

**M**aj.-Gen. Danny Rothschild, who until recently served as coordinator of government activities in the territories, delivered the annual Simon Syrkin memorial lecture on February 15, 1995. Rothschild began by reviewing the expectations that the Israelis and the Palestinians had following the signing of the Oslo agreement, and the disappointments that came in their wake. On the Palestinian side, there was hope (after the implementation of the first stage of the agreement in May 1994) that IDF soldiers would no longer be seen in Gaza and Jericho, and that the economic situation would improve. While the first expectation was fulfilled, the second was not; the fact that economic conditions have deteriorated creates fertile ground for the growth of radical Islam. As to the Israelis, there was hope that personal security would be enhanced, yet this too has not come about.

As to Arafat's leadership role, Rothschild said that when Arafat arrived in Gaza, he



Maj.-Gen. Danny Rothschild delivers the annual Syrkin Lecture.

## The Palestinian Authorities - Where to?

saw himself as above all the divisions and conflicts among the Palestinians, but he quickly realized that he would not be able to continue in this role. During his first days in Gaza, Arafat recruited to the local police members of the organization that came from Libya and Yemen. These recruits were not familiar with the language, the conditions of daily life, and

the accepted rules of the game. Arafat realized that they could not fulfill their role, and he then recruited additional forces from among the local population who had carried out the Intifadah, with the hope that they would be more successful in dealing with the task of maintaining internal security. For this reason the police force has more than doubled - from 7000 to 15,000 men. According to Rothschild, these local recruits are the ones that will be best able to carry out their duties; in his opinion, mistakes that were made at the outset have been corrected, and the system is beginning to operate as it should.

Rothschild stressed that Israel must make every effort to help the Palestinian authorities stand on their own economically, including assistance in creating employment opportunities. At the same time, the authorities have begun organizing in order to absorb funds from the contributing states. The Palestinian population that was under Israeli control for 27 years understands how democracy works; they have learned how to formulate their demands, and understand the power of the media. During the Intifadah they used the media against Israel, and today they are using these same means against their own leadership.

# Continuity and Innovation

## The Future Outlook of JCSS

**T**he changing of the guard at the post of Head of Center provides me with the opportunity to share some of the ideas I have formulated upon assuming office.

The basic approach I wish to follow is continuity and innovation. I am committed to the goals set out by Arale, namely, that JCSS should focus its research and public activities on issues of major importance to Israel's national security - past, present, and future. We will continue to develop and publish research that is relevant and useful in aiding the policy and security community in its analysis of pertinent problems, planning of future policies and evaluating past and present ones. We will continue to maintain our objectivity, independence, and pluralism. Activity at JCSS will seek to contribute to public knowledge about, and understanding of, national and international security issues. We seek, through our publications, conferences, seminars, and public appearances, to help base the public discussion of these issues on more accurate data and more rational and reasoned analysis.

I hope to implement some innovations in the Center's work. Innovation implies change, but change is due not only to the personality, interests, and background of the new Head of Center. It is also a result of the fact that the Middle East, in general, and Israel's national security in particular, are undergoing dramatic transformations. In order to stay "ahead of the news," we need to adjust both our research agenda and our ways of thinking about new challenges and opportunities that have emerged in recent years. I believe that we need to focus more on regional problems and their impact on Israel's national security. JCSS's general statement of purpose has conceived of "strategic studies" in broad terms, that is, as an area of inquiry and policy that includes economic, social, and political processes. The Center will expand research and public discussions on these issues.

We are concerned, and rightly so, about the resurgence of radical Islam in many Arab states. But we have not done enough to understand the strategic implications of the possible rise of radical

Islamic regimes in states such as Egypt, Syria, or Jordan. Nor have we explored the possible threats posed by economic problems in various Arab states to the future of the cooperative relations which seem to be emerging in the region. The peace process promises major opportunities for cooperation, prosperity, and stability. However, it would be irresponsible to assume that this is irreversible. We cannot afford to ignore processes and problems that may threaten peace and stability in the region. Nor can we stop exploring new opportunities that global and regional changes may present.

