

**T**he possible nuclearization of the Middle East, and the implications of such a development for the countries of the region was the major focus of this year's annual one-day conference in memory of Lt. Gen. David Elazar ("Yom Dado"), held May 17, 1993.

In the opening session Prof. Yuval Ne'eman, TAU, reviewed the process of nuclearization in the Third World and the Middle East, and emphasized the dangers entailed in the Iranian and Algerian nuclear programs. Regarding Israel, Prof. Ne'eman warned against entering a disarmament process that might reduce Israel's strength, and spoke against former President Bush's arms control initiative.

Prof. Emeritus Yehoshaphat Harkabi, Hebrew University, presented an opposing viewpoint, through an analysis of the nuclear dilemmas faced in the Middle East. He argued that it was unlikely that one state would be able to maintain a nuclear monopoly over time without this leading to a nuclear arms race in the region. Instability in the nuclear realm, he



Maj. Gen. (res.) Avihu Bin-Nun (l.) and MK Ephraim Sneh (r.) address the closing session of the conference.

## A Nuclear Middle East?

noted, was dangerous for *all* states in the Middle East, thus all must seriously weigh the risks of nuclearization against those of comprehensive nuclear disarmament. He went on to explain that an arms control process seeks security through cooperation, but is not based on mere belief in good intentions.

Dr. Shai Feldman, JCSS, closed the first session by examining whether the

nuclearization of the Middle East was a reversible process. While his answer was on the whole "yes," he related in turn to four facets of the issue: the risks of nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, the threats Israel faces in the nuclear realm, whether the process could be reversed, and by what means. As to the risks of proliferation, only Iraq and Iran pose a real danger, and even here Dr. Feldman stressed the difficulties entailed in assessing how long it would take the two countries to acquire a nuclear capability. Concerning the threat involved in these programs, he emphasized the need to distinguish between Arab rhetoric and actual behavior; there is no logic in turning Iran from a distant adversary into a "sworn enemy." Finally, not only do we have evidence, even in the Middle East, that the nuclearization process is reversible, but there is a range of means at our disposal for helping the arms control process along.

The second session consisted of two lectures that considered the notion of nuclear images: Dr. Yehuda Ben-Meir, JCSS, examined the views of the Israeli public regarding nuclear

capabilities, while Dr. Ariel Levite, JCSS, discussed Israel's nuclear image in the eyes of the Arabs. Dr. Ben-Meir noted that since the Second Gulf War, the nuclear issue has assumed a rather prominent place in the public debate in Israel, especially in comparison to earlier years. In general, Israel's nuclear policy is widely supported by the public; Ben-Meir presented data from public opinion polls conducted by JCSS asking whether the use of nuclear weapons could be justified, and under what conditions.

Dr. Levite assessed Israel's nuclear image in the eyes of Arab states and the Palestinians in terms of the rationale assigned to Israel's nuclear activity, as well as the nuclear policy and nuclear arsenal attributed to Israel. He reviewed the evolution of these images as they appeared over the years, and pointed to two main Arab approaches to Israel's nuclear option: those who claim that the threat is insignificant or even nonexistent and those who claim that Israel's presumed nuclear arsenal poses a clear threat to the surrounding Arab states. One of his conclusions was that Arabs are deterred by Israel's presumed nuclear potential, but essentially assume that this potential would be fulfilled only in the event of a threat to Israel's very existence.

**12 July 1993**

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# Peace and Security on the Golan

NEW BOOK



**B**rig. Gen. (res.) Aryeh Shalev, a senior research associate at JCSS and a former senior IDF Military Intelligence officer, has devised a detailed plan which weaves together a staged Israeli withdrawal from the Golan with gradual implementation of full peace with Syria.

Shalev represented Israel in the Mixed Armistice Commission with Syria in the 1950s, and specializes in the security relations between the two states. He published his new plan in a JCSS book, *Peace and Security on the Golan*, published (in Hebrew) in early April 1993 by Papyrus. An English version is being readied for the JCSS 1993-1994 Studies Series.

The plan contains four stages. Each stage comprises three elements: a limited Israeli withdrawal, security arrangements, and an additional step toward peaceful relations and normalization between Israel and Syria.

The transition from one stage to the next takes place only after all elements of the previous stage are fully implemented.

