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## Brothers and Generals; The End of Coexistence

Elazul

### MB & Islamists: We support Brutality Until it's used against us

*"A lot of people (especially non-Egyptians) are wondering: Why are people who stood against the Military and the Police forces, and decried their brutality previously, not doing the same now that the Pro-Morsi protesters are facing off against them? The main reason? Because while they were in power, the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamists Condoned AND Supported brutality by the army & police against those same people"*

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Nader Bakkar

### How did the crisis in Egypt snowball?

*"As for the military, the Muslim Brotherhood didn't comprehend the role of the military institution in ousting Mubarak's dictatorship by withdrawing its support and leaving him to face the crowds on his own. This brought huge popularity to the military that wasn't dented by the first transitional period. **The Muslim Brotherhood didn't comprehend that the military established the other state institutions after the 1952 revolution, and that it considers itself a guardian to these institutions and would never accept any threats to it, especially when it comes to the judiciary and to intelligence.** The military found more reasons to interfere as the presidency failed to deal with the situation, and it gave many hints that the presidency didn't take seriously enough. Regardless of the constitutionality of such a situation, we tried several times to convince the Muslim Brotherhood that it was an established one that they had to reckon with. Up till July 3, they were relying on the army's statement that it had divorced itself from Egypt's politics once and for all. But there is a huge difference between understanding reality and accepting it"*

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H.A. Hellyer

### Days of Impunity

*"There are other such instances that could be looked at: the clashes at the Cabinet in 2011, when many were killed, including Sheikh Emad Effat, the Mohamed Mahmoud deaths and others. The key takeaway ought to be that*

*in 2011 – in 2012 – in 2013 – or whenever it takes place, no-one ought to be killed for simply being in a protest. Independent accountability is not a luxury in Egypt, or a privilege – it is a right, and it ought to be a primary demand for any genuinely patriotic force struggling for progressive and just change within this country. **When one condemns violence in one circumstance to serve their own partisan end, but does not in another when it doesn't serve that end, they are not simply hypocrites – they just condemn a part of their own soul. Egypt has had more than enough of that. She deserves better"***

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## **Egypt's Crowd Democracy**



**Wael Nawara**

### **Egypt's Crowd Democracy**

*In a speech at a military graduation ceremony aired live on television, Gen. Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, chief of the Egyptian army, asked "honest Egyptians to take to the streets today, Friday, July 26, to reveal their will and authorize the army and police with a mandate and an order to do what is necessary to stop bloodshed." [.....] "It is expected that Sisi will get what he wished for. The millions of Egyptians to whom Sisi spoke directly need no permission from activists to demonstrate. But one has to be careful with one's wishes. What shall the army do with this mandate? If it cracks down on the sit-ins, armed militants will most likely use civilians, women and children as human shields. The cost of blood will be too heavy to bear, which will work in favor of the Muslim Brothers who could in fact use such casualties to regain some of the sympathy it had lost. Sisi's best strategy may be to deny them such gains and target the real movers of the terror campaigns with minimal collateral damage" [.....]" **It is one of these instances where you have to live up to the high expectations placed upon you as a national hero, or watch yourself become the villain"***

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**Mohamed A. Fouad**

### **Beyond "Crowd Democracy"**

*"We must not forget that we are here today because of a series of missteps. It is our choice to succumb to the euphoria, the festivities and the jubilations. It is our choice to think it is going to be OK or that the Brotherhood will see the crowds and decide to pack and go home. It is our choice to think that the army in this day and age can arrest hundreds of thousands of people. There*

is only a political solution out of this. The crowds will only serve as a catalyst to these negotiations. We must also condition ourselves to accept less than ideal solutions. Otherwise, this constant grind can carry on forever and will have its repercussions sooner or later. The army has asked for a popular mandate and can conformably claim that it has received one. **Now, the delicate task is to catapult Egypt beyond crowd democracy with some deft short term political solutions by way of negotiation and some long term structural changes that will restore faith into a form of democracy which is beyond contestation: representative democracy"**

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## **#July26 Demonstrations: Is Egypt Heading Towards A Complete Ctl-Alt-Delete**




