



**Israeli Public Threat Perceptions Index:
Public Opinion and Expert Survey Findings
February-July 2026**

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Introduction

Research Objective

This study, conducted within the framework of the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), examines the Israeli public's perceptions regarding 14 main threat scenarios facing the State of Israel—spanning security, diplomatic, social, economic, and environmental domains. The list of 14 scenarios was developed during a preliminary stage of the study, and was validated based on the coding and analysis of open-ended questions included in the expert survey. Scenarios concerning the Israeli–Palestinian conflict were examined separately. The study includes the findings of three surveys conducted at two points in time: February and July 2026. The first data collection was conducted prior to Operation "Roaring Lion" (which began in late February) and, since then, changes have taken place in Israel's diplomatic and security reality. At the same time, the public agenda has also shifted, driven among other things by the issue of Haredi (ultra-Orthodox) enlistment, preparations for the Knesset election campaign, and rising concerns over election fraud. Against the backdrop of these developments, the data collection in July provides an opportunity to evaluate the stability of the public's threat perceptions and analyze the changes that have occurred, relative to February.

This study examines several dimensions of these scenarios, assessing for each of them their perceived threat level, likelihood of occurrence, and anticipated scale of damage. Additionally, it evaluates the anticipated impact of each threat on various domains of life in Israel, as well as the state's level of preparedness to cope with each threat. Beyond these elements, the study focuses specifically on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and examines general assessments regarding the national security situation and respondents' sense of personal security.

This report presents the research findings of the three surveys, with an emphasis on the two surveys conducted among a representative sample of the adult population in Israel in February and July. Where relevant, a comparison is also presented to the survey that examined the perceptions of 147 experts from fields of research, academia, the defense industry, and the government sector, who were sampled in February. The findings of the expert survey serve as a reference point for the findings of the first survey among the general public. Taken together, the findings provide a current snapshot of the prevailing threat perceptions among the Israeli public and highlight the shifts that have occurred since Operation "Roaring Lion."

The three surveys were conducted as part of the "Existential Threats" project led by Brig. Gen. (res.) Yuval Eylon, a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS). The questionnaire development and formulation of the research methodology were carried out by Abir Gitlin, a researcher at the Institute's Data Center. The research assistants for the project are Gal Shani and Jan Solwyn. Data processing and analysis were performed by Alon Talmud.

Methodology and Sample

The study was conducted via an online survey distributed through the Qualtrics system of the Data Center at the INSS. The surveys were distributed to participants of the iPanel online panel across two sub-samples: a Jewish sample and an Arab sample, constituting—after sectoral weighting—a representative sample of the adult Israeli population (aged 18 and older). The survey conducted in July included 968 respondents. The fieldwork for the survey was conducted between June 28 and July 2, 2026. As part of the quality control

process, 32 respondents were removed due to completing the survey too quickly or because they were identified as duplicates. The survey conducted in February 2026 included 921 respondents from the general public (following the application of the same quality control measures), alongside the expert survey ($N = 147$) used in this report for point-in-time comparison. Findings for the closed-ended questions were analyzed using SPSS software.

The survey examined public perceptions regarding 14 threat scenarios. Each respondent was asked to select the three scenarios they considered most threatening from the list, and subsequently answered follow-up questions (likelihood of occurrence in the next five years, anticipated level of damage and, in the current survey, anticipated impact on various domains and level of preparedness) regarding the three scenarios they selected. Additionally, to enable an estimation of the entire sample's attitudes toward each scenario (and not just among those who selected it), each respondent was presented with follow-up questions for additional scenarios randomly selected from those they did not choose: three scenarios in the current survey, and seven in the previous survey.

Naturally, the responses of those who chose a scenario as one of the top three most threatening differ from the responses of those who did not select it. In order for the findings to reflect a reliable estimate for the general population (incorporating both groups at their correct weight), the data were normalized using an exposure-weights method: for each scenario, the responses of participants to whom the scenario was randomly assigned also represent the remaining non-selectors who were not assigned that scenario at random. Their weight was calculated as the ratio between the total number of non-selectors and the number of non-selectors actually questioned about that specific scenario, based on the observed data in each survey. This reconstructs the full composition of the sample for each scenario—selectors and non-selectors alike—in their true proportions.