The first stage would be launched upon the signing of the peace treaty, Shalev writes. Both sides would end the state-of-war that prevails between them. Syria would cease its economic boycott of Israel. It would also settle half the Palestinian refugees living in Syria. Both countries would introduce arrangements designed to prevent accidental clashes: each country would inform the other of any exercise or movement of a force, brigade-size or larger.

The Israeli withdrawal at this stage would be limited "to a few hundred meters at two or three points in the southern sector of the Heights." The IDF would remain at strategic points elsewhere on the Heights, and could deploy two armored or mechanized brigades on the Golan.

Shalev writes that Israel could start with a more significant withdrawal if Syria would

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# Bombing of

**O**n June 6, 1993 JCSS held an evening conference devoted to a retrospective examination of the bombing of the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq 12 years ago, as well as a discussion of the implications for Israel of a possible nuclearized Middle East. The occasion was prompted by the publication of an updated version of Shlomo Nakdimon's (Hebrew) book dealing with the bombing of Osirak, *Tamuz Bilehavot*. The event was held with the support of *Yediot Aharonot*, publishers of Nakdimon's book.

Maj. Gen. (res.) David Ivri, director general of the Defense Ministry, opened the evening with a discussion of the relationship between

## Alpher Appointed JCSS Director

At the recommendation of Head of Center Aharon Yariv, Joseph Alpher was appointed Director of Center in March 1993. The appointment was made by Tel Aviv University President Yoram Dinstein. Alpher served since 1986 as deputy head of JCSS.

Maj. Gen. (res) Aharon Yariv, Head of JCSS  
Joseph Alpher, Director of JCSS

JCSS BULLETIN

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# Osirak - 12 Years Later

military and political decisionmaking. He noted that those responsible for the military planning of the Osirak operation took into consideration the political constraints that would have to be faced; they had to strike a delicate balance between military dictates and political realities. One example of the compromises made was the timing of the operation: the date was postponed several times due to political considerations. While the political decision was a tough one, Ivri considers the operation to have been a success, especially in terms of its long term deterrent effect.

Former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, who served as foreign minister at the time of the operation, outlined aspects of the political



Col. (res.) Ze'ev Raz delivers his account of the bombing of Osirak.

struggle that preceded the decision to bomb Osirak. He noted the extensive diplomatic efforts made to convince France and Italy to discontinue their aid to Iraq in the nuclear field and, after those efforts failed, the attempt to convince the US of the need to pressure France and Italy on this point. When it became clear that nuclear activity in Iraq was going to continue, the decisionmakers realized that Israel must act on its own. Although strong reservations regarding the operation were expressed within senior policymaking circles and by the leadership of the political opposition, the decision was taken and the

operation carried out.

Dr. Shai Feldman (JCSS) and Deputy Minister of Defense Mordechai Gur discussed the implications of a nuclear threat that Israel may face in the years to come. Both speakers assessed that the probability of nuclear war breaking out in the Middle East was relatively low, but that the danger must be confronted. Feldman outlined six guidelines of behavior that Israel should adhere to regarding the nuclear threat: 1) exercise caution when facing a nuclear threat; 2) preserve a deterrent capability; 3) continue a policy of attempting to ward off the nuclear ambitions of Arab and Muslim states in the Middle East; 4) contribute to arms control efforts in the region (but without compromising the preceding three guidelines); 5) maintain a strategic understanding with the US in the nuclear realm; and finally, 6) attempt to keep the nuclear threat in proportion - differentiate between Arab rhetoric and actual behavior. Feldman also stressed that it was not in Israel's interest to invest valuable resources in passive defense systems against nuclear attack.

Moshe Vardi, editor of *Yediot Aharonot*, spoke about the role of the media regarding disclosure of sensitive information. The media must decide between the public's right to information, and maintaining silence on certain matters in accordance with the "national interest." Vardi described the media coverage regarding Iraq's nuclear activity, including Israel's anticipated reaction, during both the Osirak era and the Gulf War period. Shlomo Nakdimon, a member of the *Yediot Aharonot* editorial staff, emphasized that following the Osirak operation Israel lost interest in Iraq, especially while the Iran-Iraq War seemed to neutralize Iraq as a potential enemy. As a result, Israel lost six crucial years of intelligence-gathering regarding Iraq's nuclear activities, and when we "woke up to reality" in 1988, it was the eleventh hour.