Accordingly, and in addition to the existing projects listed above, JCSS is undertaking a number of projects that fall into the category of what I call "innovations."

1. Special Issue of *The Journal of Strategic Studies*. This prestigious academic journal has provided us with a unique opportunity to edit a special issue on Regional Security in the Middle East: Past, Present, and Future. This issue will be based both on studies written by JCSS research associates and by scholars outside the Center. If this special issue works out well, as we are confident it will, we will continue this project on an annual basis, with each such issue devoted to a different subject. This is an important opportunity to enhance the reputation of



**Prof. Zeev Maoz, Head of JCSS**

**Dr. Ephraim Kam, Deputy Head of JCSS**

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the Center within the international community of scholars engaged in teaching and research on national and international security affairs.

2. The Yariv Seminar on Issues in Israel's National Security. This bi-weekly seminar series started in February 1995 and will provide a permanent forum for considering diverse topics concerning Israel's national security, with an eye toward the future. We bring together for this forum leading academics, senior officials in the government and the security community, senior IDF officers, and political leaders from the entire spectrum of parties. This is designed to provide an open setting for discussion and debate on a wide variety of issues. We feel that, along with other activities to memorialize Arale, this will become a long-lasting tribute to the kind of person he was and the ideas he cherished.

3. The Middle East Toward the 21st Century. This project explores the future evolution of the region in terms of security affairs, economics, physical and human infrastructure, and social and cultural issues. This project will be based on cooperation between JCSS and other research centers in the Arab world, in the United States, and in Europe. We have already received expressions of interest by leading research centers and by various scholars in Israel and abroad. The plan is to make this one of the central collective research efforts at JCSS over the next few years.

JCSS could not have become what it is today without the generous financial, moral, and substantive support of our friends in Israel, North America, and Europe. We plan to maintain and solidify our relations with our community of friends and supporters. We are embarking on a project of memorializing Arale. We are beginning work, along with

Mr. Joseph Alpher, former acting Head of JCSS, left the Center to direct the Jerusalem office of the American Jewish Committee (AJC). Mr. Alpher served as Deputy Head of the Center from 1987 to 1993, when he was appointed director. Mr. Alpher was succeeded by Col. (res.) Dr. Ephraim Kam.

We wish Yossi and Ephraim much success in their new positions.



The New Head of JCSS Prof. Zeev Maoz

some of our friends, on a fundraising campaign toward the establishment of the Yariv Building that is intended to become the home of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies. We see this as a permanent memorial to the founder and first head of JCSS and hope that our old and new friends will help us realize this goal. JCSS will preserve many of its traditions. It will also change in some ways. Many of these changes represent natural developments, others reflect a change in emphasis.

My hope is that these changes will enhance the Center's reputation and contribution, without detracting from those traditions that helped make JCSS a distinguished resource of research, writing, and analysis on national and international security problems.

*Zeev Maoz*

## Zeev Maoz, New Head of JCSS

Prof. Zeev Maoz joined JCSS in 1994 as Head of Center. He completed undergraduate studies and an MA in international relations at the Hebrew University in 1978, and received his PhD in political science from the University of Michigan in 1981. Prof. Maoz served as a professor and chairman of the Department of Political Science at the University of Haifa, where he also directed the Center of Policy and Security Studies and the MA program in national security of the National Defense College of the IDF. Prof. Maoz has held appointments as a visiting fellow at Carnegie-Mellon University (1981-1982) and as a visiting professor of politics at New York University (1985-1989). Professor Maoz specializes in international relations theory, strategic and international security affairs, international negotiations,

and foreign policy decisionmaking. He is the author of four books: *Paths to Conflict: International Dispute Initiation, 1816-1976* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1982); *National Choices and International Processes* (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1990); *Paradoxes of War: On the Art of National Self-Entrapment* (Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990); and *Domestic Sources of Global Change* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1995). He has published over 40 articles in scholarly journals such as *The American Political Science Review*, *World Politics*, *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *International Studies Quarterly* and others. He is the 1989 recipient of the Karl Deutsch Award of the International Studies Association for his scholarly contribution to international relations and peace research.

