا أثناء الطغيان النازي.
والحقيقة أن أنصار السلام في
إسرائيل لم يستطيعوا بعد أن
تد... الثوابت بما يؤهل...
من طرفه

د. عصام الدين جلال

واليهودية في مرحلة ازدهار. مما
يفرض التعامل مع هذا الواقع، ولما
حاولت بادب أن أبين له البلاء
لعلمية لاقتراض قواعد حسابية
أنت أكثر الظاهر الاجتماعية

في هستيرية صارخا أنه سيخرج كل
من يجسر على احتلال أرض
الميعاد. وقام زعماء الجالية بنهذته
واعتدروا لي وقالوا أنه مهاجر من
بلندا ثم لاضطهاد النازية.

الحوار مع طراف إسرائيلية فعالة
وانكسر بداية ١٩٥١. وندلور
المة اليهودية في
أه محاضرة
ة

An article by JCSS Head Prof. Zeev Maoz dealing with the peace proces
was published by the Egyptian daily *Al-Ahram* in late November 1996.
This was the first time *Al-Ahram* published an article by an Israeli
figure not clearly identified with the far left in Israel.

After a general overview of the peace process since the Netanyahu government came into office, Maoz delineates two views that exist in the Israeli political system regarding the relations between Israel, Egypt, and the Arab world: what he calls the "conspiracy conception," and the "evolutionary conception." According to the latter, the process

of reconciliation between Israel and the Arab world has made significant progress, but is nevertheless tentative and drawn out, and characterized by ups and downs related to the evolution of the peace process. The supporters of peace in Egypt and other Arab states face an internal opposition, similar to the situation in Israel. Maoz's message is

that the supporters of peace in Israel and the Arab states must help each other; "a continuous dialogue between Arabs and Israelis at all levels, both in times of progress on formal tracks, and especially in times of crisis on the official level, is an important element in advancing peace." ■

The Likelihood that Syria will Declare War is Growing Significantly

Zeev Maoz



government constitute a major withdrawal from the understandings reached during the Peres and Rabin governments—applying Resolution 242 to the Golan Heights; the "Land for Peace" principle—or in the Syrian version, "total peace in return for total withdrawal"; and the principle of reciprocal security arrangements, but not necessarily symmetrical.

Whereas with regard to the Palestinians the Netanyahu government has a clear policy of honoring agreements, with regard to the Syrians, there has been a total turnaround. The positions, both official and unofficial, of the present

In the negotiations conducted by previous governments, the Syrians were given to understand that the principle of withdrawal to the international border is acceptable to Israel. The differences between the two parties boiled down to discrepancies between the

international and the 1967 border. Since no agreement was reached not even at the level of a memorandum of understanding—which puts into writing the commonly accepted foundations for talks, the Netanyahu government may feel legitimately unbound by the commitments made by previous governments. As far as public opinion is concerned, Netanyahu can assume that his policy is an expression of the public's will, as various polls have shown that a

majority in Israel opposes a total withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Nevertheless, the Syrians feel cheated. Israel, as they see it, has stepped away from a significant commitment achieved through negotiations, so from a Syrian point of view, we have gone back to the pre-Madrid situation.


The futile initiative of "Lebanon First" was intended not so much to launch a new framework for negotiations as to lay the blame for the delay in negotiations at the Syrians' doorstep. As far as public relations are concerned, Netanyahu can chalk up another success. But PR is one thing, and policy is something entirely different. The position of the Netanyahu government on the Syrian issue is a legitimate one as far as international procedure is concerned. Asad, who refused to reach an agreement with Israel has only himself to blame for the present government's withdrawal from the previous government's positions.

Nevertheless, the new situation with regard to Syria demands an analysis of policy, strategy, and battle readiness in face of new dangers. The main implication of the policy change in the Syrian arena is a significant increase in the likelihood of a war breaking out with Syria, and perhaps with other Arab entities.

Possibility of War

Two differing views on the likelihood of war in the near future are presented by the Deputy Head, Ephraim "Ha'aretz" (August 18 and 29, 1994), contributed to the initiation of talks on this question, in light of the current talks. The debate has had an important place within the security committee circles.

** JCSS thanks "Ha'aretz" for the articles here.



Israeli-Syrian Disengagement Agreement, May 31, 1974

AGENDA

War With Syria

likelihood of war with Syria in
d by JCSS Head, Zeev Maoz,
Kam. Originally published in
respectively), these viewpoints
a public and political debate
e stalled Israeli-Syrian peace
impact on discussions taking
munity, as well as in political

allowing the reprint of these

Therefore, as long as the Netanyahu government is planning to continue its current policy, which is essentially "peace for peace," it must prepare Israel for war in the not too distant future.