The final presentation was delivered by Col. (res.) Ze'ev Raz, the IAF pilot who led the attack on Osirak. He gave a personal account of the events leading up to and during the actual attack, from the standpoint of the pilots who participated in the operation. His remarks were accompanied by a film showing the bombing of Osirak.

JCSS Director Joseph Alpher and Head of Center Aharon Yariv emphasized in their opening and closing remarks, the need perceived by the Jaffee Center to focus the public discussion in Israel on the strategic ramifications of the possible nuclearization of the Middle East.



JCSS Head Aharon Yariv greets former Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir at the entrance to the conference hall.

Speakers at the opening session: Seated (l. to r.) Lt. Gen. (res.) Mordechai Gur and Maj. Gen. (res.) David Ivri; standing (l. to r.) JCSS Director Joseph Alpher and Shlomo Nakdimon, author of *Tamuz Bilehavot*.



## The Second Ginosar Conference:

**O**n January 6–10, 1993, JCSS held the Second Ginosar Conference on Security and Arms Control in the Middle East.

The focus of this conference was on confidence-building and the verification of agreements. Some 24 experts from six countries (US, Russia, Egypt, Britain, Germany, and Austria), as well as US officials and some 30 Israeli participants, including members of the Israeli delegation to the multilateral negotiations on arms control in the Middle East, took part in the five days of discussions.

An attempt was made during the conference to present both Israeli and Arab threat perceptions in order to assess which arms control and confidence-building measures might be applicable to the Middle East. In addition, discussion focused on the European as well as US-USSR experience with negotiating confidence-building measures, and verification of the parties' compliance with agreements reached.

The opening session was held at TAU's "Green House" Faculty Club, in the presence of TAU President Prof. Yoram Dinstein. Dr. Shai Feldman, Director of JCSS' Arms Control Project and conference organizer, delivered opening remarks in which he noted that the major aim of the conference was in the realm of education: to expose the Israeli professional community and decisionmakers to the experience that has accumulated in other regions of the world in the realm of arms control and confidence-building. This, as a possible contribution to the acceleration of the multilateral arms control negotiations between Israel and Arab countries which began in Moscow in January 1992, and have reconvened three times since then, in Washington and Moscow.

The keynote addresses at the opening session were delivered by Dr. Bo Huld, Director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies in

# Confidence-Building and Prospects for the Middle East



Foreign Minister Shimon Peres meets with conference participants. On his left, JCSS Head Aharon Yariv; on his right, conference coordinator Dr. Shai Feldman.

London, and Prof. Michael Sturmer, Director of the Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik in Ebenhausen, near Munich. Both speakers warned of the new range of security concerns facing the western world: the possibility that the violence in Yugoslavia would spread to other areas of the Balkans and implicate countries and powers outside the region; the danger of an overall deterioration in Russia and other ex-USSR republics; the rise of religious and secular extremism in the Muslim world; the possible spread of weapons of mass destruction and long-range ballistic missiles, particularly to the Middle East and Northern Africa; and, finally, the possibility that waves of immigrants from East Europe, the Middle East, Western Asia, and North Africa would pose serious threats to the stability of regimes in Western Europe.

The conference proceedings, held at Nof Ginosar on the shores of the Sea of Galilee, provided the opportunity, for the first time in Israel, for a dialogue between Arab and Israeli experts focusing on the threat perceptions and the security concerns of both Israel and the Arab countries. Dr. Ariel Levite, JCSS, addressed Israel's security concerns, pointing out that Israel confronts three levels of insecurity: internal sources of insecurity, regional sources of insecurity (the

Arab-Israeli context), and the extra-regional dimension. The third level involves the threat



of external intervention as well as exaggerated and unfair demands to comply with certain rules of conduct. Dr. Feldman stressed that Israelis have been conditioned to think of national security in primarily zero-sum terms, and that Israelis find notions of mutual and collective security – that are central to arms control thinking – difficult to accept. Israel will have to begin to think about arms control as one element of its security policy and doctrine.

