Saudi Arabia has traditionally tended to avoid direct confrontation with strong enemies. Instead, it uses its deep pockets to increase its influence and focuses on attempts at mediation in the Arab world in order to neutralize dangers. In spite of its political and religious standing and its being the largest exporter of oil in the world, with one-quarter of the proven oil reserves on its territory, it sees surrounding states such as Iran, Iraq, and Yemen as a threat, although for differing reasons. This sense of vulnerability, along with Saudi Arabia’s relative military weakness – its borders are long and easily penetrated, and its military, though equipped with advanced weaponry, is small and untrained – has until now prompted it to rely on American patronage for deterrence and defense. However, the turbulence in the Arab world has led Saudi Arabia to a stronger sense that it is left on its own to cope with the threats it faces, as well as to the recognition that the challenges at home and abroad compel it to adopt different solutions than in the past. This has led it largely to abandon its former relative passivity, to fling down the gauntlet to Iran, and even to adopt a more independent policy toward the United States. This article will examine the motivation behind what appears to be an adjustment in Saudi policy, and the implications of this change.

Buying Domestic Quiet
Until now Saudi Arabia has coped with threats of unrest by iron-fisted suppression of the protests (especially in Shiite areas) and by injecting large sums of money (some $120 billion) into buying domestic quiet. It appears that the royal house has learned the lessons of events in North
Africa. It has made extensive use of social networking sites to connect with the citizenry and both propose solutions to domestic problems and warn against harm to the royal house. For example, in spite of the efforts by various opposition figures both inside and outside the kingdom to promote a "day of rage" in March 2011, early preparations by security forces and warnings not to demonstrate contributed to calm the situation.

At the same time, a series of edicts was published that were intended, inter alia, to assist in housing solutions, encourage employment of young people, and expand the social safety net. King Abdullah also issued a royal decree intended to fight the rise in prices of basic foods, and he approved six decisions concerning wage increases for public service workers in security, health, and agriculture. Several days before the local elections on September 29—which occurred only for the second time in the history of the kingdom—the King announced that women would be given the right to vote and run for a seat in the local municipalities. However, the fact that he avoided implementing the dramatic step at this point calls into question his actual willingness to realize it—it seems more a gesture than a tangible measure.

In spite of the increasing calls to fight corruption, separate powers, and make a gradual transition to a constitutional monarchy, most of the reforms were economic in nature. Nonetheless, they have helped take the sting out of the protests. Once again oil wealth has proven to be an effective tool for calming social and political tensions, at least as long as oil prices remain at their current level. Yet not only is the regime reaching deep into its pockets; it has also shown its determination to use force against any manifestation of popular protest, and in particular, to take vigorous action against the protests—thus far limited—of Shiites in the Hasah and Qatif region. Charges that the protesters were Iranian agents strengthened the legitimacy of the regime’s suppression by force and deterred others from taking to the street. Saudi Foreign Minister Saud al-Faisal threatened that the authorities would “cut off every finger” that worked against the regime, and the Council of Senior Ulama, the most important religious body in the kingdom, issued a religious edict stating that the protests are a deviation from the path of Islam. Likewise, rules governing the print media and the internet, which were already draconian, have been tightened, and it was reported that the royal house was working on a new “anti-terror” law that would place further restrictions on the
population. Inter alia, the new regulations permit extended detention without trial and increase use of the death penalty for anyone who casts aspersions on the royal house and its policy. These steps, ostensibly part of a war on terror, aim to curtail the rights of the kingdom’s subjects, which are already circumscribed. There is an intention to expand the definition of “act of terror” to any action that “harms the reputation of the state” or “endangers national unity.” Additional measures include increased security around strategic facilities; mass preventive arrests; and tightened supervision of Shiite clerics and control of the entry of foreign citizens, especially Arabs, to the kingdom, to preclude the import of revolutionary ideas.