First, it is important to emphasize that in the IDF and the political establishment there are many who believe that, despite the expected (and perhaps desirable) freeze in talks with Syria, there is low likelihood of war breaking out in the near future. This assessment is based on two principal components: the geostrategic situation and the balance of military forces.

Geographically, the IDF is situated 60 km from Damascus. This is a major deterrent against Syrian adventurous designs. Moreover, difficulties in inter-Arab relations are detrimental to forming a common Arab bloc. Syria can rely on nobody but itself in this campaign. Syria's potential allies are neutralized militarily (Iraq), or politically (Jordan and Egypt). The chance of an economic front that would back Syria in a war on Israel is also faint. Saudi Arabia has an umbilical cord linking it to the US and it is hard to believe that it would jeopardize aid money by imposing an oil embargo in Syria's favor. In today's economic
(cont. pg. 14)

Premature War Alarm

Ephraim Kam



About one thing there should be no doubt: the positions of the Netanyahu government on issues related to the peace process, particularly regarding the Syrian track, should induce the Syrian leadership to reevaluate its policy toward Israel. It is true that the diplomatic process with Syrian has not yet come to a complete stalemate, and the Israeli government is trying to find ways to revive it. However, what the Syrians have learned thus far about the intentions of the Netanyahu government should make it clear to them that sooner or later they will have to formulate a policy on the basis of the assumption that negotiations with Israel will reach an impasse.

It is also clear that whatever conclusions Syria reaches will have consequences of the utmost importance to Israel. It is also possible that Israel will find itself groping in the dark for a long time trying to fully grasp Syria's intentions, especially if the Syrians come to a crossroads concerning a decision between peace and war. Thus, the Head of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, my colleague Prof. Zeev Maoz, performed an important public service in drawing attention to possible changes in the Syrian position.

Maoz's basic contention is that stalemate on the Syrian track means a significant increase in the likelihood of war between Israel and Syria. The contention itself is not new. About two years ago, Yitzhak Rabin led a campaign to emphasize the dangers inherent in a failure of negotiations with Syria, claiming that should a peace treaty with Syria not be attained, Syria might initiate a war with Israel within three to seven years. Obviously, an assessment of the dangers of war has highly practical consequences. Adopting the position that should Israel fail to attain a peace treaty with Syria, it would find itself at war within a few years, perforce leads to one of two far-reaching conclusions. One, Israel must become more flexible and strive for a peace treaty with Syria, even at the price of painful concessions; this was Rabin's claim. The alternative conclusion is recognizing the need to change priorities and prepare for war in the not distant future; this was Maoz's recommendation.

The basic question, naturally, is whether a protracted stalemate in the peace process will in fact lead Syria to take the path of war within a few years. Maoz answers in the affirmative, because he ascribes considerable weight to motivation: a stalemate in negotiations with Israel greatly increases Syrian motivation to embark upon a military course, with the aim of breaking the stalemate. It is true that under conditions of progress toward peace, Syrian motivation to go to war is much smaller than it would be in a stalemate. Yet, motivation for war is not the paramount matter. It is only one of several important considerations – and not necessarily the deciding one. It is a fact that in

(cont. pg. 15)

MIDDLE EAST MILITARY BALANCE

Ballistic Missiles in the Middle East*

Yiftah Shapir

**Historical background**

Ballistic missiles were introduced into the Middle East in the 1960s, soon after they began to play a significant role in global strategy. They have been used extensively in Middle Eastern conflicts since 1980. Iraq used them from the first days of its war with Iran; when Iran retaliated, Baghdad became the first capital in the

Middle East to be hit by ballistic missiles. By 1988, Iraq developed the Al-Hussayn missile that was capable of covering the 600 km from the Iraqi border to Tehran, and subsequently fired some 190 missiles on Iranian cities. Since the end of the war between Iran and Iraq, ballistic missiles have been used on several occasions, the most notable being in Afghanistan and, during the Gulf war, on Israel and Saudi Arabia.

