The Weight of the Demographic Factor in Israel’s Strategic Considerations on the Palestinian Issue

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Demography is the discipline that deals with static and dynamic aspects of population growth and changes – and the interrelationships between them – in the composition of a population. Demography affects economics, society, politics, security, and overall quality of life, and hence the importance of demography for national security. When it comes to international politics, demography also reflects cultural processes showing weakening or strengthening fault lines between civilizations, indicative of emerging conflicts rooted in differences between populations vying for resources and influence. Therefore, experts claim that demography is essential for understanding what happens in the world.

In the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the demographic question has become a source of profound disagreement in Israel. Many see the demographic processes as a threat to the future of Israel as a state that is both Jewish and democratic, thereby necessitating rapid disengagement from the Palestinians, whether by means of a negotiated settlement or unilateral steps. Others dispute the need for panic, pointing instead to data indicating much more moderate trends: the Jewish majority will continue and even grow, both in the State of Israel proper and in the whole of the western land of Israel, certainly if the Gaza Strip is excluded.

However, the State of Israel does not exist in a vacuum, and is influenced by regional and global demographic trends. Therefore, any discussion of demography as it relates to Israel requires the mapping and analysis of other demographic spheres (regional and global) and an analysis of their

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interrelations. It also requires a look at past experience (specifically the disengagement from the Gaza Strip and northern Samaria) and at trends and actors in Israel, the region, and the international community. Otherwise, the discussion is liable to be incomplete, biased, and inaccurate in terms of the broader strategic context.

Two Approaches
Both demographic approaches regarding Israel deal with three spheres: the Muslim world, especially the region near Israel; western Israel, i.e., the Israeli-Palestinian sphere; and the State of Israel – the Jewish-Arab/Muslim sphere. The discussion mostly centers on the western land of Israel, i.e., the Israeli-Palestinian sphere, but experts in both camps relate to the other two spheres as well, though with varying attributions of import and alarm.

The Demographic Threat
Prominent researchers representing the more ominous approach view current demographic trends as a threat reflecting the connection between two leading elements: one, the Muslim sphere, characterized by rapid population growth and rampant poverty, violence and dwindling resources, radicalized attitudes to Israel, and growth of militant Islam, and two, the demographic changes rapidly taking place in a small, densely populated Israel that “have extensive impact on all aspects of life and their impacts are more significant than in Europe.”

Evgenia Bystrov and Arnon Soffer focus on a rise in the influx of Arabs and Muslims into Israel from neighboring states (due to family unification, unlawful entry, migrant labor/infiltrators) and the concomitant deterioration in relations between Israel’s Jewish citizens and Arab citizens, who view themselves as Palestinian citizens of Israel. These join other demographic processes pointing to a weakening of Israeli sovereignty in the Galilee, the “Triangle” area, the Negev, and Jerusalem, and the convergence of the Jewish majority into a small urban sphere dubbed the “State of Tel Aviv.” At the same time, nations in the region, including the Palestinian Authority, are not keeping pace with globalization: their development is slow or even negative, which leads to exacerbated socioeconomic gaps in contrast to Israel and heightened tension and hostility, which in turn makes Israel even more threatened and vulnerable.

Thus, Bystrov and Soffer assert that what happens socially, economically, ecologically, and security-wise in Israel cannot be divorced from what
happens in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank. Therefore a discussion of the demographics of the State of Israel must also entail a discussion of the demographics of the land of Israel. Furthermore, they stress, the demographic clock is ticking fast, and not in favor of Israeli Jews. They contend that while Israel can continue to exist only if it has a clear Zionist, Jewish majority living in a territory whose size and borders allow the realization of the state’s sovereignty and its defense, and if it provides a quality of life befitting a “Western society,” demographic data and trends threaten the prerequisites for Israel’s existence as a state with a clear Jewish, Zionist majority. Referring to the huge gaps between the Palestinians living in western Israel and the Jewish population, Bystrov and Soffer conclude that attempts by impoverished Palestinians living close to Israel’s borders and by Arabs from neighboring countries to cross into Israel will continue and even grow.