General Ahmed Abdel Halim, from the National Center for Middle East Studies in Cairo, provided an Egyptian view of the

◀ At the opening reception (l. to r.): TAU Pres. Yoram Dinstein, Dr. Mark Heller, Ambassador Muhammad Bassiouny, Gen. Ahmed Abdel Halim.

Dr. Ariel Levite (l.) ▶  
and Prof. Michael Sturmer.





# Verification: Middle East



Dr. Bo Huldts delivers keynote address.  
Seated: Prof. Michael Sturmer.

Middle East security environment. He stressed the threat emanating from Israel's perceived nuclear capability, and the Arab demand that regional security be based on the principle of equal strength for all states in the Middle East. Dr. Ahmed Hashim of "Search for Common Ground" in Washington, also participated in the discussion of the Middle East security environment. He emphasized the importance of understanding the substructure of hostilities and suspicions in the Middle East, including the Arab view of Israel as an expansionist "high-tech crusader state" - a highly advanced technological society with no clearly delineated borders.

The conference included a session aimed at fostering understanding of the actual process of negotiating confidence-building measures. This session was opened by Dr. Michael

realm. Then Oleg Grinevsky, who presently serves as Ambassador of the Russian Federation to Sweden, and Ambassador Lynn Hansen, former US representative to the CSCE in Vienna, provided a joint presentation. During 1985-1986, Grinevsky and Hansen represented the USSR and the US in the negotiations leading to the Stockholm agreements on CBMs, which became a central pillar of the CSCE process. At Ginosar, the two ambassadors collaborated to illustrate how they negotiated the Stockholm accords. They disclosed many of the details of their two years of negotiations, as well as each side's views of the other side's intentions at each stage of the negotiating process.

Another issue examined was European and superpower experience with verification. The session was opened by Dr. Gloria Duffy, then

President of Global Outlook in Palo Alto, analyzing the different efforts to ensure compliance with arms control and CBM agreements. Presentations devoted to the application of on-site inspection were then delivered by Dr. Edward Ifft, Deputy Director of the US On-Site Inspection Agency, Colonel Don Stovall, who commanded the US Army observers that inspected Warsaw Pact forces following the Stockholm accords, and Colonel Doug Englund, who leads one of the UN inspection teams in Iraq. All three speakers focused on the means to discover attempts to circumvent limitations that the parties previously agreed to uphold.

Yet another session focused on verification through the use of satellites, and was led by Dr. Vipin Gupta, VERTIC, London. Dr. Gupta emphasized the high resolution of the images of ground objects that can be obtained through the use of commercial satellites, and demonstrated this with commercially-obtainable slides and videos that provided vivid images of the battle area in Kuwait during the Gulf War, the nuclear reactor in Dimona, an Israeli Air Force base in Hatzetim, and Kibbutz Ginosar.

The final session of the conference was devoted to discussion of the CBMs that can be implemented between Israel, the Arab states and the Palestinians. Emily Landau, JCSS, provided a conceptual framework for the application of CBMs to the Middle East. Then Deputy Head of JCSS Joseph Alpher proposed a set of CBMs between Israel, Jordan, and the Palestinians; Dr. William Durch of the Stimson Center examined the past record of using peacekeeping forces, and Dr. Dore Gold, JCSS, examined the feasibility and desirability of stationing US peacekeeping forces on the Golan Heights, as part of a security package aimed at stabilizing in the future a peace agreement between Israel and Syria.

JCSS Head Aharon Yariv stressed in his closing remarks the need to build a level of confidence between the countries of the Middle East, as a basis for more far-reaching arms control agreements.

◀ (l. to r.): Dr. Zeev Eytan, Dr. Bradford Dismukes, Ambassador Lynn Hansen.

◀ Dr. Gloria Duffy and Ambassador Oleg Grinevsky discuss a point during the conference.

Tour of the Golan Heights (l. to r.): Ahmed Hashim, Douglas Englund, Steven Miller, Christoph Bertram, Oleg Grinevsky, Michael Sturmer, Heinz Vetschera. ▼



Krepon from the Stimson Center of Washington DC, elaborating the importance of confidence-building in regions of high tension. Dr. Steven Miller, Associate Director of Harvard University's Center for Science and International Affairs, stressed the utility and limitations of arms control and confidence-building measures in the naval



# Reshaping US-Israel Relations:

## A JCSS Working Group Report

**I**n recognition of the major changes taking place in US foreign and domestic policies, JCSS's Project on US Foreign and Defense Policy formed a working group on US-Israeli relations some six months before the American presidential elections. Dr. Dore Gold, with the assistance of Gal Levy, served as principal author of the group's report, *After the American Elections: Preparing for Change in US-Israel Relations*, that was issued in December 1992 (JCSS Memorandum No. 37). An abridged English version was released in March 1993.