Additionally, the general public sample was weighted to match the proportions of the adult population in Israel—80% Jewish and others, and 20% Arabs. The final weight for the follow-up questions is the product of the exposure weight and the demographic weight. Following the calculation of the final weight, normalization was performed: each respondent's weight was divided by the average of the weights within that specific scenario, such that the average weight after normalization equals 1 and the sum of the weights equals the actual number of respondents. This normalization does not alter the estimates themselves, as dividing by a constant maintains the proportions; however, it prevents a situation in which a sum of weights greater than the sample size artificially inflates the statistical significance tests. The weights were calculated and normalized separately for each of the two sets of comparisons presented in the report—current public versus previous public, and experts versus previous public. The expert sample was not demographically weighted (as it lacks defined population targets), but exposure normalization was calculated for it separately, within the expert group.

In the tables, a green upward-pointing arrow indicates a statistically significant increase compared to the previous wave (February), while a red downward-pointing arrow indicates a statistically significant decrease. The preparedness row reports the share assessing preparedness as low or very low, based on the entire public sample, and is presented for the July 2026 survey only.

Findings

The Most Threatening Scenarios

Respondents were asked to select the three most threatening scenarios facing Israel in the next five years from a list of 14 scenarios spanning security, diplomatic, social, economic, and environmental domains. The four most frequently selected scenarios are: violent conflict between societal groups (39%, compared to 42% in the previous measurement), Iran acquires nuclear weapons (39%, compared to 40% in the previous measurement), a large-scale missile attack on the home front (35%, compared to 38% in the previous measurement), and undermining the State's democratic character (31%, compared to 34% in the previous measurement)—the exact same top four that led in the previous wave.

Compared to the previous wave, statistically significant increases were recorded in three scenarios: a prolonged war on one of Israel's fronts (from 23% to 27%), international isolation and sanctions (from 21% to 26%), and most conspicuously—a decrease in economic productivity due to demographic changes, where the selection rate tripled (from 4% to 12%). Concurrently, a decrease was recorded in the percentage of respondents selecting a cyberattack and foreign influence in the digital sphere as a significant threat (from 12% down to 9%). No significant differences between waves were found across the remaining scenarios.

Regarding the increase in the productivity scenario, a wording change must be taken into account: in the current wave, the word "economic" was added to the title of the scenario ("a decline in economic productivity due to demographic changes") to prevent confusion with other interpretations of the term. Therefore, it cannot be definitively determined whether the difference stems from the change in wording or from public discourse and the current security situation, in which security tensions are lower.

For comparison, among the experts (February 2026), the most prominent concerns were undermining the State's democratic character (67%), violent conflict between societal groups (58%), and international isolation and sanctions (44%)—a pattern that emphasizes internal and diplomatic threats, whereas the general public continues to attribute greater weight to direct security threats. The complete findings are presented in Figure 1 and Table 1.

Figure 1: Percentage of Respondents Selecting Each Scenario as One of the Top Three Most Threatening – July 2026 vs. February 2026




Table 1: Percentage of Respondents Selecting Each Scenario as One of the Top Three Most Threatening

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Violent conflict between societal groups	39%	42%	58%
Iran acquires nuclear weapons	39%	40%	16%
Large-scale missile attack on the home front	35%	38%	16%

Undermining the State's Democratic Character	31%	34%	67%
Prolonged war on one of Israel's fronts	27%↑	23%	10%
International isolation and sanctions	26%↑	21%	44%
Loss of U.S. support	22%	21%	37%
Undermining of the State's Jewish character	19%	22%	5%
Large-scale natural disaster	14%	14%	10%
War between Israel and a regional coalition	13%	12%	10%
Decline in economic productivity due to demographic changes	12%↑	4%	9%
Cyberattack and foreign influence in the digital sphere	9%↓	12%	4%
Damage to essential infrastructure and supply chains	9%	11%	10%
Worsening impacts of climate change	5%	6%	3%
N	968	921	147
<i>From the following scenarios, please select the three scenarios that you believe are the most threatening to Israel in the next five years.</i>			

The Most Significant Threat

Respondents were subsequently asked to indicate which of the three scenarios they selected represents the most significant threat in their eyes. In the current wave as well, no clear consensus emerged among the public, with the top four threats being: Iran acquiring nuclear weapons (19%), violent conflict between societal groups (15%), undermining the State's democratic character (15%), and a large-scale missile attack on the home front (13%). These are the same four threats that led in the previous wave, with a slight change in order and similar percentages.