# Yariv Conference

## State of the Nation Toward 1995

**O**n December 29, 1994 JCSS held a one-day conference in memory of the late Maj.-Gen. Aharon Yariv, the Center's founding Head. Israeli President Ezer Weizman delivered opening remarks in memory of Yariv, in which he spoke about their mutual experiences. He noted the foresightedness of the Yariv - Shem-Tov formula, which set forth conditions for initiating negotiations with the PLO. This formula was not accepted at the time it was presented, but is today viewed in a different light.

The speakers at the conference related to different aspects of Israel's strategic setting as it enters a new year, and the challenges that will be faced. Maj.-Gen. Uzi Dayan, Head of IDF Planning Branch, reviewed the security situation in the region, and assessed possible developments. He described several scenarios for the coming years that are included in the IDF's long-range plan and that will have an impact on the strategic reality in the Middle East. Dayan noted the threat from Iran, particularly in light of its nuclear potential. He claimed that due to shortcuts that may be taken by Iran in its quest for nuclear weapons, Israel may be forced to make decisions regarding this threat as early as 1995. Together with the comments by "highly-placed Israeli-officials" as quoted in the *New York Times* - who stated

that this decision may take the form of an attack on Iran's nuclear facilities - Dayan's statement elicited a sharp Iranian reaction which consisted of counter-threats to Israel in the event of such an attack. MK Binyamin Netanyahu (Chairman of the Likud) presented his views on Israel's situation in the coming years. He claimed that the present government has broken the national consensus; in his view, in light of the regional situation, the peace agreements must be based on security. He referred to the Iranian nuclear threat as the major threat facing Israel.

Prof. Ephraim Ya'ar (Tami Steinmetz Center for Peace Research) presented results of various public opinion surveys conducted by the Steinmetz Center which included data on Israeli attitudes regarding the peace process. According to these surveys, there is relatively stable

that have accompanied their implementation. If the percentage of supporters and opponents of the peace process remains constant and roughly equal among the population, Ya'ar concluded that when the government faces critical decisions regarding the peace process, it will have to turn to the public, and take its opinions into account.

The remaining four lectures related to different aspects of Israel in its regional setting.

Maj.-Gen. (res.) David Ivry (General Director of the Ministry of Defense) opened the second session with an overview of the progress of the Multilateral Working Group on Arms Control and Regional Security (ACRS) in the Middle East, in his capacity as head of the Israeli delegation. He emphasized that the goal of these negotiations is

## Israel and the Strategic Realities in the Middle East

and ongoing support for the peace process, even in light of the harsh events

regional security, not necessarily arms control as such. He described the nature of the working group, the negotiating norms, and the agenda for discussions. According to Ivry, Israel's approach is regional in conception; Israel has reservations regarding global solutions such as the NPT.

The success of the working group may be seen in the generally positive atmosphere that has developed, or in the fact that discussions have been moved to the Middle East, although Ivry pointed out that the time is not yet ripe to suggest conducting a session in Israel. One of the continuing obstacles to progress is the non-participation of some of the countries relevant to the discussions. On the positive side, Ivry emphasized that one of the most important means for making progress in these negotiations is by focusing on those questions where consensus may conceivably be achieved, rather than centering on the clear points of conflict.



**President Ezer Weizman delivers the opening remarks at the annual conference in memory of Maj.-Gen. Aharon Yariv, founding head of JCSS.**





Chairman of Likud Binyamin Netanyahu addresses the conference. Seated (l. to r.) Maj.-Gen. Uzi Dayan, President Ezer Weizman, Prof. Yoram Dinstein (President of TAU), Prof. Zeev Maoz (JCSS Head) and Maj.-Gen. (res.) Meir Amit.