JCSS Director Joseph Alpher and Dr. Shai Feldman edited the report and served on the working group, along with the Head of JCSS, Maj. Gen. (res.) Aharon Yariv, Professor Abraham Ben-Zvi, Ambassador Hanan Bar-On (formerly deputy director of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs), Dan Halperin (former economic attache at the Israel

Embassy in Washington), Ariel Weiss (former assistant to the Speaker of the House of Representatives, "Tip" O'Neill), and Zvi Rafiah (formerly responsible for liaison with Congress at the Israel Embassy in Washington). Ambassador Moshe Arad also contributed to the discussions of the study group at an early stage, before taking up a governmental appointment.

The heart of the report was contained in two sections. First, the study group issued a forecast for the US-Israeli relationship in the Clinton years. It anticipated warm ties between the two countries based on shared values and a continuing American interest in the Arab-Israel peace process. This, despite the domestic political orientation of the administration.

The group also raised a number of issues that have since appeared on the American public agenda: the pressure to divert aid funds intended for Israel in order to support the growing needs of Russia; the debate over the future of self-determination in American foreign policy; and the difficulties experienced by the Israeli defense industry with the American defense establishment, despite the good political relations between the two countries.

Second, the report contained operational recommendations, some of which have already appeared in the official US-Israeli dialogue, such as the proposal for a joint commission for civilian research and development in high technology. The report called in December 1992 for "new strategic understandings" with the US in view of the threat of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction – a subject actually raised by Secretary of Defense Les Aspin during his June 1993 address at AIPAC.

The report also looked at longer-term trends in American public opinion and demography, focusing on the increasing centrality of the Asian and Hispanic communities in the US. Finally, it looked at global strategic trends such as the rising importance of the Pacific Rim. And it anticipated a decline in the American strategic orientation toward the Middle East in favor of European issues – a trend born out by the administration's interest in finding an enhanced role in Bosnia, and the reduction in confrontations in the air with Iraq.

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In the final session of the day, MK Ephraim Sneh stressed that, in the framework of peace arrangements in the Middle East, Israel must not abandon its policy of ambiguity regarding its nuclear potential. A former commander of the Israel Air Force, Maj. Gen. (res.) Avihu Bin-Nun, assessed that the probability of Israel being attacked with nuclear weapons was very low due to three factors: Israeli deterrence and the sense that Israel has a second strike capability; the possibility that the US would attack a country that uses nuclear weapons against Israel; and the existence of the holy places in Israel.

The greatest threat to Israel in a nuclear Middle East, Bin-Nun argued, was still from a *conventional* attack on the part of an Arab and Muslim coalition. Hence the need for Israel to strengthen its conventional capability.

## Profile of a Researcher



### Abraham Ben-Zvi

**A**braham Ben-Zvi is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science, and a senior research associate at the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies at Tel-Aviv University. Professor Ben-Zvi received his PhD in political science at the University of Chicago in 1973. Between 1973 and 1979 he was a lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Since 1979 he has been affiliated both with the TAU Department of Political Science and the Jaffee Center.

Prof. Ben-Zvi has published extensively on a variety of issues pertaining to American policy in the Middle East, coercive diplomacy and surprise attack. His recent books include *The Illusion of Deterrence: The Roosevelt Presidency and the Origins of the Pacific War* (Westview Press, 1987); *Between Lausanne and Geneva: International Conferences and the Arab-Israel Conflict* (Westview Press, 1989); and *The United States and Israel: The Limits of the Special Relationship* (Columbia University Press, July 1993, forthcoming).

Prof. Ben-Zvi notes, only slightly tongue-in-cheek, that his interest in strategic issues developed as an extension of his passion for American baseball and football. He is married to Irith; they have one daughter, Doreen.