Notably, although the current wave was conducted following Operation "Roaring Lion," no statistically significant change was recorded in the proportion of respondents identifying the Iranian threat as the most significant. This contrasts with the expert sample, among whom there was a clear convergence around a single scenario in the previous wave—undermining the State's democratic character (45%). The complete findings are presented in Table 2.

Table 2: The Most Significant Threat Among the Three Selected

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Iran acquires nuclear weapons	19%	19%	3%
Violent conflict between societal groups	15%	15%	20%
Undermining the State's Democratic Character	15%	15%	45%
Large-scale missile attack on the home front	13%↓	16%	5%
Prolonged war on one of Israel's fronts	7%↑	5%	4%
Undermining of the State's Jewish character	7%	9%	--
Loss of U.S. support	5%	7%	10%
Large-scale natural disaster	5%	6%	3%
International isolation and sanctions	4%	3%	6%
War between Israel and a regional coalition	3%	2%	2%
Decline in economic productivity due to demographic changes	3%↑	1%	--
Cyberattack and foreign influence in the digital sphere	2%	1%	1%
Damage to essential infrastructure and supply chains	2%	2%	1%
Worsening impacts of climate change	1%↑	0%	--
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	968	921	146
<i>Of the three scenarios you previously selected, which scenario, in your opinion, is the most threatening?</i>			

Threat Scenarios: Current Status and Changes Between Waves

This section presents the current status of each of the 14 scenarios, ordered by the rate at which they were selected as a significant threat in the current wave. For each scenario, the following are presented: the percentage of respondents selecting it as one of the three main threats, the percentage assessing a high or very high likelihood of its occurrence, the percentage estimating that its occurrence would cause high or very high damage, and, for the July 2026 public survey only, the percentage of the entire sample assessing state preparedness as low or very low. Estimates of likelihood, damage, and preparedness are based on the entire

sample, normalized using the exposure-weighting method described in the methodology section above. The expert data (February 2026) are presented for context, and references to them are in comparison to the previous timeframe only. Changes between waves are indicated by arrows showing an increase or decrease where the difference is statistically significant. In addition, in the most recent wave, respondents were asked about the anticipated damage across four dimensions. A comparative summary of likelihood, damage, and preparedness levels in the current wave is presented in the summary section below.

Violent Conflict Between Societal Groups

This scenario was selected by the highest percentage of respondents in the current wave as one of the three main threats—39%, similar to the previous wave (42%, a non-significant difference). Across the entire sample, 54% assess a high or very high likelihood of its occurrence, and 69% expect high or very high damage if it occurs—data similar to those recorded in the previous wave. In the July survey, perceptions of preparedness are very low: 64% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness as low or very low. Furthermore, this scenario also ranked second highest among the experts (58%).

Table 3: Violent Conflict Between Societal Groups

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	39%	42%	58%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	54%	52%	43%
High or very high anticipated damage	69%	66%	80%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	64%		
N	550	719	112

Of the four domains examined, the anticipated damage is particularly pronounced regarding respondents' sense of personal security (77%) and emotional and social resilience (77%).

Table 4: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – Violent Conflict Between Societal Groups (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	51%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	77%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	59%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	77%
N	556

Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons

This scenario was selected by 39% of respondents as one of the three main threats, similar to the previous wave (40%), and it remains the scenario most frequently cited as the single most significant threat (19%)—even following Operation "Roaring Lion," with no statistically significant change. The perceived likelihood of the scenario occurring rose—43% compared to 36% in the previous wave—while the proportion expecting high or very high damage dropped from 73% to 67%. In the July survey, 32% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low. Among the experts, this scenario was selected at a much lower rate as one of the three main threats (16%). These shifts may reflect the public's experience following the campaign with Iran.

Table 5: Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	39%	40%	16%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	43%↑	36%	23%
High or very high anticipated damage	67%↓	73%	58%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	32%		
N	527	719	69

The anticipated damage in the event that the scenario occurs is particularly pronounced regarding the sense of personal security (71%) and emotional and social resilience (64%).