Monarchies Unite!
Since coping with domestic protests, Saudi Arabia has been free to attempt to restore the regional status quo, and if it could, to compete for leadership of the Sunni world. Perhaps its most dramatic step is connected to the initiative to enlarge the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) by including Jordan (and perhaps Morocco) in a new bloc of monarchies in order to prevent them from bowing to the demands of protesters and implementing significant reforms. The Saudi elite, which fears that governmental reforms in the Arab world will serve as a role model for opposition forces in Saudi Arabia, is seeking to immunize the monarchies from possible risks to their stability and to strengthen their legitimacy, both domestically and abroad. In this framework, it is pushing to include Jordan in the GCC in spite of the reservations of some of its members, who fear that their standing in the organization will be harmed and who still remember King Hussein’s support for Saddam, and despite the longstanding hostility between the Saudis and the Hashemites.

Inviting Jordan, likewise a pro-Western Sunni monarchy that opposes Iran, into the private club of oil producers (at this stage, it is not clear what its status will be) will give the loose thirty-year old GCC political and security depth; contribute to increasing investments in Jordan; and facilitate the supply of cheap oil from the Gulf states. This is a fundamental issue for Jordan – whose economy is even smaller than Oman’s – as 80 percent of its electricity production is dependent on the supply of Egyptian gas. In parallel, Saudi Arabia transferred $1.5 billion to Jordan as part of a five-year plan intended to assist it in coping with
its budget deficit, which has grown significantly as a result of the rise in energy prices. There is also a not-insignificant security dimension to the initiative. From the Saudi perspective, Jordan’s joining the GCC will improve the Saudi ability to cope with a possible deterioration in the security situation. Jordan’s special units and intelligence services have a good reputation, and they have been training and assisting security forces in the Gulf for several years (it was even reported that Jordanian troops joined the forces that entered Bahrain in March 2011). In parallel with the negotiations to include Jordan in the GCC, Riyadh is providing Gulf states that were hit with protests with large grants ($20 billion for Bahrain and Oman, most of it Saudi money). These moves have already produced results, and the GCC appears more united than ever. Even Qatar, which in recent years has had a policy that was independent of Gulf positions (in order to avoid conflict with Iran, to balance Riyadh’s power, and to highlight its own status) has largely fallen into line with the other members. This is particularly noticeable in broadcasts by the Qatari-owned satellite channel al-Jazeera.

Saudi Arabia is also devoting significant efforts to keep Egypt from drawing closer to Iran. After Mubarak’s ouster, comments were made in Cairo about the need to renew diplomatic relations with Tehran. Iran welcomed statements by the Egyptian leadership concerning its intention to turn over a new leaf in relations with Iran, and it even noted that Egypt’s opposition to Israel was creating common ground between the two countries. In response, Riyadh stepped up coordination with Cairo, dusted off a series of joint initiatives that were intended to strengthen relations between Saudi Arabia and Egypt, and committed itself to transfer $4 billion in order to help the Egyptian economy stay afloat (the UAE is reportedly transferring an additional $3 billion). It appears that this investment has paid off. Egypt has expressed support for Saudi policy, including in Bahrain, and has made it clear that it considers the security of the Gulf to be the security of Egypt itself – a clear signal to Iran to stop its negative involvement in the Gulf states. Indeed, it is unlikely that Cairo actually intends to implement one of the most fundamental changes in its foreign policy since the Islamic Revolution, particularly in light of various long term goals. At the same time, and particularly if the Muslim Brotherhood attains substantial influence in the future Egyptian regime, Egypt’s relations with Iran may
grow stronger despite the different ideologies because of common short term goals. And indeed, according to Israeli Military Intelligence chief Major General Aviv Kochavi, Iran “is funding and strengthening its ties with the Muslim Brotherhood in order to influence the results of the political process in Egypt.”