Prof. Haim Ben-Shahar (The Extraordinary Chair for Economic Policy) described Israel's economic situation today and the prospects for peacetime. Ben-Shahar detailed the economic growth in Israel since the mid-1980s; as explanations for this growth he cited the disappearance of the Iron Curtain, massive immigration to Israel, the peace process, the opening of new markets to Israel, and structural changes in Israel's economy. Regarding prospects for economic integration, Ben-Shahar claimed that the most interesting regional option for Israel is the Persian Gulf. For other states in the Middle East, Israeli economic activity is likely to be interpreted as, and even to become, hegemonic. The greatest economic potential for Israel is to be found outside the Middle East.

Prof. Zeev Maoz (Head of Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies) focused on the development of the Middle East military balance in the past 15 years, using an integrative approach which takes into account both military and economic variables. According to his analysis of the data, there was a significant decline in the conventional threat to Israel, even before the peace process began. Israel's conventional strength has increased even in light of a reduced defense budget, due

to accelerated economic growth. At the same time, a dangerous arms race in the realm of long-range surface-to-surface missiles has developed, which points to a dangerous technological leap in the region, and also signifies the expansion of the circle of threats facing Israel.

Dr. Dore Gold (JCSS) focused on the development of US-Israeli relations in the


past and today. He described the model of relations that was created at the time of the Separation of Forces Agreement in Sinai in 1975, and claimed that it would be difficult to speak of a continuation of this model in the present negotiations, primarily due to reduced US defense budgets and a reduced sense of commitment on the part of the US. Israel is unique in the new isolationist policy of the US. On the basis of statements made by US congressmen, Gold claimed that there is a need to realize the connection between future US aid to Israel and current US strategic interests.



(l. to r.) Ya'acov Nimrodi and former president Haim Herzog.

## New Book

# Israel's Nuclear Image



**I**srael's Nuclear Image: Arab Perceptions of Israel's Nuclear Posture, by Ariel Levite and Emily Landau (Hebrew - Papyrus Publishing House, December 1994), is based on research which analyzes the attitudes of Arab statesmen, academics and commentators toward Israel's perceived nuclear activity, as expressed publicly by them over the course of the years since 1960. The descriptions of the attitudes expressed in each of the major Arab states (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Libya, Iraq, and the Gulf states) and within the PLO are accompanied by comparisons between the findings in the different countries, as well as by discussion of dominant common themes. The study includes description and analysis of general trends in Arab attitudes over time.

The study attempts to provide answers to a number of questions of historical, political and practical significance, solely on the basis of unclassified Arab publications. These questions include the Arab view of Israel's motives for pursuing its nuclear potential, the exact nature of the potential attributed to Israel, the perceived significance of this potential and the implications that follow from it, and the preferred means of dealing with the perceived threat as evident from Arab sources. The study also relates to broader questions regarding the effect of Israel's nuclear image on its deterrence posture, as well as the interrelations between Arab attitudes toward Israel's nuclear potential and their views regarding the Arab-Israeli conflict in general.

The authors found that Arab sources have dealt extensively with Israel's assumed nuclear capability over the years. Their public statements and assessments since late 1960 reflect a widespread belief that this is a strategic issue with far-reaching implications for the Middle East in general, and the Arab-Israeli conflict in particular. Interestingly enough, the salience attributed to Israel's nuclear potential derives not only, or even primarily, from the actual potential for large scale destruction of nuclear weapons. In fact, in Arab eyes, nuclear weapons are a superpower status symbol that signifies

technological advancement and qualitative superiority. As such, it captures the essence of the tremendous gap between the Arabs and the west in the realm of scientific-technological advancement.