Table 6: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – Iran Acquires Nuclear Weapons (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	44%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	71%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	54%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	64%
N	555

Large-Scale Missile Attack on the Home Front

This scenario was selected by 35% of respondents as one of the three main threats (compared to 38% in February 2026). 61% assess the likelihood of it occurring as high or very high (compared to 57% in February 2026), while the proportion anticipating high or very high damage dropped from 66% to 56%. In the July survey, perceived preparedness for this scenario is among the highest across the scenarios examined: only 16% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness as low or very low, while 38% assess it as high or very high. It is possible that the decline in perceived damage, combined with relatively high perceived preparedness, moderates the overall threat perception of this scenario.

Table 7: Large-Scale Missile Attack on the Home Front			
	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	35%	38%	16%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	61%	57%	63%
High or very high anticipated damage	56%↓	66%	48%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	16%		
N	510	737	71

The anticipated damage is particularly pronounced regarding sense of personal security (78%) and emotional and social resilience (75%).

Table 8: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – Large-Scale Missile Attack on the Home Front (July 2026)	
Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	53%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	78%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	69%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	75%
N	509

Undermining the State's Democratic Character

This scenario was selected by 31% of the public as one of the three main threats, a similar proportion to the previous wave (34%), while 15% identified it as the single most significant threat. 37% assess the likelihood of its occurrence as high or very high, and 68% believe that if it occurs, the damage caused will be high or very

high, with no statistically significant change compared to the previous wave. In the July survey, perceived preparedness to cope with this scenario is among the lowest: 55% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness as low or very low. Although the scenario is perceived by the public as a significant threat, it is even more prominent among experts: in the previous wave, 67% selected it as one of the three main threats, and 45% cited it as the single most significant threat.

Table 9: Undermining the State's Democratic Character

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	31%	34%	67%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	37%	40%	63%
High or very high anticipated damage	68%	66%	91%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	55%		
N	492	683	113

The anticipated damage is high and relatively uniform across all four domains examined (59%–62%).

Table 10: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – Undermining the State's Democratic Character (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	59%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	62%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	60%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	62%
N	479

Prolonged War on One of Israel's Fronts

The proportion of those selecting this scenario rose from 23% in the previous wave to 27% in the current wave, and concurrently, the perceived likelihood of its occurrence also increased — from 50% to 59%. 57% expect high or very high damage should it occur (55% in the previous wave, with no statistically significant difference). In the July survey, 20% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low.

Table 11: Prolonged War on One of Israel's Fronts

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	27%↑	23%	10%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	59%↑	50%	59%
High or very high anticipated damage	57%	55%	64%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	20%		
N	450	665	55

Should this threat occur, the anticipated damage is particularly pronounced regarding financial security and standard of living (63%), emotional and social resilience (63%), and sense of personal security (62%).

Table 12: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – Prolonged War on One of Israel's Fronts (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	46%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	62%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	63%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	63%
N	455

International Isolation and Sanctions

The proportion of those selecting this scenario as a main threat rose from 21% in February 2026 to 26%, while the most notable increase was in its perceived likelihood of occurrence—from 26% to 37%. 60% anticipate high or very high damage (compared to 55% in the previous wave, with no statistically significant difference). In the July survey, 50% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low. Notably, this scenario was prominent among experts (44%, compared to 26% among the public), such that the trend in the current wave brings public perceptions somewhat closer to those of the experts.

Table 13: International Isolation and Sanctions

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	26%↑	21%	44%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	37%↑	26%	45%
High or very high anticipated damage	60%	55%	85%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	50%		
N	453	660	93

Should this threat occur, the damage anticipated by the majority of respondents will manifest in financial security and standard of living (60%).

Table 14: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – International Isolation and Sanctions (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	49%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	42%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	60%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	44%
N	459

Loss of U.S. Support

The proportion of those selecting this scenario remained stable (22%, similar to 21% in the previous wave); however, its perceived likelihood of occurrence doubled from 13% to 26%—the steepest increase among all scenarios. 67% anticipate high or very high damage in the event of loss of U.S. support (71% in the previous wave). In the July survey, 59% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low. Among experts, assessments of the scenario's severity were particularly high: 93% estimated that it would cause high or very high damage should it occur.

Table 15: Loss of U.S. Support

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	22%	21%	37%

High or very high likelihood of occurring	26%↑	13%	15%
High or very high anticipated damage	67%	71%	93%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	59%		
N	411	627	90

53% indicated that, should the threat occur, the damage will impact financial security and standard of living.