**Flinging Down the Gauntlet to Iran**

Classic balance of power considerations and Sunni-Shia rivalry are intertwined with Saudi activism in an attempt to contain Iran and create a Sunni front as a counterweight to Iranian influence. Indeed, the turbulence in the Arab world has revealed the depth of, and has perhaps even increased, the Saudi-Iranian rivalry. In the first stages of the Arab spring, Iran attempted to present the protests as an achievement for itself. For Iran, the protests, at least until they reached its Syrian ally, looked like a golden opportunity, an opportunity to weaken the Sunni front and take credit for the achievements of the masses. And in fact, Saudi Arabia fears that one of the results of the Arab spring will be to tip the regional balance of power in the direction of Iran, given that Saudi Arabia’s friends in the “moderate” camp have been undermined, and given the increasing threats to its security with the collapse of the old order around it.

The uprising in Bahrain, which has clear ethnic characteristics, looked to Riyadh like a critical event in the Sunni-Shiite conflict and an opportunity to redesign the rules of the game with Iran. In its involvement in Bahrain, Saudi Arabia sought to establish: first, when there is a danger to the stability of the kingdom, it will act, even against the advice of Washington. Second, it will use force openly if required, as evidenced in the battle Saudi Arabia waged in 2009-10 against the Houthis on its border with Yemen, who it claims are receiving Iranian support (this was the largest military battle in the Arabian Peninsula since the Gulf War). It appears that the events in Bahrain, which were seen as an Iranian plot, provided a sense of urgency for the need to contain the influence of Iran. The House of Khalifa, from many points of view – geographic, historical, and even familial – is closest to Saudi Arabia, and therefore, it was no surprise that the Saudis sent forces to protect it. The Saudis also sent (on March 15, 2011) military forces to their neighbor Bahrain in order to ensure that the House of Khalifa would not become a constitutional monarchy and that the Shiite protests would not “infect” the Shiite population.
centers in the northwest of the kingdom. Calm has been preserved for now, though at the price of tension in relations with the Americans as well as with the Iranians, all of whom did not view the Saudi intervention favorably, though for different reasons.

This dispatch of forces was intended to prevent the Shiites, who are the majority in the tiny archipelago, from threatening the rule of the al-Khalifa family, but also to send a clear signal to Iran that Bahrain is located deep within the Saudi realm of influence. Saudi forces have not yet completely left Bahrain, even after the state of emergency was canceled, and it was reported that there is an intention to establish a permanent base in the country for the Gulf states’ joint military force. The vigorous response of the Saudi-headed Gulf camp to the events in Bahrain also included closure of dozens of Iranian and Shiite media channels; expulsion of Iranian diplomats by Kuwait and Bahrain; a serious escalation of anti-Iranian rhetoric; calls for waging economic warfare against Iran by sending Iranian workers back from the Gulf; a letter to the Security Council on the matter of Iran; and even calls for incitement of the Arab population in Khuzestan in response to Iranian incitement of the Shiites in the Arab Gulf states.9

Another issue troubling Saudi Arabia is that Iraq is becoming increasingly identified with Iran.10 This can be seen in Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki’s recent expression of support for the Shiite protest in Bahrain, in the closer economic relations between Iraq and Iran, in Iraq’s support for the Asad regime, and even in Iraq’s support for Iran in its struggle against Saudi Arabia within OPEC.

Syria, like Iraq, is liable to become a theater of conflict between Iran and the Arab states, this time led by Saudi Arabia, which does not hesitate to oppose Bashar al-Asad openly and lend active support to the Sunnis. The Saudis have sought to limit Iranian influence in various areas, but their realization that placing themselves at the head of the anti-Iranian camp in Syria would bring them into conflict with Tehran has thus far prevented them from adopting a more assertive policy. Now Saudi Arabia is seeking to oust Asad, if only because this will cause Iran to lose a major ally, undermine the radical camp, and give Saudi Arabia an opportunity to lead a Sunni camp that is larger and more cohesive than in the past. In addition to sending ambassadors home and using an increasingly strident tone against Asad, it was reported that Saudi Arabia and the
other Gulf states have stepped up the pace of oil production in order to
cover the deficit in Syrian oil in the European markets, and that they are
actively aiding the Sunni rebels. In the Saudi view, it is still not too late
to take advantage of Asad’s weakness and offer him a “deal”: implement
“reforms” and stay in power in exchange for cutting off relations with Iran
and Hizbollah. Saudi Arabia hopes that undermining the Asad regime
will reduce Iran to its “natural size.” This would be the best scenario for
Saudi Arabia, second only to the fall of the Islamic Republic.