The particularly widespread discussion of Israel's assumed nuclear capability since the latter half of the 1980s seems to indicate an internalization of the idea that Israel has a large and varied nuclear arsenal, whereas the Arab states have no clear answer to this challenge. There are a number of Arab approaches for dealing with the perceived threat of nuclear weapons - the authors found that the relatively moderate states (Egypt, Jordan,

favor a political/diplomatic response, whereas the more radical states, including opposition parties in the moderate states, favor developing a strategic response. For both, Israel's nuclear potential is an issue that is outside the bounds of the Arab-Israeli military balance. The perceived need to close the scientific-technological gap with the West is a significant destabilizing factor in the Middle East that will, in the absence of an effective Arab response, probably characterize the region as long as the nuclear issue remains open.

A widely held view in the Arab world is that Israel's nuclear monopoly has existed in the Middle East for quite some time, and that this prevents the Arabs from posing a threat to Israel's very existence. The probability of a nuclear response on the part of Israel becomes more remote in Arab eyes as the nature of the Arab threat moves away from an existential threat. Thus, they are not deterred from initiating limited military action against Israel.

The authors found that Israel's nuclear image seems to have had an important impact on the Arab assessment regarding the possibility of defeating Israel militarily. The overall Arab perceptions of Israel's military power (both

conventional and nonconventional), strategic strength (due to US support), and the constraints on action in the current world order have together brought various Arab states to the realization that they must adopt a different strategy in their struggle against Israel. This entails either fighting below the nuclear threshold and attempting to develop their own nonconventional capability, or working toward a peaceful resolution of the conflict, including disarmament initiatives directed at Israel's assumed nuclear arsenal. The future impact of Israel's nuclear image is also examined, particularly in light of the ongoing peace process. In this context the authors assess the Egyptian stance regarding the need to deal with Israel's nuclear potential.



## U.S. Defense Policy in the Middle East:

# Between the Mediterranean and Persian Gulf

**T**he end of the Cold War and the defeat of Iraq in the Gulf War have completely altered the strategic landscape in the Middle East and created new opportunities for U.S.-Israeli strategic relations. This was the consensus of American and Israeli military experts attending the JCSS symposium, "Between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf: U.S. Defense Policy in the Middle East."

Dr. Dore Gold, Director of the U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Project, organized the conference. He noted that historically American security planners had separated the Mediterranean from the Persian Gulf into two distinct defense sectors. The former was regarded as part of the southern flank of NATO while the latter was treated separately in the context of the defense of world oil resources.



Dr. Dore Gold (JCSS) addresses the Conference.



(l. to r.) Admiral (ret.) William D. Smith, Dr. Bradford Dismukes, and Prof. Anthony Cordesman.

Since 1983, the Mediterranean had been the responsibility of the U.S. European Command, while the Persian Gulf was under the U.S. Central Command. The 1991 Gulf War showed that this division was artificial. American B-52 bombers took off from bases in Britain and Spain, while 84% of the military equipment that came to the Gulf actually came through the European theater.

Dr. Bradford Dismukes of the Center for Naval Analysis, a former Captain in U.S. Naval Intelligence in Europe, noted that in recent years, the U.S. Navy had already made as a planning assumption the unification of these two theaters. Participants suggested that Israel, which had previously been placed in the area of

responsibility of the U.S. European Command, might have a significant role to play as an American defense partner in the Persian Gulf.

Admiral (ret.) William D. Smith, also with the Center for Naval Analysis, thought that homeporting an American aircraft carrier in Haifa might be useful, although Congress may not be so willing to close up bases in the U.S. and open new ones overseas. Smith estimated that the U.S. would continue to be committed to the defense of the Mediterranean, and would find ways of implementing this policy goal.

Prof. Anthony Cordesman, a fellow at the Wilson Center, noted that it would be

*Cont. on p. 12*

# Israeli-Syrian Security Arrangements: U.S. Forces on the Golan Heights

Even before the onset of the Washington debate, Dr. Dore Gold, Director of the U.S. Foreign and Defense Policy Project, released a Jaffee Center memorandum that examined whether it was in Israel's interest to have U.S. forces deployed on the Golan Heights in the context of a future Syrian-Israeli peace agreement. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs took a close interest in the study and distributed the Hebrew version to those who follow the negotiations and are generally concerned with U.S.-Israel relations.