Technical characteristics of ballistic missiles in the Middle East

The main characteristic of ballistic missiles is their ability to carry a payload over very long ranges, in a very short time. Yet, compared to the most advanced missiles used by the superpowers, almost all the ballistic missiles now in use in the Middle East are quite primitive, having limited capabilities:

- Range: Most of the missiles in use in the region are derivatives of the Scud, with ranges of 300-500 km. There are a few that have longer ranges: the North Korean Nodong, the Chinese Dong-Feng-3 (CSS-2), and the Jericho-2, allegedly operated by Israel. It is worth noting that in the Middle East, there is no need for a missiles with longer ranges.
- Accuracy: All the Scud derivatives have very limited accuracy. No missile in the Middle East is known to have terminal guidance, which refers to the capability to lock onto a target.
- Number of warheads: All known missiles in the Middle East have single warheads.
- Types of warheads: All ballistic missiles employed so far have carried conventional (HE) warheads. Iraq possessed chemical and biological warheads, which it did not use, and Syria is believed to have a large stockpile of chemical warheads.


- Propulsion: Most medium-range missiles available in the region are propelled by liquid fuel, which makes their operation quite cumbersome.

The purpose of ballistic missiles

Ballistic missiles do have some serious limitations. They are cumbersome, inaccurate and expensive, and, as long as they do not carry nonconventional warheads, they are capable of causing only limited damage. Yet, ballistic missiles continue to proliferate for several reasons.

First, they are capable of overcoming the limitations of air power. The role of ballistic missiles in war is quite similar to that of an air force – carrying explosive payloads to targets deep inside enemy territory. Usually aircraft would be much more cost-effective: they carry similar payloads, deliver them much more accurately, and return to be reloaded for additional missions. But aircraft are vulnerable to the various air defense systems. Thus, a country possessing an air force inferior to that of its adversaries, that cannot be counted on to deliver its payload, might consider using ballistic missiles instead.

Second, they may enhance artillery firepower. The role of artillery is equivalent to that of aircraft and ballistic missiles. Ballistic missiles can enhance the artillery in terms of range, size of the payload and sometimes accuracy.



Taken from Zeev Maoz, "The Evolution of the Middle East Military Balance, 1980-1994" *Middle East Military Balance, 1994-1995*, p. 88.

Third, possession of ballistic missiles is considered by many leaders as a source of national pride. Ballistic missiles symbolize power, invincibility, and the mastery of modern technology. Usually this is only a secondary consideration in the decision-making process, but sometimes it might become a major one. This could be

* This article is based on a chapter that appears in JCSS's *Middle East Military Balance*, published in January 1997.

the case regarding the Saudi decision to acquire the Chinese-made CSS-2, a missile far too complicated and with far too long a range for the apparent needs of the country.

The Role of Ballistic Missiles in National Strategies

Ballistic missiles also have several roles in national strategic planning. First, they serve a deterrent role – a warning to an enemy, that it might suffer severe punishment if it crosses certain thresholds or "red lines." It seems that when ballistic missiles first entered Middle Eastern arsenals, they were considered weapons of deterrence, even though they were armed only with conventional warheads. Arming the missiles with nonconventional warheads enhances their destructive power, and hence their deterrent value. The more frequently that conventionally armed missiles are actually used, however (e.g. in the role of a long range artillery), the less they will be perceived of as "severe punishment," with a concomitant lowering of their deterrent value. Ballistic missiles are also used to support the main battle effort by destroying important military installations in the rear. In addition, ballistic missiles are used to terrorize civilian populations, in order to break enemy morale and will to fight. By employing the missiles in this role, they become a weapon of coercion.


Supply Side Considerations

The parameters relevant to a state's decision to acquire ballistic missiles must include considerations of the supplier, which could play a crucial role in such a decision. Soviet ballistic missile sales to client states, like those of other weapons systems, served Soviet interests as much as they did those of the clients. But such client-patron relations have all but disappeared. The suppliers of the 1990s seek cash more than political influence. Thus, one cannot expect to find loyalties which had previously existed between arm vendors and procurers.

The Burden on National Economies

On the face of it, at \$1-1.5 million apiece, ballistic missiles seem very expensive weapons. For a few thousand dollars each, one may procure a Mk-84 bomb, which is just as lethal. Furthermore, to operate a ballistic missile brigade, it is necessary to allocate a force of 1,000-1,500 personnel, several hundred vehicles, and usually to construct heavily shielded bunkers. The total cost of acquiring and maintaining a missile brigade could reach millions of dollars.

The real cost, however, should be calculated against the alternative, which is a well equipped and well trained air force. For most countries in the Middle East, the latter option is not only much more expensive, but impossible. Thus, ballistic missiles can be seen not only as a cheap weapons system, but sometimes the only solution for a national security problem.