Riyadh appears readier than ever to harness all of its resources in an
attempt to cope with Iran’s regional aspirations. Turki al-Faisal, former
Saudi intelligence chief and ambassador to Britain and the United States,
was quoted by the Wall Street Journal as saying that “Iran is very vulnerable
in the oil sector, and it is there that more could be done to squeeze the
current government.” Furthermore, al-Faisal threatened that Saudi
Arabia would not hesitate to use the oil weapon and increase production
in order to cover the deficit in Iranian oil in the markets. This may be a
signal that Saudi Arabia is prepared to take it upon itself to reduce the
expected damage to the world economy if the sanctions against Iran are
tightened and an oil embargo is imposed, perhaps even to minimize the
consequences of any possible attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities, first
among them, harm to oil export from the Gulf.

Saudi Arabia has thus offered not only an incentive, but also a
threat. In recent months, statements have been made implying that
Saudi Arabia will seek to develop its own nuclear option: an Iranian
nuclear device “would compel Saudi Arabia . . . to pursue policies which
could lead to untold and possibly dramatic consequences,” Turki al-
Faisal declared in a closed meeting with NATO. This comment, along
with similar statements made in March at a conference in Abu Dhabi,
constitutes a change in the Saudi approach to the issue. For the first time,
senior officials of the royal house are publicly and explicitly addressing
the nuclear military issue, which strengthens the assessment that Iran’s
nuclearization is liable to bring about increased nuclear proliferation in
the region. The purpose of these statements may be to put the spotlight
on events within the kingdom in the context of the Arab spring, and to
induce the West to solve the Iranian nuclear problem, but the possibility
that these comments are motivated by a desire to examine the nuclear
path cannot be ruled out.
Increasing Independence from the United States

In his May 2011 speech to the Arab world, President Obama declared that promoting reforms in the Arab world is now a primary goal of the administration. Criticism of the administration’s double standards – military force against the Qaddafi regime versus a weak call to Bahrain to maintain freedom of speech – led Obama to change his priorities, at least publicly, and to make promoting reforms the top priority. Although Saudi Arabia was not mentioned in the speech, Riyadh understood the message. In the Saudi view, this speech recalls the ease with which the United States abandoned its significant allies, such as Ben Ali in Tunisia and Mubarak in Egypt. The fear that if forced to choose again between freedom and stability the United States could “abandon” Saudi Arabia as well is becoming tangible in Riyadh.

Saudi-American relations have seen ups and downs over the past decade, especially after the September 11 terror attacks and the US invasion of Iraq, but the kingdom has remained the keystone of what remains of the pro-American Arab camp. Indeed, although Washington is not satisfied with the decisions being made in Riyadh, the United States cannot permit itself to lose Saudi Arabia. With the thinning of US forces in Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States increasingly needs Saudi Arabia to use its influence to stabilize the situation, and likewise in places such as Yemen and Lebanon, where Saudi influence acts as a counterweight to Iranian intervention. Washington also needs Riyadh to work to moderate oil prices, as it attempted to do in the summer of 2011, whether through OPEC or by exploiting Saudi surplus production capability. In addition, the United States intends to sell the Saudis more than $60 billion worth of weapons in the coming years. This deal, like others in the pipeline, is a form of Saudi leverage, because loss of the deal would have a negative impact on the US economy in general and the arms industry in particular. And despite the tensions, the two sides are continuing their security cooperation: the United States has announced that Saudi Arabia is seeking to significantly upgrade the aging Saudi fleet, including missile defense capability (the Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense). The US is also continuing to train the new 30,000-man Saudi force for protecting strategic facilities, including government buildings, oil terminals, and refining facilities. These various considerations
perhaps explain why the entry of Saudi forces into Bahrain did not result in a significant American condemnation.