A look at the demographic figures relating to West Bank Palestinians and Arabs in Israel, who in 2030 are expected to number 2.2 million, shows that these gaps probably cannot be bridged in the near future. Given this state of affairs, there is a growing importance to the development and strengthening of national awareness among many of Israel’s Arabs, as there is “a high probability that in the two parts of the Palestinian people there are forces strong enough to forge closer relations between them, and the day will come when they will cooperate with their brothers east of the Jordan River [i.e., exhibit irredentist behavior] to establish a large Palestinian state stretching from the Mediterranean to the desert.” Therefore, there is a true existential danger requiring total separation from the Palestinians and a reduction of more than 4 million Arabs from the State of Israel’s demographic balance. According to these researchers, this is also justification for the separation barrier in the West Bank and the recently fortified fence along the Egyptian border.

To these problematic trends, Bystrov and Soffer add the growth in Muslim immigration to Europe and the rise in tensions resulting from the failure of multiculturalism, which encourages European societies and governments to vent their anger and frustration at Israel. The demographers warn that tolerance of Israel in the West is ebbing rapidly, the result of old-fashioned anti-Semitism mixed with anti-Israel ideology. Support for this position is provided by Leslie Lebl, who discusses the ramifications of Muslim immigration for European security and who identifies developing
demographic trends as a security risk to Europe and a challenge to European values and interests.\textsuperscript{12}

Since the early 2000s, internationally renowned demographer Sergio DellaPergola has warned that the Jewish majority in western Israel is shrinking. At the 2002 Herzliya Conference,\textsuperscript{13} DellaPergola presented a figure showing that for the first time, Jews represented less than half – 49.8 percent – of all residents of western Israel (including the Gaza Strip), and pointed to various demographic scenarios whereby the Jewish majority would grow dramatically – to more than 86 percent of the population – should Israel separate from the Palestinians and should there be land swaps, including the Triangle area. In June 2013, DellaPergola presented similar findings, saying that while Israel did not officially verify the PA population data, these were realistic figures. Basing his statement on data from Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics, he estimated the number of residents in western Israel, including migrant workers and refugees, at just over 12 million. Within the State of Israel proper, there are somewhat more than 8 million people, and in the PA approximately 3.5-3.8 million residents, split between the Gaza Strip (1.6 million) and the West Bank (2 million). Given that Israel is home to just over 6 million Jews (including those living in the West Bank) and some 350,000 non-Jews, the Jewish sector constitutes only some 52 percent, a small, shrinking, and possibly non-existent majority if one claims that 350,000 of the country’s immigrants are not Jewish to begin with. According to DellaPergola, should Israel decide to maintain control over the West Bank, the Zionist dream is over; if the West Bank is annexed, the country remains Jewish but not democratic because of Arab disenfranchisement. Israel will find itself totally isolated internationally.\textsuperscript{14}

Viewing the immigration from the Soviet Union as an atypical historical event resulting from the breakdown of the non-democratic USSR, DellaPergola does not consider additional Jewish immigration to Israel as the country’s great white hope. He argues that the number of non-democratic places in the world have a relatively low number of Jews; thus, substantial immigration is feasible only from Western countries, such as the United States, Canada, France, and Great Britain. There is Jewish emigration from those states, but in small numbers only.\textsuperscript{15} Therefore, concludes DellaPergola, Israel is now at the demographic boiling point and something must be done.
The Less Alarmist Perspective

In 2013 the Institute for Zionist Strategies published an updated, comprehensive study leading to conclusions differing from those presented above. The most significant differences indicate that the number of Palestinians in the PA (the Gaza Strip and the West Bank) is lower by 0.7-1.3 million than the number presented by the more alarmist approach and the data of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. Moreover, the data shows a Jewish majority in all of western Israel today, and a more significant majority in the coming two decades, especially if the Gaza Strip is excluded from the equation.

This study contends that despite the forecasts of a demographic disaster, the Jewish population of the land of Israel has grown significantly over the last 120 years. According to the report, in 2012 the population in western Israel reached 10,755,000 (differing from DellaPergola’s 12 million), which included a greater Jewish population of 6,332,900 (i.e., those who are eligible for Israeli citizenship according to the Law of Return though not necessarily Jewish according to religious law, or individuals unaffiliated religiously who nonetheless align themselves with the Jewish people); 4,109,000 Muslims (2,726,000 in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank); 181,000 Christians (52,000 in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank); and some 132,000 Druze. The rate of the expanded Jewish population is 59.14 percent of the total population of the western land of Israel. The study is based on Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics data about the Gaza Strip from 1993 and the West Bank from 1994, but it takes a conservative approach and accepts the Palestinian data about birth rates and natural increase, even though it argues that the credibility is suspect. These numbers do not take into account data on young Arabs from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip leaving for abroad, further decreasing natural growth.