Considerations Relating to Local Manufacture of Ballistic Missiles

A different question is the cost of developing and maintaining a national industrial capability to produce such missiles. Almost all states in the Middle East with ballistic missile arsenals have attempted to build an indigenous production capability. There are several reasons for this.

First, the desire to gain independence from foreign suppliers. Even at the peak of the Cold War, the superpowers were cautious about selling their clients ballistic missiles. The ability of countries in the region to purchase ballistic missiles diminished with the advance of arms control processes, such as the INF treaty and the introduction of the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in 1987. Thus, acquiring the capability to produce the missiles has become more important than acquiring the missiles themselves.

Second, the desire to enhance a state's technological level. Production of ballistic missiles involves many aspects of modern technology. However, the basic production requirements are not beyond the reach of underdeveloped countries. Thus, for many countries in the Middle East, the production of ballistic missiles has provided a convenient route towards acquiring advanced technical capabilities.

Several countries in the Middle East have taken this route. Syria, Egypt and Iran purchased the capability to assemble the Scud-C from North Korea. Iraq developed the capability to improve the missiles from the Scud family, namely the Al-Hussayn, Al Abbas and Al-Abed missiles. Egypt and Iraq went further in the 1980s, with their attempt to construct the Condor-II (Badr-2000) missile, together with Argentina. Israel took a slightly different route, relying mainly on indigenous capabilities. Israel has thus managed to build a sophisticated space industry, with the capability to launch satellites. This industry has recently entered the competitive international markets for satellite launches. ►

RESEARCH IN PROGRESS

The Quest for a Regional Security System

Dr. Mark A. Heller

This study, which is supported by a grant from the United States Institute of Peace, focuses on one of the central issues emerging in the political discourse of the post-Cold War Middle East: the quest for a new regional security system. Evidence of interest in this issue includes the multilateral negotiations, in which Arabs and Israelis have been engaged since 1992, and the call for the institutionalization of security relations through the establishment of a Conference for Security and Cooperation in the Middle East (CSCME), modeled on the 1975 Helsinki Process, which appears in the 1994 Israeli-Jordanian Treaty of Peace. In early 1996, U.S. Secretary of Defense William Perry and former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres set up a joint working group to explore the possibilities of a new security system for the region.

There has been a keen debate in the literature of international relations over whether such institutions actually contribute to stability. Behind this debate are differing assumptions about whether or not regional security systems are merely Wilsonian models for collective

security that ignore the foundations of political realism.

After analyzing these theoretical considerations, this study proposes to examine the national interests of the actors in the Middle East regarding the creation of a regional security system. Until now, Middle East experts have often been



unfamiliar with the literature that exists on regional security in other contexts, while experts on regional security systems elsewhere, particularly in Europe, have been

unfamiliar with the complexities of the Middle East. This study aims to fill this gap while considering how such institutions might serve to promote mutual interests and protect the Arab-Israeli peace process from many of the uncertainties of the future.

As presently conceived, the project will be based on parallel studies by the National Center for Middle East Studies in Egypt, the Department for Disarmament and Security Studies in Jordan, and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Israel. Using materials collected from the Arab-Israeli multilateral negotiations and from the experiences of institutions in Europe (the CSCE/OSCE and the EU) and Asia (ASEAN), each center will examine the applicability to the Middle East of models developed elsewhere and suggest specific refinements and/or alternatives from its own national perspective. In the final stage, the three centers will attempt to reconcile and integrate their different ideas. To the extent that this proves possible, the conclusion of the study might provide the basis of a model applicable to the Middle East.

Ballistic Missiles (Cont. from pg. 11)

Conclusion

Ever since ballistic missiles were introduced into the Middle East, their relative importance has increased steadily, and they are now a major factor in the strategic thinking of the countries in the region.

Ballistic missiles play an important role not only as weapons, but also as an important economic factor. They are a vehicle for achieving technological know-how, are marketable goods in international markets, and cause for massive investment in expensive anti-ballistic missile projects.

In the future we can expect two different trends. The

first is a growing propensity to use conventionally armed missiles in various war scenarios, due to their increasing availability, and possible greater accuracy in the future. One can expect greater numbers of missiles deployed in the future, though the change will not be drastic in the present decade. The second trend will be toward enhanced importance of nonconventionally armed missiles in the region. Either way, due to their growing significance, missiles and nonconventional weapons will be a factor that will have to be taken into account in the framework of the ongoing peace process in the Middle East. ■

INSIDE JCSS

PROFILE OF A RESEARCHER

Emily Landau



Emily Landau has been with JCSS since 1985, first as a research assistant to Dr. Ariel

Levite on the JCSS project dealing with Israel's national security, and recently as a researcher. She took her BA (1985, magna cum laude) in Political Science and English Literature and her MA (1991, magna cum laude) in Political Science from Tel Aviv University. She is currently a PhD candidate in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University, Jerusalem.