In spite of continued security cooperation, however, senior Saudi officials have leveled criticism at Washington in recent months, unprecedented in its severity, because of US policy toward the events in the Arab world. According to a senior Saudi official, this “ill-conceived” American policy is one of the reasons that Saudi Arabia is adopting a policy that will sometimes conflict with US interests in the region. Furthermore, in Riyadh’s view, “Washington has shown itself . . . to be an . . . unreliable partner” in face of the Iranian threat. The official stated that the decades-long US-Saudi arrangement of “oil for security” is at an end. The Saudis have also brought a new-old weapon into the battle: unprecedented public criticism directed at the Obama administration for not pressuring Israel enough on the peace process, in what appears to be an attempt to take the spotlight off the kingdom.

Access to the economy of the Gulf, the fight against terrorism, the struggle against the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and the peace process in the region will continue to be basic American interests. How the Saudis will be included in these objectives in the future is not clear. It is also unclear how events will influence the ability of the United States to secure these interests and whether they will have an impact, for example, on the location of the bases, e.g., the Fifth Fleet in Bahrain, and the US force structure in the region. It is still too early to assess how any change in the deployment of bases will affect future US military missions, especially with regard to containment and deterrence of Iran. The unrest in Bahrain is liable to cause the United States, if it has not already done so, to reconsider maintaining its base there. An evacuation of some of the forces, or even an indication that the United States is considering this, would be a victory for Iran and would further weaken the willingness of Saudi Arabia and the Gulf states to rely on US security support. From the Saudi point of view, the inability to coerce Iran looks like American weakness. Add to this the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, which is

Overall the Saudi policy can be understood as an attempt to redesign relations with the United States. This will likely limit even further the ability of the United States to wield influence in the region.
seen in Riyadh as a terrible error, and the result is that the United States appears in fact to be abandoning the arena to Iran.

The chill in relations between the capitals can also be seen in the Saudi street. In a poll conducted in the kingdom published in July 2011, 70 percent had negative opinions of the United States, as opposed to 60 percent who had such opinions in 2009 (the killing of Bin Laden may have influenced the results). Riyadh’s concerns about the Arab spring are similar to its concerns after the September 11 terror attacks: that the events would have a negative impact on the kingdom’s image in the United States, and that in the long run, the willingness of the United States to defend Saudi Arabia would be damaged. Relations with the United States, in spite of their decisive contribution to the kingdom’s security against external enemies, cannot help it to face the new-old challenges at home. On the contrary, the royal house’s connection with the United States is problematic, and was also a major factor in the establishment of al-Qaeda. In addition, even a massive investment in advanced weaponry cannot bring relief to the security challenges it confronts, most of them internal.

Overall the Saudi policy can be understood as an attempt to redesign relations with the United States. These relations, which have borne the characteristics of patron-client relations, are likely to be different in the future. Beyond the fact that the United States is a source of criticism by opposition figures in the kingdom, over time protests in the Gulf are liable to highlight ever more clearly the significant ideological distance between Washington and Riyadh and drive a wedge between them. This would likely limit even further the ability of the United States to wield influence in the region. Currently, there is no substitute for the American defensive force. However, the Saudis are seeking to leave most of their options open, and are also looking eastward toward China for political support and at Muslim states such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan in an attempt to recruit mercenaries and other means of defense.

It is not easy to break off relations built over the course of sixty years that are based on the deep material interests of both sides. The American need for access to the Gulf economy will continue, as will the Saudi need for effective security support. It is true that an assertive Saudi policy, especially if aimed at Iran, is consistent with Washington’s interests. Nevertheless, preserving the framework of relations with Riyadh, certainly with the continuation of the protests, is liable to be more
expensive for Washington and in the future force it to decide between its liberal values and the need to preserve stability even after it withdraws a significant portion of its troops from the region. It appears that Riyadh is not only expressing doubts about the utility of adhering to the alliance with the United States; it is attempting to mold the alliance so that it will allow it greater freedom to maneuver than in the past. In addition, Riyadh is also likely to seriously consider parallel security arrangements.