**Sarah Carr**

**A note on the imminent dispersal of the Pro-Morsy sit-ins**

*"I hope that anyone who protested yesterday against terrorism is able to differentiate between acts of terrorism, and violence used in response to an attack by security bodies. I hope also they realise that Egypt's security bodies have never demonstrated any ability to deal with civilian protesters in a way that protects life and minimises casualties, and that in "mandating" security bodies to deal with the "terrorists" they sanctioned arbitrary and excessive use of force. The fallout from arbitrary and excessive use of force against a group like the Muslim Brotherhood will not be confined to them. But yesterday's protesters are not responsible for the violence that is about to take place because the idea of them giving a mandate to the army or security bodies is of course ridiculous nonsense. **Egypt's security bodies act with complete disregard for what citizens want and they care no more about the wishes of the people who took to the streets yesterday in support of the army than they do about those in Rabza and Nahda"***

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


## Nervana Mahmoud

### On Mandate and Massacres

*"Does Sissi honestly need a mandate? Certainly not, it is his job to defend the country, so why has he called for this protest? Simply put, there are two reasons. (1) **The protest is a form of visual psychological warfare against the Muslim Brotherhood to expose their relatively small number of supporters.** (2) **The protest will serve as a balloon test of the mood of the general public; a large turnout will confirm his popularity and silence foreign critiques**" [...]*

*"There is no doubt that Sissi perfectly understands the strengths and weaknesses of the Muslim Brotherhood, including their great ability to rally and protest and their inept performance in negotiations and inability to compromise. **The mother of all resistance movements in the Middle East has failed to transform into a crafty, skilled political party.** Ironically, the Muslim Brotherhood's performance in conducting the Rabaa sit-in has proven that Morsi's return will not solve the country's crisis; defiance alone does not solve any crisis or prove effective leadership"*



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## Ziad Akl

### The Sisi Propaganda

*"I am not claiming that yesterday's marches were nothing but propaganda, but I am pointing out how many of those who participated were under the influence of a collective infatuation that certainly found its supporting means and started to grow worrisomely. Al-Sisi's charisma is indeed expanding, the army's presence in different aspects of life in Egypt is being further consolidated day after day and the role of all political forces, whether institutional or non-institutional, is receding. While these could be seen as early signs of Al-Sisi's attempts to establish himself as more than a commander-in-chief of the armed forces, I believe this is not what we should be worried about" [.....] **"The institutional presence of the army must be kept intact while more input goes to building civil political***

*institutions. Al-Sisi has not shown himself as a power-hungry General so far, but the unnecessary propaganda unfortunately does not help to support this idea. Those who are not pro-Sisi are not necessarily pro-Brotherhood. It must be understood that a middle ground does exist between both poles and there are plenty of Egyptians who are not represented on either side of the struggle, not because they don't want the army to fight terrorism, but because **they want the army to remain an institution**. Recreating the rule of the individual is Egypt's ongoing curse that we must get rid of one day"*

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**Sarah Carr**

### **The Popular War on Terror**

*"It seems clear that in any case, the army and/or the police will use force to break up the Nahda and Rabea al-Adaweya Mosque sit-ins as part of its great war on terror, and there have been calls for security forces to do this even from leftist, vocally anti-police activists. They are correct in their assertion that a sit-in with arms and torture areas should not continue. I cannot, however, agree with a full on police assault" [...]* **"Whatever security bodies do, they are bound by duty to use reasonable force; but this is an alien language to both the police and the army, and the general public is braying for blood. It was always going to end – or perhaps begin – like this"**

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**Nervana Mahmoud**

### **The Anatomy of Defiance**

**"Defiance has two main goals: 1. it sheds the sense of defeat, sidelines the reasons for failures, and transforms the feeling of being the underdog with its sense of victimhood and emotional irrationality into something positive, and even productive. 2. it creates favorable conditions that pressure their opponents to accept concessions. Arguably, it has worked.** The sit-ins at Rabaa and Nahda have continued for days, despite July 26 demonstrations in support of Sissi's mandate against "terror," and the repeated calls by the Interior Minister to end the sit-ins. There have been a consistent number of jubilant participants (men, women and children), thanks to an embodiment of total demonization, which has been an effective tool in maintaining the determination and tenacity of the crowd. Now, the pro-Morsi supporters

consider Sissi as an extreme version of Sharon, Saddam, Assad, and Ghaddafi. Such hyperbolic labeling has compelled some protestors to pray for his paralysis, even comparing him to the devil that dared to disobey the Almighty"