Table 16: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – Loss of U.S. Support (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	39%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	42%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	53%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	38%
N	431

Undermining the State's Jewish Character

This scenario was selected by 19% of respondents as one of the three main threats (22% in the previous wave). The other measures also remained similar across the two waves: 18% assess the likelihood of its occurrence as high or very high (the same percentage as in the previous wave), and 48% anticipate high or very high damage (49% in the previous wave). In the July survey, 42% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low.

Table 17: Undermining the State's Jewish Character

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	19%	22%	5%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	18%	18%	9%
High or very high anticipated damage	48%	49%	53%

Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	42%		
N	401	701	56

Perceived anticipated damage across the various domains is among the lowest of all scenarios, with the most significant domain being emotional and social resilience (43%).

Table 18: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – Undermining the State's Jewish Character (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	29%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	38%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	33%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	43%
N	396

Large-Scale Natural Disaster

Perceptions of this scenario remained stable across measurements on all metrics: 14% selected it as one of the three main threats, 25% assess the likelihood of its occurrence as high or very high (compared to 23% in the previous wave), and 64% anticipate high or very high damage (compared to 63% in the previous wave). In the July survey, 58% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low.

Table 19: Large-Scale Natural Disaster

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	14%	14%	10%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	25%	23%	24%
High or very high anticipated damage	64%	63%	73%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	58%		
N	369	651	48

The anticipated damage across all four domains is high, compared to the proportion of those selecting it as one of the three significant threats.

Table 20: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life - Large-Scale Natural Disaster (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	61%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	67%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	68%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	63%
N	364

War Between Israel and a Regional Coalition

This scenario was selected by a relatively low proportion of respondents as one of the main threats (13%), and the perceived likelihood of its occurrence is similar across both waves (29% compared with 28%). 51% anticipate high or very high damage should it occur. In the July survey, 28% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low.

Table 21: War Between Israel and a Regional Coalition

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	13%	12%	10%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	29%	28%	10%
High or very high anticipated damage	51%	52%	64%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	28%		
N	384	615	57

The anticipated damage is similar across personal security, emotional and social resilience, and financial security (61%–65%).

Table 22: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life - War Between Israel and a Regional Coalition (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	47%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	65%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	61%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	63%
N	343

Decline in Economic Productivity Due to Demographic Changes

This scenario recorded the most significant change between waves, with an increase across all three main metrics: the proportion of those selecting it as one of the three main threats tripled (from 4% to 12%), the perceived likelihood of its occurrence rose from 13% to 24%, and the proportion anticipating high or very high damage increased from 28% to 44%. In the July survey, 53% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low. However, these changes should be interpreted with caution: in the current wave, the phrasing of this scenario was revised by adding the word "economic," in order to prevent survey respondents from confusing it with demographic fertility. It is therefore not possible to conclude whether the change stems from a shift in public discourse in Israel or the revised wording of the scenario.

Table 23: Decline in Economic Productivity Due to Demographic Changes

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	12%↑	4%	9%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	24%↑	13%	16%
High or very high anticipated damage	44%↑	28%	45%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	53%		
N	325	607	66

The anticipated damage is associated primarily with financial security and standard of living (62%), but not exclusively.

Table 24: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life - Decline in Economic Productivity Due to Demographic Changes (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	41%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	40%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	62%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	52%
N	341

Cyberattack and Foreign Influence in the Digital Sphere

The proportion of respondents selecting this scenario dropped from 12% in the previous wave to 9% in the current wave. At the same time, the perceived likelihood of its occurrence actually rose (44% compared to 35% in the previous wave). It appears that, despite the increase in its perceived likelihood, the public currently perceives other threats as more significant. In addition, the proportion anticipating high or very high damage dropped from 44% to 34%, the lowest among all scenarios. In the July survey, perceived preparedness is among the highest across the scenarios: 14% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness as low or very low.

Table 25: Cyberattack and Foreign Influence in the Digital Sphere

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	9% ↓	12%	4%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	44% ↑	35%	63%
High or very high anticipated damage	34% ↓	44%	44%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	14%		
N	309	624	53

The anticipated damage is particularly pronounced in terms of the functioning of state authorities (64%).

Table 26: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life - Cyberattack and Foreign Influence in the Digital Sphere (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	64%

Significant damage to sense of personal security	54%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	49%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	47%
N	318

Damage to Essential Infrastructure and Supply Chains

This scenario remained stable and relatively low across all metrics: 9% selected it as a main threat, 19% assess the likelihood of its occurrence as high or very high, and 50% anticipate high or very high damage. In the July survey, 37% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low.

