A second combat front opened by Hezbollah in the north, in parallel with the war against Hamas, will create additional challenges for Israel and change the face of the war and its results. Yet it is already clear that the war in the north, if Hezbollah chooses to join Hamas, will be entirely different from the one underway in the south for the past few days. This is for two main reasons. First, Hezbollah would not enjoy the element of surprise. Second is the fact that the IDF is prepared and ready for this possibility in the north. In recent years, the IDF has prepared for this scenario and held exercises to respond to a combined attack by Hezbollah that includes massive rocket fire on the home front and a ground attack by the organization's commando force (the plan formulated by Hezbollah and implemented by Hamas on October 7) as part of a multi-arena campaign. In addition, a massive reserve mobilization has been underway and the assembly of Israeli forces in the north is being completed. Thus, the IDF is on full alert and ready to respond to any move by Hezbollah or even take the initiative on this front. In addition, recent painful lessons have been learned and residents of the communities near the fence in the north have already been evacuated.
Additional considerations that will affect Hezbollah's decision making beyond the pressure exerted on it to join the fighting by Hamas (and perhaps Iran as well) are the severe damage expected to the Lebanese state, as well as to the organization and its Shia supporters following the IDF's response. In Lebanon, the voices of criticism are already expanding about Hezbollah dragging the country into wars that are not in its interest. Another important consideration is the strengthening of Israel's international legitimacy, which will only grow in the event of the opening of two fronts without an Israeli initiative, as already stated by President Biden and other Western leaders.
These developments sharpen Hezbollah's dilemma regarding involvement in the war that erupted in the south, when it faces three main options:
1. Continue with symbolic steps to demonstrate solidarity with Hamas, along the lines of the shooting at Mount Dov (October 8) or sporadic shooting by the Palestinian factions in Lebanon (October 9)
2. A step up in the nature and scope of the activity along the border to the point of engaging in several days of combat against the IDF
3. Joining fully in a long war, with all its strength and resources
At this stage it is difficult to assess whether the organization will be satisfied with the act of symbolic recognition, but it seems that as the war against Hamas in Gaza drags on, the likelihood of a limited or widespread conflagration in the north increases as well, either at the initiative of one of the parties or as a result of unintended deterioration.
A second combat front opened by Hezbollah in the north, in parallel with the war against Hamas, will create additional challenges for Israel and change the face of the war and its results. Yet it is already clear that the war in the north, if Hezbollah chooses to join Hamas, will be entirely different from the one underway in the south for the past few days. This is for two main reasons. First, Hezbollah would not enjoy the element of surprise. Second is the fact that the IDF is prepared and ready for this possibility in the north. In recent years, the IDF has prepared for this scenario and held exercises to respond to a combined attack by Hezbollah that includes massive rocket fire on the home front and a ground attack by the organization's commando force (the plan formulated by Hezbollah and implemented by Hamas on October 7) as part of a multi-arena campaign. In addition, a massive reserve mobilization has been underway and the assembly of Israeli forces in the north is being completed. Thus, the IDF is on full alert and ready to respond to any move by Hezbollah or even take the initiative on this front. In addition, recent painful lessons have been learned and residents of the communities near the fence in the north have already been evacuated.
Additional considerations that will affect Hezbollah's decision making beyond the pressure exerted on it to join the fighting by Hamas (and perhaps Iran as well) are the severe damage expected to the Lebanese state, as well as to the organization and its Shia supporters following the IDF's response. In Lebanon, the voices of criticism are already expanding about Hezbollah dragging the country into wars that are not in its interest. Another important consideration is the strengthening of Israel's international legitimacy, which will only grow in the event of the opening of two fronts without an Israeli initiative, as already stated by President Biden and other Western leaders.
These developments sharpen Hezbollah's dilemma regarding involvement in the war that erupted in the south, when it faces three main options:
1. Continue with symbolic steps to demonstrate solidarity with Hamas, along the lines of the shooting at Mount Dov (October 8) or sporadic shooting by the Palestinian factions in Lebanon (October 9)
2. A step up in the nature and scope of the activity along the border to the point of engaging in several days of combat against the IDF
3. Joining fully in a long war, with all its strength and resources
At this stage it is difficult to assess whether the organization will be satisfied with the act of symbolic recognition, but it seems that as the war against Hamas in Gaza drags on, the likelihood of a limited or widespread conflagration in the north increases as well, either at the initiative of one of the parties or as a result of unintended deterioration.