Ms. Landau is in charge of the information infrastructure of two ongoing projects at JCSS: Israel's national security, and arms control in the Middle East. Her current research focus is the arms control and regional security process in the Middle East — both the official ACRS talks, as well as the many and varied informal "Track II" efforts.

Ms. Landau has published on issues relating to CSBMs in the Middle East, and Arab perceptions of Israel's qualitative edge. She is coauthor of ***Israel's Security 1967-1991: An Annotated Bibliography and Research Guide***, Moshe Grundman, ed. (Ma'arachot, MOD Publishing House, 1992), and, with Ariel Levite, of ***Israel's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture***, (Hebrew) (Tel Aviv: Papyrus, 1994). She has also contributed in recent years to JCSS's annual ***Middle East Military Balance***.

Born in Boston, MA in 1960, Ms. Landau moved to Israel with her family in 1974. She currently lives in Ra'anana with her husband Giora, a lawyer, and her two children, Guy (7) and Tamar (3).

NEW RESEARCHER AT JCSS

Ariel T. Sobelman



Dr. Ariel T. Sobelman joined the JCSS research staff in 1997. For several years he has been involved at the Weizmann Institute of Science in the area of advanced high-speed computer network performance, modeling, and development of routing algorithms.

In 1995 Ariel Sobelman earned his PhD in computer science for his graduate research conducted jointly at the Weizmann Institute and at the University of Maryland at College Park, where he also held the position

of visiting scientist. Working at TERENA (Trans European Research and Education Networking Association) in Amsterdam (1996), Dr. Sobelman began applying the theoretics of his earlier research in several pan-European projects providing for the connectivity needs for advanced networking.

Dr. Sobelman is now widening the scope of his research to explore the emergent field of Information Warfare (IW) as it touches upon other areas of strategic interests.

pressure on the US to actively intervene in the negotiations.

According to the second scenario, there will be a radical change in Arab-Israel relations due to the deadlock in talks with the Palestinians and disappointment in Jordan over the fruits of peace. Here too, war may bring Syria to a leadership role and make the Palestinians and even the Jordanians line up behind the Syrian position. In both scenarios, an inability to ignite the negotiations through a military initiative may worsen Syria's international position.

Militarily, the willingness to wage war could be based on two options: defining limited objectives and thus a limited war, or a willingness to take high risks by striking at the Israeli home front. The limited war scenario assumes that Syria has a monopoly on the opening move and the termination of the war. As long as Israel has the Golan Heights, the option of a pre-emptive Israeli strike is politically unfeasible. Moving the war over to Syrian territory will create severe diplomatic difficulties and will increase the probability of other Arab states joining the fray. As with all previous wars, an Arab initiative to impose a cease-fire will always enjoy widespread international support.

Another option stems from the fact that Syrian frustration at the international situation will continue to grow to the point where Syria will be willing to take risks and make

sacrifices. The only area in which Syria can inflict real damage—if not militarily then definitely psychologically—is in the home front.

The danger to Syria is of course, a massive Israeli retaliation against comparable targets in Syria. The level of danger from the Syrian point of view is not dependent on Israel's capability, but rather on Syria's readiness to absorb losses in order to achieve political goals. Risks that are unacceptable when there are diplomatic options may become acceptable if Syria felt it had its back to the wall or that time was working against it.

There is no certainty that conditions that would make war a feasible option for Syria will appear in the near future. Because, as much as the territorial and international status quo is bad for Syria, a war could have far worse consequences. Nevertheless, the main argument is that the longer the diplomatic deadlock continues, the greater Syria's motivation will be to resort to military options, and its willingness to make sacrifices will also increase.

The military problem, as Syria sees it, could be redefined: instead of asking how do we win a war, they might ask how can we limit the military damage or how can we obtain a symbolic military victory. Worse still, instead of relating to limitation of military losses, the issue could become Syria's

willingness to suffer losses in return for an Israeli bloodletting and a blow to their national morale by launching a massive attack against Israel's home front.