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## **The 3<sup>rd</sup> Square**



**Mai El-Sadany**

### **What the Third Square Represents**

**"In essence, the Third Square is a reaction to the simplistic means by which domestic and international policymakers, citizens, and media sources have attempted to define what is happening in Egypt. The Third Square is a reaction to the American obsession with determining whether or not the ousting of Morsi was a coup. [...] " The Third Square is a reaction to the effort by both the army and the Muslim Brotherhood to paint the other side in broad brushes and use hefty and emotionally charged words like "terrorists" and "kuffar," (infidels)" [.....] "In essence, while the Third Squares' lifetime may not be extensive, its vision not comprehensive, and its mobilization slow, the movement's symbolic value is beyond priceless. It is an effort by everyday Egyptians to reject the notion of a "black and white" political battle, to refuse to buy into "the enemy of my enemy is my friend" philosophy, and to humble analysts and Egypt observers, myself included, into a powerful and nuanced reminder that a one-size-fits-all political theory will never adequately explain Egypt's evolving political scene. The Third Square is a reminder that there is a third perspective, that there is a fourth, and that there is a fifth.**

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### **The Dark Tunnel**

**"As for those who find themselves stuck in the zone of not supporting the MB and not supporting the military, there is a way out, and it isn't creating "The Third Square" movement, which name and rhetoric further cement the idea that they are no longer one of the main two parties in Egypt's political struggle, but rather a third party that has no influence on the process. If you don't support the MB or military rule, your best bet is to support**

**and hold to task the civilian government to strengthen it, because that's your end game: civilian rule.** Also, calling on "the revolutionary ministers" to resign repeatedly every time a clash happens is illogical and serves no end. Within the arrangement of the transitional period, the military is clearly handling security, while the civilian government is handling the civilian affairs. Asking them to resign over incidents that they have no power nor control over, and no real alternative solution or plan, serves no purpose other than excluding your representatives from the process. Not only would such calls, for the sake of conscience and revolutionary purity, prevent us from having any input on the laws and the constitution being drafted, but it would ensure that no one from our side would ever attempt to reach power or be part of any future government, given our tendency to punish those who would dare take that risk and how easily we could be manipulated to stop supporting them"

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## The Return of The Police State



**Bassem Sabry**

### Egypt's Precarious New Reality

**Worries are now stronger than ever about a return of the police state. Amid a growing pro-security mindset in the country,** Interior Minister Mohammed Ibrahim casually announced on July 27 the reconstitution of departments to monitor extremism, as well as political and religious activities, and reinstatement of state security officers relieved of duty following the revolution. There is already a small, possibly expanding "third square" movement opposed to the Brotherhood as well as the prospects of the return of the police state and Mubarak remnants, but reception to it has thus far been hostile. It has been a tumultuous month for Egypt since June 30. Yet, there is still a chance to move forward with the transition and create a sustainable and new democratic Egypt. [.....] **"The first step toward rescuing the situation begins with deescalation and inclusive efforts to avoid situations that might lead to provocations or the loss of more lives. Then, maybe a breakthrough will be possible"**

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## Wael Nawara

### Competing for Corpses

*"During a month of political violence, 310 people have been killed — including 50 in the Sinai — and 3,000 wounded. It's difficult and inhumane to classify the victims according to their political affiliation, but in any case, not all of those dead were Brotherhood members. Dozens of members of the army and police forces, as well as civilians, were killed and wounded in jihadist attacks. This is in addition to dozens of other ordinary citizens who were victims of the clashes with Brotherhood marches and sit-ins, and residents of areas they passed through, such as Manial and Bain al-Saray. Thus, the quarrel over legitimacy has been transformed into a race for corpses. **The political battle has shifted from an electoral competition through the ballot box, into a competition between crowds filling the squares and, finally, a competition over the count of different types of boxes: coffins.** If the players think that the winner shall be the party with the greatest number of corpses, it is not hard to see the bloody outcome of this deadly march"*