# Palestinian Autonomy: Issues and Solutions

**A** new Jaffee Center memorandum (No.40), *The Autonomy: Main Issues and Possible Solutions* (Hebrew), reexamines the principal problems involved in achieving an interim solution with the Palestinians. The memorandum was written by Brig. Gen. (res) Aryeh Shalev, a senior research associate at the Center. Shalev is a former governor of the West Bank, and among his works published at the Center are two books dealing with aspects of a settlement with the Palestinians.

The memorandum analyzes a number of critical issues for both sides. Agreement on them appears to be essential if an interim autonomy arrangement is to be achieved. After analyzing the areas of disagreement and airing possible solutions, the author presents a framework of suggested compromises – proposals that would demand of both sides considerable flexibility:

1. The source of authority will be a joint body that comprises Israel, Jordan and the autonomous authority. Every decision of this body must be unanimous.
2. Free and democratic elections will be held in the West Bank and Gaza to choose the self-governing authority. Arab residents of East Jerusalem will be permitted to vote (but not to stand for election), in polls located outside of Jerusalem.
3. The self-governing authority will be responsible for administration in the West Bank (not including East Jerusalem) and Gaza, but will have no authority over the Jewish population and Israeli security forces in these areas. The construction of additional Jewish settlements, and expansion of existing settlements, will require the sanction of the source of authority.
4. Responsibility for public safety and for civil and criminal courts among the Palestinian population will rest with the self-governing authority (once the appropriate institutions are established – a process of some 6–12 months that could begin even before the autonomy agreement is signed).
5. Responsibility for internal security and prevention of terrorist violence in

## Guests Speakers at the JCSS



Ambassador Samuel Lewis at JCSS Research Staff meeting, November 16, 1992. On his right, JCSS Director Joseph Alpher.



Academician Georgy Arbatov, Director of the Institute of the USA and Canada, Academy of Sciences of the Russian Federation, meets with JCSS staff. Arbatov delivered this year's annual Simon Syrkin Memorial Lecture on February 18, 1993. The subject was Russia's internal problems and their strategic implications.

general – particularly against Israel and Israelis – will be allocated as follows:

- Israel will retain responsibility for the first three years.
- During this period, with the assistance of Jordan and Israel, a large (several thousand-strong) Palestinian internal intelligence and security force will be created in the West Bank and Gaza.
- After three years of autonomy, internal security responsibility will be transferred gradually to the self-governing authority, in close coordination with Israel and Jordan. The following two years will constitute a trial period to test the capacity of the self-governing authority to carry out its responsibilities.
6. The authority of the self-governing body will not include primary legislation. When the necessity for such legislation arises during the autonomy period, this will be accomplished by the source of authority. The self-governing body will carry out secondary legislation in designated issue-areas that are assigned to its authority.
7. Local Palestinian legal jurisdiction will not apply to the Jewish population and Israeli security forces in the West Bank and Gaza;
8. State lands will be divided among three authorities: a portion will be assigned to the self-governing authority for development purposes necessary to the Palestinian population; a portion will be assigned to Israel, for the security zone that it retains and for Jewish settlements; and a portion will be relegated to the source of authority, or to a joint committee which will be authorized to allocate, by consensus, the use of state lands by the self-governing authority or by Israel.
9. Authority over new and additional use of water will be retained by the source of authority or by a joint Israeli-Palestinian committee.
10. The border between the West Bank and Jordan will continue to be the customs border. Customs on goods entering the West Bank and Gaza across the Jordan River bridges, from Egypt or from Israel, will be turned over to the self-governing authority.
11. The self-governing authority will be authorized to undertake the gradual enhancement of the local West Bank and Gazan economy, and to raise funds for this purpose. Palestinian commuter labor in Israel will continue, but on a reduced basis.

## Book Review

**T**he October–December 1992 issue of *Military Intelligence* praises Ariel Levite's *Offense and Defense in Israeli Military Doctrine* (JCSS Study No. 12) as "an excellent book which ties together the often disparate concepts which form Israeli military doctrine."

The US Department of Defense's *Friday Review of Defense Literature* recently reviewed Aharon Klieman and Reuven Pedatzur's *Rearming Israel: Defense Procurement Through the 1990s* (JCSS Study No. 17). Reviewer Dr. Harry H. Almond Jr. of the National Defense University cites the study as "useful reading on the problem of

Israeli procurement."