The study indicates a decreasing trend in the annual growth of the Arab population of western Israel and a much more drastic decrease starting in 2030. It attributes the decrease in Arab annual growth and rates of reproduction to improved educational levels, the expansion of urbanization and modernization trends, the immigration of Arab youth abroad, and the aging of the Arab populations, leading to an increase of natural death rates. In fact, the continuation of the trend, alongside the natural growth rate of the Jews in Israel, leads to equal rates of natural growth of Arabs and Jews.

Based on calculated assessments of Israel’s Central Bureau of Statistics data on the West Bank and Gaza Strip for 1993-1994, the researchers conclude
that the Arab population of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 2017 is likely to reach 3,099,762, for a total of 4,950,000 in western Israel, including Israel’s Arab citizens. This estimate ignores the negative immigration rates of the Arabs of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and assumes a conservative estimate of young Arabs leaving the State of Israel. Should the data on increased Jewish immigration to Israel (the result of rising anti-Semitism around the world) be factored in, the rate of Jewish growth will increase even further to a clear and absolute majority by 2030.

Similar assessments may be found in the work of Yoram Ettinger and Guy Bechor, who speak about erroneous demographic notions. According to Ettinger, the inflation of the number of Palestinians living in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is a Palestinian reaction to waves of Jewish immigration to Israel meant to scare the Jewish population and Israel’s leadership; it is nothing more than “a civil intifada.”

Ettinger also speaks of other false demographic estimates. In 1967, for example, the demographic establishment called on Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to withdraw from Judea and Samaria lest the Jews become a minority by 1987. In August 1988, Arnon Soffer warned of an Arab majority by 2008. Soffer and DellaPergola had ruled out further significant waves of Jewish immigration, but nonetheless more than one million immigrants arrived from the Commonwealth of Independent States. Ettinger sums it up as follows: “The claim that the Jews are doomed to become a minority west of the Jordan River and that geography must be conceded in order to save demographics is either a phenomenal blunder or a scandalous distortion.”

In December 2013, Ettinger presented the findings of a comprehensive demographic study carried out by a joint Israeli-US demographic research team headed by Bennett Zimmerman. These findings support the trends he had previously identified and findings presented in a comprehensive study conducted by the Institute for Zionist Strategies. The three key points of the study are:

a. The number of Arabs in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip is 3.1 million, not 4.4 million as claimed by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

b. The number of Arabs in the West Bank is 1.7 million, not 2.7 million as claimed by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics.

c. In western Israel (excluding the Gaza Strip), there is a solid Jewish majority of 66 percent benefiting from emerging demographic trends.
Explaining the Differing Demographic Estimates

The numerical difference between the two schools of thought – perhaps reaching 1.3 million – is highly significant. The gap between the two is also evident in the demographic trends they identify; hence the researchers’ different estimates about the extent of the Jewish population in western Israel both with regard to the last few years and expectations for the future.

The main reasons for the differences between the data and trends of the two schools of thought are:

a. Data provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics: Their credibility is the focus of intense debate not only among Israeli researchers. The World Bank, the CIA, and the Norwegian Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies have all expressed various reservations on the reliability of this data.\(^{22}\)

b. The Gaza Strip: The Gaza population is included in some demographic discussions, even though the disengagement from the Gaza Strip was completed and the Gaza Strip is now governed by Hamas as an independent entity.

c. More than 300,000 Palestinians have lived outside the jurisdiction of the Palestinian Authority for more than a year yet are nonetheless counted as PA residents, contrary to what is common practice in demographic studies.\(^{23}\)

d. Abnormalities in demographic indexes in the Jewish sector: The waves of immigration Israel has experienced were not predicted, a phenomenon that may repeat itself should anti-Semitism in Europe spread and the standard of living in Israel rise. There are currently some 1.2 million Jews in Europe, with the largest communities located in France, Ukraine, Germany, and Britain.\(^{24}\) Furthermore, immigration itself affects birthrates in Israel – and Israel is already the only country in the developed world with a steady increase in the birth index.