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## Adel Heine

### Grieving the Dead

*"Death has become a constant companion to us of late. The demise of those slain is brought about in various ways. Sticks, stones, knives, machetes, bullets and pellets of every variety and even bare hands are put to questionable use: all resulting in bodies wrapped in shrouds and lives brought to an abrupt end. And for every person gone, there is a group in society that shrugs its shoulders to the soundtrack of wailing dirges sung by their opponents"*

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## **The Alternative**



## Samuel Tadros

### Pity Egypt, It Has No Liberals

*"Egyptian liberalism was flawed from the start. Egyptian liberals were born, not from an independent bourgeoisie, and from the tension of the individual and the state, but from the very bosom of that state and its bureaucracy. Obsessed with modernization, they*

always allied themselves with the ruler, hoping that he would turn out to be an autocratic modernizer. Viewing Islam as an obstacle to modernization and drinking from the fountain of French secularism, they aimed to banish it from the public sphere and in the process grew antagonistic to Copts. Their liberalism was inherently illiberal, and what remained of it, was soon swept away as the disillusionment with liberal democracy coincided with the fascist temptation haunting Europe" [...]

**"Egypt is caught between democrats who are not liberals (Muslim Brotherhood) and liberals who are not democrats, goes the popular saying. The first half is problematic. The Brotherhood's understanding of democracy is flawed and had no room not only for minority rights, and press freedom, but to such basic concepts such as separation of powers and the rule of law. But the second half is false. Those supporting a military coup who rejoice at the repression of their political opponents and engage in the worst display of ultra nationalist discourse against the U.S. are hardly liberals. Egypt's liberals are not flawed democrats. They are illiberal to begin with"**

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## **Old Players and New Games**

As we move ahead as a nation with a new transition plan, it's important to note who is and who isn't a player in this new phase, and where they fall in this new state order. **People who are out of the stage of influence are both the Muslim Brotherhood and the independent Jan 25 revolutionary symbols: the former due to being the party that this revolution was created to oust, and the latter due to their usual inherent and systemic problems** (lack of organisation, mixed messaging, in-fighting, etc.) coupled with a record-low popularity amongst the Egyptian public, who fairly or unfairly, after the mess of the past three years, no longer trust them or their judgment very much. Their unease with the post-30-June Egypt, while completely understandable, has placed them on the fringes of an explosively polarised political scene where there is no room for a nuanced position, for now anyway." [...]

**"This leaves only four players left, and they are the main four players behind 30 June: the military, the judiciary, the National Salvation Front (NSF) and the old regime forces"**

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## Al Nahda Losing Power

Juan Cole

### Tunisia: Government Teeters on Brink after Slain Leftist's Funeral

*An estimated 50,000 came out in Tunis for the funeral of the assassinated leftist opposition member of parliament Mohamed Brahmi, leader of the pro-worker Popular Front. [Estimate here]. Brahmi was shot 14 times outside his home on Thursday by an unknown assailant. A major suspect is extremist Boubakr al-Hakim, a former recruiter of fighters for Iraq, who fought against US troops there himself" [...]* **"The assassination has caused public outcry because many Tunisians believe that the transitional government has not been vigilant about curbing Muslim extremism. The fundamentalist Renaissance Party (Ennahda) has the office of Prime Minister and several other key cabinet posts, including the Interior Ministry (think: FBI). Many leftist and secular Tunisians believe that Prime Minister Ali Larayedh has been soft on the extremists because he does not want to alienate the right wing of his own party"**

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Abdel Bari Atwan

**Tunisia can step out of Egypt's shadow**

**"Although I do not expect Al Nahda (which is a comparatively mild Islamist party) to retain its dominance of the Tunisian political scene, I believe that Al Gannouchi — who I know well from his years in exile in London — may play a key role in resolving the current crisis and returning Tunisia to the path of democracy.** A pragmatist, Al Gannouchi is willing to compromise for the sake of national unity and has already responded to the escalating protests with a commitment to complete the constitution by October 23 and to hold elections on December 17, the third anniversary of the uprising"

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