Aryeh Shalev's *The Intifada: Causes and Effects* (JCSS Study No. 16) is singled out in the Fall 1992 edition of *Orbis* as providing specialists with "a bright light under which to analyze Palestinian society in the territories." The book, which was published by JCSS in Hebrew and English, was recently published in Arabic by the Arab Studies Society of Jerusalem.

*Defense and Foreign Affairs' Strategic Policy* editor Gregory R. Copley hails the *Middle East Military Balance 1990–1991* as "an essential addition to the research library."

Dr. Yossi Olmert, reviewing Aryeh Shalev's *Peace and Security on the Golan* (Hebrew, Papyrus) in *The Jerusalem Report* of July 1, 1993, notes that Shalev "has once again produced a thoroughgoing book, exhaustive

and balanced... a significant contribution to public discussion on the subject, not only because it is the first, but also because of its quality."

### Foundation Support

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1. Doron Foundation for Education and Welfare
2. Ploughshares Fund
3. Yad Hanadiv
4. Yekutiel Federman Foundation

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halve the size of its active ground forces and deploy only a division or two between the Israeli lines and Damascus.

The second stage of the agreement would see the inauguration of a Syrian embassy in Jerusalem and an Israeli embassy in Damascus. The border would be open to movement of people and goods. Syria would complete the resettlement of the Palestinian refugees residing on its territory, and other Arab countries would settle a quarter of the Palestinian refugees living outside Syria. Shalev advocates an overall settlement of the refugee problem, involving several Arab states, because he fears that failure to solve this problem could torpedo the entire peace process.

In exchange, Israel would withdraw from the strategic hills in the eastern Golan to a second, more western, row of hills. The IDF would be replaced by an American or multinational force of "up to a division."

The third stage would include Syrian–Israeli economic and political cooperation, a reduction of Syria's military forces by half, and limitations on both sides' armaments. Additional refugees would be settled.

The IDF would then withdraw from the second row of strategic hills. An American or a multinational force would take over the area while continuing to hold the first row of strategic hills. In the southern sector of the Golan the IDF would pull back to three passes: one at the Nahal Golan–El Al area, a second between Afik and Givat Yoav, and a third south of Meizar.

In the fourth and final stage, peace would be at a "level that exists today between Western European states." All the Palestinian refugees

would be resettled in Arab states, Syria and Israel would enjoy "strategic cooperation," and democratic regimes would be established in the Arab states.

Israel would then dismantle its settlements on the Golan, and the IDF would withdraw to a new international border, stretching some three to four kilometers east of the old armistice lines. The narrow strip between the two lines would be retained to enable Israel to control the few routes needed in an emergency to rush troops up the escarpment to the Heights. Control of that strip would also make it impossible for Syria to interfere with the flow of water from the Baniyas to the Jordan River.

Shalev advocates retention of three intelligence–gathering stations during the

above stages: on Mt. Hermon in the northern sector of the Golan, at Tel Abu Nida in the central section, and at Tel Fares in the south. If the Syrians demand a quid–pro–quo, Israel might agree that Syria establish its own intelligence–gathering station on the Golan, possibly even inside Israel proper, west of the international border.

Shalev recommends that Syrian soldiers be barred from any territory that Israel cedes on the Golan, although lightly armed local policemen might secure the Syrian population if it is allowed back to the Heights. An additional sector in Syria, east of the Golan, should be demilitarized and Israel should demilitarize a symbolic sector west of the international border, he adds.

## JCSS – Current Publications:

### Coming: The JCSS 1993–1994 Publication Series

*The Middle East Military Balance 1992–1993*  
edited by Shlomo Gazit, with Zeev Eytan and Amos Gilboa, August 1993

*The Israel–Syria Armistice Regime, 1949–1955*  
by Aryeh Shalev  
JCSS Study No. 21, October 1993

*Deterrence in the Middle East: Where Theory and Practice Converge*  
edited by Aharon Klieman and Ariel Levite  
JCSS Study No. 22, December 1993

*Arms Control and the New Middle East Security Environment*  
edited by Shai Feldman and Ariel Levite  
JCSS Study No. 23, February 1994

*Israel and Syria: Peace and Security on the Golan*  
by Aryeh Shalev  
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