The Netanyahu government has the legitimate right to change the policies implemented by the previous government on the Syrian front even if there are no public statements to that effect. But it must consider the possible ramifications of such a change. It should be stated plainly that such a war, like the Yom Kippur war will not begin because Syria will try to destroy Israel but because the Syrian diplomatic initiative failed. The idea of "Peace with the Golan" is a fantasy, as there are no buyers on the Syrian side. So the choice is "Peace or the Golan." If Israel chooses to keep the Golan under its sovereignty, the government should tell the people in a clear voice that we may well have to defend this sovereignty with force. And it may well be that the main victims will be Israeli population centers.

Even if the government cannot, for political reasons, send this message to the people, it must put this message across to the defense establishment and to give it tools to deal with the increased likelihood of war, especially considering the new threats that stem from the increased Syrian ability to strike at the home front. ■

Translated by: Israel News Today

Premature War Alarm (Cont. from p. 7)

the period 1974-91 there was a complete stalemate in relations between Israel and Syria, but Syria did not try to break it with a military move, because it accorded priority to considerations of military balance and geostrategic circumstances.

It was not merely a matter of chance that Syria decided to join the peace

process only in 1991. That decision was a direct outcome of a gradual, ongoing process in which several bullwarks of Syria's national security concept collapsed: the collapse of its Soviet strategic pillar, which meant the loss of a superpower safety net in the event of military hardship; loss of the prospect of Arab military participation in a war; and the

undermining of expectations for a narrowing of the qualitative gap with Israel (the effort to achieve this had contributed to an economic crisis in Syria over the past decade). These and other factors convinced the Syrians to avoid a military move, and even, for the first time in years, to refrain from threatening such a move, because the dangers inherent

in such actions far outweighed the prospects.

Prof. Maoz answers the above in the following manner: true, but the Syrians are liable to go to war in order to break the stalemate, even if they believe that a war will end in a draw, or even their defeat – as Sadat had adapted his military objectives in 1973 to his political needs. This contention is not sufficiently convincing. A country does not go to war if it believes it will be defeated. Neither is the parallel to Sadat valid. Sadat did not go to war on the assumption he would lose it. He defined limited military objectives for himself, on the assumption that attaining them would get a political process moving. In embarking on his course, Sadat enjoyed strategic advantages Syria does not currently have: Syria, and eventually Iraq, took part in that war; the Soviet Union stood by Sadat; and the prospect of the United States taking advantage of his move to move the political process forward appeared greater at the time than it does now.

What will Asad do if the stalemate continues? On the one hand, there is no realistic chance of his agreeing to a political arrangement that does not involve the return to him of the Golan Heights. On the other hand, going to war involves serious dangers, and neither are the

prospects exceedingly bright: Asad has no assurance that the United States would want to take advantage of the results of a war to move toward a political settlement closer to his terms. He has no basis for expecting a war to exhaust Israel and spur it into accepting his conditions for a settlement. In fact, the opposite might turn out to be the case: war might strengthen Israeli determination to hold on to the Golan. Furthermore, it is doubtful if Syria would be able to drag the Arab world into such a war, the large majority of which currently opposes an Arab-Israeli war.

There is a third way, though: neither peace nor war. This was the path Asad took between 1974 and 1991, and he may also see it as the most reasonable path for him in the future. Neither is this a passive approach: it could be used to exact an increasing price from Israel in Lebanon; to mar the process of reconciliation between Israel and the Arabs; and to try to stick a wedge between Israel and the United States. Thus, such an approach could be used by Syria to prepare conditions for a future renewal of negotiations under more promising conditions – perhaps after the next elections in Israel.

The intention here is not to deny that Syria has a military option, or to

dismiss the possibility that a halt of the peace process could eventually lead to war. However, the connection between the two is not automatic or necessary. What would raise the possibility of war is a change in the totality of factors. Syrian conduct over the past generation shows that from among all relevant factors, they attach paramount importance to the strategic balance of military forces. Whoever claims that the likelihood of war with Syria has increased must first point to the factors that are liable to change the way its leaders read the strategic and military map.

None of this touches upon the need for caution. No one has a monopoly on being able to discern the future, or is immune to faulty analysis, the price of which may be high indeed. The failure of many countries to correctly assess the likelihood of war requires that Israel's defense forces and intelligence community show the utmost vigilance. This, lest the above assumptions prove to be mistaken, and Syria's considerations different than those outlined here. This is all the more so when political circumstances are in a state of flux. If signals are received that indicate approaching war, it is imperative not to persist in assumptions such as these, but rather to scrutinize such signals with the utmost openness of mind. ■



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