Table 27: Damage to Essential Infrastructure and Supply Chains

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	9%	11%	10%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	19%	16%	14%
High or very high anticipated damage	50%	53%	70%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	37%		
N	322	623	57

The anticipated damage to financial security and standard of living is the highest among all scenarios (77%), along with 60%–63% across the remaining domains.

Table 28: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – Damage to Essential Infrastructure and Supply Chains (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	60%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	63%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	77%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	60%
N	321

Worsening Impacts of Climate Change

This scenario was selected by the lowest proportion of respondents as one of the main threats (5%, compared with 6% in the previous wave). 33% assess the likelihood of its occurrence as high or very high (31% in the previous wave), and 35% anticipate high or very high damage (36% in the previous wave). In the July survey, 60% of the full public sample assess the State's preparedness for this scenario as low or very low.

Table 29: Worsening Impacts of Climate Change

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Selected as one of the three main threats	5%	6%	3%
High or very high likelihood of occurring	33%	31%	24%
High or very high anticipated damage	35%	36%	21%
Low or very low preparedness (entire public sample – July 2026)	60%		
N	305	579	65

The anticipated damage across all four domains is among the lowest of all scenarios (29%–38%).

Table 30: Anticipated Impact Across Domains of Life – Worsening Impacts of Climate Change (July 2026)

Domain	% High or Very High Damage
Significant disruption to the functioning of state authorities	29%
Significant damage to sense of personal security	31%
Significant damage to financial security and standard of living	38%
Significant damage to emotional and social resilience	33%
N	281

Summary of the Current Wave: Likelihood, Damage, and Preparedness

This section consolidates the findings of the July survey across four metrics—perceived likelihood of occurrence, anticipated damage, anticipated damage across domains of life, and perceived state preparedness (estimated for the entire sample)—with each metric ranked from highest to lowest.

The likelihood rankings are led by ongoing security scenarios: a large-scale missile attack on the homefront (61%), prolonged war on one of Israel's fronts (59%), and violent conflict between societal groups (54%). The

lowest-ranked scenarios are damage to essential infrastructure and supply chains (19%) and undermining the State's Jewish character (18%).

Table 31: High or Very High Likelihood of Scenario Occurring – July 2026, Ranked from Highest to Lowest

Scenario	% Assessing Likelihood as High
Large-scale missile attack on the home front	61%
Prolonged war on one of Israel's fronts	59%
Violent conflict between societal groups	54%
Cyberattack and foreign influence in the digital sphere	44%
Iran acquires nuclear weapons	43%
International isolation and sanctions	37%
Undermining the State's Democratic Character	37%
Worsening impacts of climate change	33%
War between Israel and a regional coalition	29%
Loss of U.S. support	26%
Large-scale natural disaster	25%
Decline in economic productivity due to demographic changes	24%
Damage to essential infrastructure and supply chains	19%
Undermining of the State's Jewish character	18%

In the ranking of anticipated damage, domestic and diplomatic scenarios stand out in particular: violent conflict between societal groups (69%), undermining the State's democratic character (68%), Iran acquires nuclear weapons, and loss of U.S. support (67% each). The lowest-ranked scenarios are worsening impacts of climate change (35%) and cyberattack and foreign influence in the digital sphere (34%).

Table 32: High or Very High Anticipated Damage Should the Scenario Occur – July 2026, Ranked from Highest to Lowest

Scenario	% Anticipating High Damage
Violent conflict between societal groups	69%

Undermining the State's Democratic Character	68%
Iran acquires nuclear weapons	67%
Loss of U.S. support	67%
Large-scale natural disaster	64%
International isolation and sanctions	60%
Prolonged war on one of Israel's fronts	57%
Large-scale missile attack on the home front	56%
War between Israel and a regional coalition	51%
Damage to essential infrastructure and supply chains	50%
Undermining of the State's Jewish character	48%
Decline in economic productivity due to demographic changes	44%
Worsening impacts of climate change	35%
Cyberattack and foreign influence in the digital sphere	34%

In terms of anticipated damage, military and domestic scenarios—threats of a missile attack (78%), violent conflict between societal groups (77%), and Iran (71%)—emerged as the most significant, whereas damage to financial security and standard of living is most pronounced in the infrastructure and economic scenarios: damage to essential infrastructure (77%) and a decline in economic productivity (62%).