The Gold study preceded the other major works that have been published in the public domain on this subject. Gold's analysis, in fact, is cited in *Supporting Peace*, the report of the Washington Institute Study Group, and even more extensively in the report of the Center for Security Policy. But while touching on how a Golan deployment might affect American interests, Gold looks at this question from a distinctly Israeli perspective, as opposed to these other works.

Gold outlines several different peacekeeping roles for the U.S. on the Golan Heights. He traces the development of the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in Sinai, which has only a minimalistic role of "monitoring" the limited forces zones that were created by the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty. The MFO has included a lightly-armed American battalion since 1982. In an article he prepared for the *Wall Street Journal* last July, Gold summarized his study, stressing that he was not principally concerned with the issue of another monitoring force:


"The real problem with U.S. forces in the Golan Heights will not be a replication of the Sinai MFO. It will emerge should a more serious mission be given to any American peacekeepers. For example, it is likely that in the present negotiations, Israel will seek to retain its vital early-warning stations on the eastern Golan, even if they stay on land that comes to be recognized as being

under Syrian sovereignty. Yet Syria would look to the Egyptian precedent; no Israelis remained in early-warning stations in Sinai after Israel's 1982 withdrawal. In order to avoid the impasse, the Clinton administration might offer to put Americans in former Israeli facilities in the Golan Heights."

In other words, Gold is concerned about a very specific scenario, in which Israel's concept of "security arrangements" on the Golan Heights, in the event of withdrawal, are unacceptable to the Syrian side. When negotiations deadlock, he warns, the parties may be tempted to turn to the U.S. to provide a solution,

*Cont. on p. 12*

MAP NO. 1  
ISRAELI SALIENT IN SYRIA AFTER YOM KIPPUR WAR, AND  
DISENGAGEMENT AREAS FROM MAY 31, 1974





## JCSS Annual

## The Middle East Military Balance 1993-1994

**T**he Jaffee Center's annual Study of the military balance in the Middle East, published on November 15, 1994, contains an extensive treatment of the past year's very unusual developments in the Arab-Israeli peace process, including documentation of the bilateral agreements reached during the period. It also comprises four chapters that discuss diverse aspects of another urgent issue: the proliferation of strategic weaponry in the region. The *Balance* contains all new maps, as well as new tables on PRC and North Korean arm transfers to the Middle East. The 1993-1994 *Balance* is edited once again by Maj.-Gen. (res.) Shlomo Gazit; the data sections are again compiled and collated by Dr. Zeev Eytan.

Specific contributions to Part I of the *Balance* include an article by Shlomo Gazit on the peace process, an assessment of the significance of the Iranian threat to Israel by Ephraim Kam, and an analysis of the Clinton administration's military and political priorities with regard to the Middle East in 1993-1994 by Dore Gold. Two articles deal with terrorist activity directed against Israel: Anat Kurz assesses the interrelations between Palestinian terrorism and the evolving political context and Maskit Burgin elaborates upon the attacks by the Hizballah against Israel's northern settlements, with particular emphasis on Israel's large-scale military operation "Accountability" in Southern Lebanon.

Zeev Bonen focuses on the impact of technological developments on the conventional strategic balance in the Middle East; Ariel Levite and Emily Landau assess contemporary Arab perceptions of Israel's qualitative edge in the security domain - their sources, manifestations, and security implications. The final two chapters of the section on strategic developments focus on the proliferation of nonconventional weapons in the Middle East, by Yiftah Shapir, and the progress made in 1993-1994 in laying the foundations for an arms control process in the region, by Shai Feldman.