e. Palestinian emigration: For many years, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics ignored data on negative immigration, instead noting thoroughly unrealistic positive immigration data (50,000 annually). In recent years, partly thanks to professional international criticism, the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics has adjusted its data and attributes zero effect to immigration. However, data actually indicates negative Palestinian immigration of some 20,000 annually,\(^{25}\) in addition to a 15 percent annual rate of emigration from Israel by younger Arabs.
f. Death reports: The data provided by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics on deaths is much lower than what is reasonable by any demographic standard. This is a familiar pattern, attributable in part to the Palestinians’ desire to continue enjoying the support of international organizations provided on a per capita basis.

g. East Jerusalem Arabs and family reunification: More than 300,000 Arabs carrying blue Israeli identity cards live in Jerusalem. They are sometimes counted twice – once by the Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics and once by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics. This is also true of Palestinians who become Israeli citizens or residents as a result of family reunifications.

The Role of Demography in Israel’s Overall Strategic Thinking

Any discussion about the Israeli-Palestinian conflict requires a broad regional and systemic view, and an analysis of the interface between the Israeli-Palestinian sphere and other spheres. So too with demographics, which must be examined alongside other considerations: security, ethics and morality, politics, and economics. In addition, Israel is the nation state of the Jewish people – and as such bears a certain responsibility towards world Jewry – and this element must also figure in overall calculations. Subordinating strategic thinking to the demographic consideration alone might lead to conceptual distortions and biases and damage the quality of comprehensive considerations of national security.

The differences between the two demographic approaches reflect methodological disagreements and likely political ones as well when it comes to interpreting the data and responding to them. Yet in any event, focusing on the demographic dimension alone is artificial and detached from the broader context. It fails to take into account trends and processes that can be expected to occur after a separation from the Palestinians. If one relates to demography in its broader sense, and if one assumes that the common rules accepted in demographic studies and in the current global reality will also continue after a negotiated settlement or some other kind of separation between the populations, demographic pressures, threats, and risks will not disappear just because a new border has been drawn.

The conduct of the PA is that of a failing or failed entity. It is poor, divided, and internally riddled with strife. On its own, it is incapable of providing for the needs of its population in a reasonable manner. A unilateral Israeli withdrawal unsupported by a negotiated settlement and
help in constructing the future Palestinian state will likely leave the PA a failing or failed entity of one degree or another. As such, the PA might experience a systemic collapse as a result of uncontrolled immigration by Palestinian refugees from Arab nations, especially Syria and Lebanon, both of which are in the throes of a longstanding crisis. A collapse of the PA might lead to rising demographic pressures on Israel, which could find itself under increased pressure by neighboring Arab states, Europe, and the international community to moderate its closed-doors policy towards Palestinians and show greater flexibility on freedom of movement, including immigration to Israel.

Regional demographics perforce affect the Israeli-Palestinian demographic sphere, influenced and shaped by tectonic shifts in regional trends: the development of frontiers on Israel’s borders and alongside the PA as a result of the weakening of the Egyptian central government’s hold on the Sinai Peninsula and the ongoing civil war in Syria, and the large influx of Syrian refugees liable to undermine the stability of Jordan and Lebanon. There are also new waves of migration from the regions conquered by the Islamic State, reflecting the spread of radical Sunni Islam of the most extreme kind. These trends are unaffected by the demographic balance in the State of Israel but do have an effect on it.

A strategic move involving an Israeli disengagement from Palestinian territories leading to a change in the demographic balance might have very limited effect on the legitimacy of the State of Israel, its security, and international support for it. Israel viewed the 2005 withdrawal from the Gaza Strip as the end of the occupation and responsibility for the Palestinian population there. Demographically, some 1.5 million Palestinians were suddenly subtracted from the balance, but international support for the Israeli move did not last despite ongoing and increasing terrorism from the Gaza Strip. In the eyes of the Palestinians, the Arab world, and some members of the international community, Israel is still an occupying power in the Gaza Strip because of its control of the land crossings and Gaza’s maritime and air spaces. Therefore the Palestinians, with backing by part of the international community, continue to assign responsibility for the humanitarian needs of the Gaza Strip to Israel. Would a similar move with regard to the West Bank – prompted by the demographic threat – generate a different result?