Table 33: Anticipated Damage Across Domains of Life by Scenario – July 2026 (% High or Very High Damage), Ranked by Damage to Sense of Personal Security; Highest Damage for Each Aspect Highlighted

Scenario	Functioning of State Authorities	Sense of Personal Security	Financial Security and Standard of Living	Emotional and Social Resilience
Large-scale missile attack on the home front	53%	78%	69%	75%
Violent conflict between societal groups	51%	77%	59%	77%
Iran acquires nuclear weapons	44%	71%	54%	64%
Large-scale natural disaster	61%	67%	68%	63%

War between Israel and a regional coalition	47%	65%	61%	63%
Damage to essential infrastructure and supply chains	60%	63%	77%	60%
Prolonged war on one of Israel's fronts	46%	62%	63%	63%
Undermining the State's Democratic Character	59%	62%	60%	62%
Cyberattack and foreign influence in the digital sphere	64%	54%	49%	47%
International isolation and sanctions	49%	42%	60%	44%
Loss of U.S. support	39%	42%	53%	38%
Decline in economic productivity due to demographic changes	41%	40%	62%	52%
Undermining of the State's Jewish character	29%	38%	33%	43%
Worsening impacts of climate change	29%	31%	38%	33%

Perceived lack of preparedness is particularly pronounced in domestic and civil scenarios— violent conflict between societal groups (64%), worsening impacts of climate change (60%), loss of U.S. support (59%), and large-scale natural disaster (58%)—and is low in military-technological scenarios including missile attack (16%) and cyberattack (14%). Combining the rankings reveals that the scenario ranked first in anticipated damage— violent conflict between societal groups—is also the scenario for which perceived lack of preparedness is highest.

Table 34: Low or Very Low State Preparedness, Entire Sample – July 2026; Ranked from Highest to Lowest

Scenario	Assessing Low or Very Low Preparedness %
Violent conflict between societal groups	64%
Worsening impacts of climate change	60%
Loss of U.S. support	59%
Large-scale natural disaster	58%

Undermining the State's Democratic Character	55%
Decline in economic productivity due to demographic changes	53%
International isolation and sanctions	50%
Undermining of the State's Jewish character	42%
Damage to essential infrastructure and supply chains	37%
Iran acquires nuclear weapons	32%
War between Israel and a regional coalition	28%
Prolonged war on one of Israel's fronts	20%
Large-scale missile attack on the home front	16%
Cyberattack and foreign influence in the digital sphere	14%

The Issue of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

As an ongoing and topical issue, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was examined separately from the other scenarios. In the current wave, 55% of the public indicated that the issue of the conflict constitutes a significant threat to Israel to a large or very large extent, similar to 53% in the previous wave (a non-significant difference). However, the proportion of respondents answering "to a very large extent" rose from 16% to 21%.

Table 35: Perception of the Threat Posed by the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Not at all	6%	5%	3%
To a small extent	12%	15%	3%
To a moderate extent	24%	24%	18%
To a large extent	35%	36%	51%
To a very large extent	21%↑	16%	26%
Don't know	3%	3%	--
Total low threat (1+2)	19%	20%	5%
Total high threat (4+5)	55%	53%	78%
Total	100%	100%	100%

N	968	921	80
<i>To what extent do you think the issue of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict constitutes a significant threat to the State of Israel?</i>			

Perception of the threat associated with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is high across all political orientations: 68% of those who identify as left-wing view the issue as a threat to a large or very large extent, compared to 59% of those in the political center and 50% of those on the right.

Table 36: Perception of the Threat Posed by the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict by Political Camp (July 2026)

	Right	Center	Left
Total low threat (1+2)	26%	14%	5%
Total high threat (4+5)	50%	59%	68%
N	533	168	107

When asked which scenario related to the conflict is perceived as the most threatening, public threat perception is distributed among the alternatives: 35% view a bi-national state in which Palestinians are granted full citizenship as the main threat, 24% point to the two-state solution, and 24% to full annexation without granting citizenship. The proportion of those who believe that none of the scenarios constitutes a significant threat stands at 9% (11% in the previous wave). Among Jewish respondents, the bi-national state scenario is the most prominent (39%), while among Arab respondents, the annexation scenario stands out (46%).