Saudi Arabia’s assertiveness vis-à-vis its stance towards Iran is apparently viewed positively in Jerusalem. In recent years, what has connected the Gulf states with Israel more than anything is the growing fear of Iran, and it was even reported that several Gulf states, including Saudi Arabia, have been holding an intelligence dialogue with Israel, directly as well as indirectly. It is possible that this dialogue does not touch specifically on Iranian nuclear development, but it is not inconceivable that the sides are working to expose and foil activity by Iran or its proxies in the region. Beyond an intelligence dialogue, the sides may also be coordinating policy on one level or another, vis-à-vis the US administration as well, whose policy on the Iranian issue is not entirely consistent with their policy. Israel and Saudi Arabia are anxious not only about Iran, but also about the turbulence in the region. And in fact, since the beginning of the Arab spring, they have both demonstrated a clear preference for maintaining the status quo, which is another reason for the tacit alliance between them.

Assessment

Saudi Arabia tries to neutralize dangers to its national security by hedging its bets, avoiding use of open military means, and attempting to avoid leadership roles. Diplomacy and cash are the preferred tools, and at the same time, there is an attempt to work behind the scenes. It is true that the kingdom is equipped with relatively good tools for coping with potential domestic protests – including economic capability, religious legitimacy, and the loyalty of the National Guard – but Riyadh may understand that traditional methods through which it has shaped its foreign policy are now insufficient. It must also harness new means to neutralize dangers to its national security, and if necessary, attempt to take the reins of leadership in the Arab world. This would expose it to conflict with its chief rival on the one hand, and its main ally on the other.
The turbulence in the Arab world, which is redrawing the map of alliances in the region, provides Saudi Arabia with an opportunity to position itself more forcefully as the leader of an Arab camp more united than in the past, even if it is weakened and battered. But along with the opportunities there are also risks, chiefly to the relationship with the United States, which constitutes a significant if damaged layer in Saudi Arabia’s national security. In addition, over time Saudi Arabia will find it difficult to lead the Arab camp alone, without Egypt and the united Gulf bloc behind it, and the recent burst of activism is liable to end quickly. The Saudis are also ambivalent about Turkey’s attempts to return to a position of leadership in the Middle East. On the one hand, the opposition to Israel and the Sunni alternative to Iran are viewed positively in Riyadh. On the other hand, Turkey’s “return” to the Middle East is liable to be at the expense of Saudi Arabia’s standing in the Sunni world. The negative memory of Ottoman rule is still fresh in Riyadh, and the model of Islam in Turkey that is preached by Erdoğan threatens the conservative character of the kingdom.

The overthrow of the Sunni regimes in North Africa, the continued unrest in Bahrain, the chronic instability in Yemen, and Iraq’s increasing move toward the Iranian sphere of influence increase Riyadh’s fear of the collapse of the existing order and increased Iranian influence in the region. It is not clear whether the unconventional means used thus far to assist the aging royal house to better cope with the old-new challenges, both domestic and foreign, is sufficient. Saudi Arabia’s advantage is in indirect conflicts; it has no battalions, only money and a leading role in the Muslim world. This is no small edge, but the role it seeks to play depends, apart from repairing the rift with United States, on backing the Arab-Sunni region, and on the illusory character of the “Arab revolution,” which may topple enemies but also eventually reach Saudi Arabia’s doorstep.

Notes
1 Joseph Kostiner, The Marginal Peace: The Attitudes of the Persian/Arabian Gulf States toward Israel and the Peace Process (Tel Aviv: Tel Aviv University, 2008).
2 For the official draft of the bill in Arabic, see http://www.amnesty.org/sites/impact.amnesty.org/files/PUBLIC/Saudi.%20anti-terror.pdf.
It will be easier for the Gulf states to accept Jordan than Morocco, which is also geographically detached from the bloc.


See also Yoel Guzansky, “‘Made in Iran’: The Iranian Involvement in Iraq,” Strategic Assessment 13, no. 4 (2011): 85-100.