## The Yariv Seminar- First Lectures

**T**his February, JCSS inaugurated The Yariv Seminar on Israel's national security. The Yariv Seminar will be held on a bi-weekly basis. The lectures this year focus on Israel's security in transition from confrontation to peace.

The opening lecture of the series was delivered by Prof. Shlomo Avineri (Hebrew University), on The New World Order and the Middle East. The second lecture - on the new Middle East reality and its implications on the peace process - was presented by Prof. Gabriel Ben-Dor (Haifa University). The third lecture was delivered by Maj.-Gen. (res.) Israel Tal, entitled "The Transformation from Confrontation to Peace: Implications for Israel's Security Concept."



Prof. Z. Maoz and Prof. Shlomo Avineri.



Dr. Ephraim Kam, Deputy Head of JCSS and Maj.-Gen. (Res.) Israel Tal.

# Final Status Issues: Israel - Palestinians

## JCSS Research Series

In October 1994, the Jaffee Center introduced a new series of short studies that examine the primary components of a future permanent settlement between Israel and the Palestinians. The studies, seven in number, represent the individual efforts of JCSS researchers.

The functional issues to be discussed in Israeli-Palestinian final status negotiations were specified in the Oslo Declaration of Principles, signed in Washington DC on September 13, 1993.

The JCSS series focuses primarily on these issues: Jerusalem, security arrangements, political status, settlements and borders, refugees, and American involvement. The series also includes two studies that will bear directly on the conduct of permanent status negotiations: standards for assessing the success or failure of the interim stages; and Israeli public opinion regarding final status arrangements.

The overall objective of the series is to inform decisionmakers and enrich the

public discussion about the likely options that Israel will encounter as it enters into detailed final status negotiations with the Palestinians, beginning no later than May 1996.

Each JCSS researcher examines and analyzes the likely and feasible alternatives for a final settlement with regard to a specific functional area, and assesses all pertinent factors, including the Palestinian position, in order to establish the advantages and disadvantages for Israel of each alternative and, if considered pertinent, make policy recommendations.

Study no. 1 in the series, published in October, is *The Israel-PLO Agreement: What If It Fails? How Will We Know?* by Mark A. Heller (English only). Study no. 2 is Shlomo Gazit's *The Palestinian Refugee Problem*, and Study no. 3 is *Settlements and Borders*, by Joseph Alpher. Alpher is also the series editor. Study no. 4 by Aryeh Shalev is



*Options for Security Arrangements.* Study no. 5, entitled *The Political Framework of the Palestinian Entity*, was written by Ephraim Kam, and Study no. 6 is *Israeli Public Opinion*, by Yehuda Ben Meir.

## Guests at JCSS



Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin visited JCSS in June 1994. Mr. Aspin chats informally with former director of JCSS, Joseph Alpher (standing) and Dr. Mark Heller.

## CONGRATULATIONS

Professor Abraham Ben-Zvi was awarded the 1994 Landau prize for his book *The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship*. (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993).



## Tsheshik Prize Awarded to Kober, Maoz, and Nakdimon

**T**he \$10,000 Rachel and Lt.-Col. Meir Tsheshik Prize for studies in Israel's national security was divided among three researchers: Dr. Avi Kober of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, for his study on Military Decision in War: Theoretical Framework and An Analysis of the Israeli Case; Prof. Moshe Maoz, of the Hebrew University, Jerusalem, for his study on Syria and Israel: From War to Peace, 1948-1994; and Mr. Shlomo Nakdimon of the Yediot Aharonot daily newspaper, for his study: Black Hole: Israel, the United States, and Iraq, 1981-1991. The award ceremony took place on March 26, 1995. The keynote speaker at the ceremony was Mr. Moshe Arens, former Minister of Defense who spoke about "Intelligence and National Security Policy." The Tsheshik Prize in memory of Rachel and Lt.-Col. Meir Tsheshik will be awarded annually for outstanding research on Israel's national security.