Some 95 percent of the Palestinians in the West Bank are under the control of the PA, which is responsible for the Palestinians’ personal and
communal welfare from birth to death. Why, then, are they counted in the
demographic balance together with the Jews as if they were part of the same
political entity? Some would say that Israel’s control of Area C and the West
Bank perimeter perpetuate a state of occupation and therefore Palestinian
citizenship and PA responsibility are meaningless words, as the Palestinians’
daily routine is affected and disrupted by Israel’s presence and control.
When discussing the demographic dimension, how does this claim differ
from the claim on Israeli responsibility for the Gaza Strip? And why would
this claim change the day after Israel separates from the Palestinians when
it is clear (certainly after the lessons of Operation Protective Edge in the
summer of 2014) that Israel will have to continue to control the Palestinian
perimeter for a long time in order to ensure its security?

Clearly, Israel’s overall strategic consideration – ensuring the secure
existence of the Jewish nation state and its continued prosperity must
take demographics into account. But it is highly doubtful that an Israeli
withdrawal to borders it considers secure that will exclude a large Palestinian
population leading to significant change in the demographic balance of
Israel proper, will in fact change the position of the Palestinians, the Arab
world, and the international community in the long term. The nature of
Israel’s secure control of the land, the Palestinian national minority on
Israeli sovereign soil that identifies itself as part of the Palestinian people,
the Palestinians’ dissatisfaction with the new reality that will be created,
and the low political functionality of the Palestinian entity or state to be
created in the area Israel is to evacuate will all continue to feed the efforts
to delegitimize Israel and the ethos of resistance and struggle.

The day may come when Israel will have no choice but to take a unilateral
step as the least of the evils among bad alternatives. But such a move must
be the direct result of a comprehensive strategy based first of all on security
considerations, followed by ethical and moral, economic, and political –
as well as demographic – considerations. However, the latter should not
head the list and should certainly not be used as a scare tactic to frighten
the public. Israel must conduct itself with appropriate strategic integrity,
understand the broader contexts and developing trends, and use the
historical perspective and experience amassed to date. Most important,
Israel must remember that any reality formed on the basis of real changes
in the demographic balance of the state will continue to be susceptible to
influence by demographic trends in its own sphere and the surrounding
spheres, as well as delegitimization forces of every nature.
Notes


6 Ibid., p. 15.

7 Ibid., p. 19.

8 Soffer and Bystrov’s estimates are very similar to those presented by the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, i.e., some 4.4 million Palestinians in the Gaza Strip and West Bank.

9 Ibid., p. 29.

10 On the failure of multiculturalism in Western Europe, see, for example, “The Well-Known Failure of Multiculturalism,” Ynet, October 18, 2010, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3971177,00.html.

11 Bystrov and Soffer, “Israeli Demographics 2010-2030,” p. 54.


14 Sergio DellaPergola, “The Jewish Majority is Close to Non-existent; We are Close to a Bi-national State,” http://www.mako.co.il/world-now-israel/Article-8f1be8320475f31006.htm.

15 Ibid.


17 “Since 2005, in seven short years, the Palestinians changed their forecast for when they would become a majority in the land of Israel no fewer than four times. At the same time, the size of the Arab population underwent bizarre
changes,” p. 29. The researchers base their reservations also on reports generated by the World Bank, the Fafo Institute for Applied International Studies in Norway, and internationally acclaimed demographers cited in the study.


19 Ettinger, “Secretary Kerry – It’s Not the Demography!”


21 Yaakov Feitelson, the head of the research team at the Institute for Zionist Strategies, also participated in the Zimmerman study.


23 “The count includes 325,000 people living for more than a year outside Palestinian territory but still carrying Palestinian identity cards and who can therefore return at any time. The number is a minimal estimate and is not exact, because it is impossible to contact all the families living abroad.” See Hassam Abu Libda, director of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, at a press conference in al-Bireh, February 26, 1998.


26 Based on most criteria constituting the Fragile States Index (FSI) of the FFP, www.fundforpeace.org.