Table 37: The Most Threatening Scenario Regarding the Issue of the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
Full annexation of the Judea and Samaria territories, without granting full Israeli citizenship to Palestinians	24%	21%	59%
A single bi-national state, including granting full Israeli citizenship to Palestinians	35%	31%	23%
A Palestinian state alongside Israel, within the framework of a two-state solution	24%↓	28%	9%
None of the scenarios constitutes a significant threat	9%	11%	8%
Don't know	9%	9%	3%
Total	100%	100%	100%

N	968	921	80
<i>In your opinion, which of the following scenarios regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is the most threatening to the State of Israel in the next five years?</i>			

Finally, when respondents were asked to choose between the general scenario they selected as the most threatening and the Israeli-Palestinian scenario they selected, 68% chose the general scenario and 30% chose the Israeli-Palestinian scenario—rates identical to those measured in the previous wave. In other words, although the Israeli-Palestinian conflict issue is perceived as a significant threat in its own right, for most of the public it does not outweigh the general scenario they identified as most threatening.

National Security Assessment and Sense of Personal Security

The national security assessment is essentially similar to the one measured in the previous wave: 35% of the public assess the situation as bad (ratings 1–2) and 25% assess it as good (ratings 4–5). The midpoint of the scale remains the most common category (38%), unchanged from the previous survey. Assessments are more negative among Arab respondents: 45% assess the situation as bad, compared to 33% among Jewish respondents. This gap may reflect perceptions of the internal security situation within Arab society.

Table 38: National Security Assessment, on a Scale from 1 to 5

	July 2026	February 2026	Experts (February 2026)
1 – Very bad situation	14%	14%	3%
2	21%	21%	24%
3	38%	37%	54%
4	20%	20%	18%
5 – Very good situation	5%↓	7%	--
Don't know	1%	1%	1%
Total bad situation (1+2)	35%	34%	27%
Total good situation (4+5)	25%	27%	18%
Total	100%	100%	100%
N	968	921	147

How do you assess Israel's current national security situation? Please rate on a scale of 1–5, where 1 = very bad situation and 5 = very good situation.

Concern regarding external threats and internal tensions remained high in both domains: 76% are concerned (fairly concerned or very concerned) about external security threats facing Israel (73% in the previous wave),

with the proportion of those very concerned rising from 18% to 23%. 87% are concerned about internal social tensions, a rate similar to the previous wave. In both waves, concern over internal tensions is higher than concern over external threats, notably driven by the proportion of those very concerned regarding external threats (45%, compared to 23%). Concern over internal tensions cuts across political camps, but increases from right to left: 84% on the right, 92% in the center, and 97% on the left.

Table 39: Degree of Concern Regarding External Security Threats and Internal Tensions

	External threats – July 2026	External threats – February 2026	Internal tensions – July 2026	Internal tensions – February 2026
Not at all concerned	4%	5%	2%	3%
Not so concerned	17%	20%	9%	10%
Fairly concerned	53%	55%	42%	41%
Very concerned	23% ↑	18%	45%	44%
Don't know	2%	2%	1%	2%
Total not concerned (1+2)	22%	25%	11%	13%
Total concerned (3+4)	76%	73%	87%	85%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	968	921	968	921

To what extent are you concerned about external security threats to Israel? To what extent are you concerned about internal social tensions within Israel?

The sense of personal security is stable across the two waves: 26% report a high or very high sense of personal security (25% in the previous wave), while 29% report a low or very low sense of personal security (28% in the previous wave)—with no statistically significant differences. The most common category is a moderate sense of personal security (44%). An examination of sectors reveals a significant gap: among Jewish respondents, 31% report a high sense of personal security, compared to only 5% among Arab respondents, 51% of whom report a low sense of personal security.

Table 40: Sense of Personal Security

	July 2026	February 2026	Jewish (July 2026)	Arab (July 2026)
Very high	4%	6%	5%	1%
High	22%	19%	26%	3%

Moderate	44%	47%	45%	44%
Low	20%	17%	17%	31%
Very low	9%	11%	7%	20%
Don't know	1%↑	0%	1%	1%
Total high	26%	25%	31%	5%
Total low	29%	28%	23%	51%
Total	100%	100%	100%	100%
N	968	921	820	148
<i>What is your level of personal security these days?</i>				

Here too, differences according to political orientation are pronounced: 40% of those who identify as right-wing report a high sense of personal security, compared to 15% of those in the center and 14% of those on the left.