Prof. Moshe Maoz and Mr. Shlomo Nakdimon

## JCSS Visits China

In March 1995, JCSS Head Prof. Zeev Maoz and Senior Research Associate Dr. Mark Heller spent 10 days in China visiting various research institutes.

(l.) Prof. Maoz, with Gen. Xu Xin, Chairman of the China Institute for International Strategic Studies.

(r.) Dr. Heller and Prof. Maoz, with Prof. Xu Dan, Vice President, and other staff members of the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations.



## U.S. Defense Policy in the Middle East

*Cont. from p. 7*

just as much trouble to load U.S. equipment stored in Israel onto ships bound for the Persian Gulf as it would be to take it from ports along the Atlantic coastline in the U.S. Maj.-General Menahem Meron, who led Israel's first strategic talks with the U.S. in 1983, suggested that an overland route to Saudi Arabia could address this problem. Several speakers remarked that such routes would grow in importance, in the event that the Suez Canal was closed.

Cordesman described the fact that in comparison with what it maintained in 1985, the U.S. was cutting back its forces by 35%. But the defense budget was being slashed by 42%. Thus there was a clear gap between the Clinton Administration's defense plans and the expenditures it was willing to put out for national defense. Thus it was far from clear whether the U.S. could even afford the reduced force that had been proposed by the Defense Department's 1994-1999 "Bottom-Up Review".

Nevertheless, Cordesman emphasized that the U.S. had several sources of strength in the future: prepositioning of equipment in the Middle East and planned increases in sealift and airlift. Moreover, U.S. fighter aircraft would have a far greater number of precision-guided munitions than in the Gulf War.

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## U.S. Forces on the Golan Heights

*Cont. from p. 8*

which would be based on enhancing the mission of any American Golan force from simple monitoring to round-the-clock early warning or even to deterrence by trip-wire forces of a surprise attack, as in Korea.

This latter possibility becomes clear when one considers Israel's likely request for deep demilitarization of southern Syria, eastward of the Golan. Gold writes: "But proposals for deep demilitarization into southern Syria would elicit harsh Syrian resistance. Limitations on Egyptian sovereignty in Sinai are far from the sociopolitical center of the Egyptian state along the Nile. In the Golan case, with Damascus only 50 kilometers from the Golan Heights, such limitations would be sought in the vicinity of the Syrian capital. What if Israel's requirements for security arrangements become a deal-breaker at a future Camp David summit? The U.S. might propose the deployment of an armored brigade to compensate Israel for the security that it failed to obtain in its bilateral negotiations with Syria."

Thus Gold looks at the risks to Israel from an expansion beyond monitoring of the American peacekeeping role on the Golan Heights. He strongly advises against getting the U.S. involved in Israel's early-warning stations. While monitoring involves occasionally surveying a defined area established in a peace treaty, early-warning entails round-the-clock surveillance of military preparations deep in a neighbor's territory.

The U.S. and Israel would have opposing interests in early-warning - Washington would seek to dismiss any hostile preparations so as to protect the new status-quo, after the peace treaty was signed; Israel would be considering whether pre-emptive action might be necessary to preclude an offensive option by the Syrians. In the past, these sorts of Israeli-American differences arose over intelligence interpretations of Soviet-Egyptian violations of the 1970 Standstill Agreement, that prohibited the deployment of Egyptian SAM systems next to the Suez Canal. In the future, these clashing perspectives would constantly strain the U.S.-Israeli relationship.

But Gold is particularly concerned with the U.S. putting a substantial force in place that implies that the U.S. is actually defending the State of Israel. He maintains that an American trip-wire force would not only have to protect Israel from a Syrian attack, it would have to prepare to protect Syria from Israeli pre-emptive action. Since peacekeeping forces must maintain strict neutrality between the parties, an American Golan force could drag the U.S. from a position of alliance with Israel to one of neutrality in other aspects of the bilateral relationship.

For these reasons, the study advises against a substantial American force deployment on the Golan Heights, in the event of a Syrian-Israeli peace treaty.



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