Fighting against Irregular Forces: Afghanistan as a Test Case

Tal Tovy

America's involvement in Afghanistan since late 2001 (Operation Enduring Freedom) is an excellent example of the highly problematic nature of fighting against irregular forces in a state with a long history of instability.[1] From Afghanistan's perspective, the American involvement represents yet another stage in the country's lack of stability, ongoing since the late 1970s.[2] In this sense, the fall of the Taliban regime, rather than a watershed, was another link in Afghanistan's checkered history.

This essay analyzes the factors behind Afghanistan's instability and argues that understanding them can explain the political and military difficulty in destroying irregular forces that share a strong ideology and operate in a given geographical arena. This essay does not purport to offer solutions or recommendations for action; rather, it claims that the primary and most basic action a state must undertake when embarking on a confrontation with irregular forces in a given geographical setting is to understand the history of the region. Such an understanding will allow it to assess how local history has created a political, social, and economic system that is a convenient base for a guerrilla activity grounded in a firm ideological base. The essay claims that understanding the area politically, socially, and demographically allows for the formulation of a strategy and varied modi operandi for defeating the guerrilla forces.[3]

The essay concentrates on the period between 1978 and 2010. During this time, Afghanistan's instability grew from an internal phenomenon, or at most a limited regional issue, to an international one that entailed the involvement of various powers that offered assistance to the warring sides.

Dr. Tal Tovy is a lecturer in military history in the History Department at Bar-Ilan University.

During these years, guerrilla forces enjoyed external support and fought against regular forces; their overall objective was toppling the existing regime and replacing it with one that would be based on the guerrillas' own political framework. For example, in the early stages of Operation Enduring Freedom, responsibility for most of the fighting was in the hands of the militias that comprised the Northern Alliance, backed by massive aerial assistance and tight cooperation with small US special forces and CIA teams.

The scope of this essay does not allow an in-depth examination of the history of Afghanistan and the factors behind the country's instability. Clearly, however, modern Afghani history is marked by stubborn resistance to both foreign occupation and a central government. Furthermore, the common denominator of all struggles in Afghanistan since 1979 is that while regular armies have succeeded to one degree or another in wresting control of central traffic arteries, control of the rural areas has remained entirely in the hands of armed guerrilla groups and militias that have over the entire period received assistance from a third party power. In other words, in the last 30 years, no central government in Afghanistan has ever managed to establish its authority over the whole country.[4]

Puncturing the Guerilla Forces' Supportive Environment

A study of campaigns waged against irregular forces points to five fundamental elements intrinsic to a guerrilla movement's success. Accordingly, the absence of some of these elements may spell failure for the movement. The five elements are: (a) a weak central government; (b) ineffective security forces; (c) external assistance; (d) safe havens for guerrillas; and (e) support of the civilian populace. These elements derive from each other, operate in tandem at different levels of intensity, and affect and in turn are affected by one another.

How are these elements manifested in Afghanistan?

At no time have the rulers of modern Afghanistan managed to establish total control over the mosaic of ethnic minorities, especially the Pashtun tribes, which represent one of the major loci of resistance to any central government in the country.[5] Although throughout most of Afghanistan's history the country was controlled by foreign powers, the actual power always lay with the tribal leaderships, and the state never came under full colonial rule.[6] Accordingly, the basic loyalty of Afghanis is to their

tribe of origin and their tribal familial and blood relations; in this they are no different from other tribal village societies in the Third World. These societies, including in Afghanistan, never experienced the development of a solid Western-style defined nationalism, and with it absolute loyalty to a central government.

Since no central Afghani government has ever managed to win the loyalty of all ranks of Afghani society and earn comprehensive legitimacy, no government has been able to gain a monopoly on the use of force or on law and order enforcement at the national level. The political instability and lack of governmental confidence have strengthened the tribal militias, which have seen to the security of their peoples; this in turn has further damaged the legitimacy of the central government.[7]

Any desire to reach a political solution in Afghanistan must understand the tribal and political structure of Afghani society, because no settlement is possible without the tribal groups as partners. The major problem for the USSR in Afghanistan in the 1980s was the attempt to impose Communist rule without understanding the complexity of Afghani society and the particular political tendencies of the different ethnic groups in the country.[8] Understanding the tribal structure and the political tendencies of each ethnic/tribal group is the key to attaining political stability in Afghanistan. The recognition that Afghani society is not homogeneous and that each group has its own particular socioeconomic and political features enables the creation of a plan of action relevant for each group.[9] For example, it may be that with regard to the Pashtuns, it is necessary to implement more civilian programs, whereas for the foreign fighting groups that are not part of the country's basic society it is necessary to stress the military dimension.[10]

The elements of internal instability in Afghanistan are compounded by another highly influential factor: external assistance and involvement by foreign powers. External intervention is first and foremost a function of Afghanistan's geostrategic location in Central Asia[11] and the massive foreign aid that has been channeled there over the last 30 years, allowing the various guerrilla groups to operate. So, for example, US aid to the mujahideen during the war against the Soviet Union, estimated at $5 billion, enabled the guerrillas to continue fighting much longer and was one of the causes of Afghanistan's ongoing instability.[12] After the withdrawal of the USSR and the renewal of the civil war in Afghanistan, the Taliban

received economic and military assistance from Pakistan and Islamic movements all over the world,[13] while Shiite tribes in western Afghanistan, which fought the Sunni Taliban regime in the second half of the 1990s, were assisted by Iran.

The foreign aid that was funneled into Afghanistan was meant to weaken the government and prompt the creation of a new government aligned with the interests of the intervening parties. The pattern was as follows: when the Kabul government would fall, a new government that did not enjoy national support and consensus would be created. It would usually operate against the interests of some foreign power or another, which would then start assisting irregular forces opposed to that central government. So, for example, the US funded the mujahideen, a composite of tribal Islamic militias without a uniform political or military system. This group spawned the Taliban, which adopted a policy opposed to American interests. As a result, the US began funding a group of a different tribal-ethnic composition – the Northern Alliance.

Safe havens for guerrillas and the support of the local populace are two conditions necessary for further erosion of the central government and damage to its ability to impose its authority. Throughout history these conditions have constituted the foundation for the successful operation of any irregular force. Military theoreticians such as Carl von Clausewitz and Thomas Edward Lawrence long ago pointed out the advantages of using irregular forces and stressed that these forces need to operate within a sympathetic civilian environment. Their writings emerged from a military reality in which decisions were achieved by regular armies.[14]

It was Mao Zedong who elevated guerrilla fighting to the strategic and political levels and whose writings set forth the process necessary for converting guerrillas from an irregular force to a political system with a regular army. In his book *On Guerrilla Warfare* (1937), he contends that it is necessary to wrest control of a certain area (base of operations) and convince the local population to support the goals of the political movement. The movement gradually expands its areas of control and influence while widening its popular base. In Mao's thinking, the safe haven and the base are the same geographical region; China's vast size allows a political movement to find a hideout far from the reach of the government and its military (its safe haven).[15]

Practitioners of Mao's philosophy who operated in smaller geographical regions than Mao himself, such as Vo Nguyen Giap, adapted Mao's teachings to their smaller expanses and separated their bases from their safe havens. "Bases" remained the areas in which it was necessary to gain the support of the local population and convince it of the revolutionary ideology in question on the way to taking control of the country.[16] "Safe havens" were regions with a geographical character that were hard for the central government to access and attack the guerrillas there. In the safe haven guerrillas can find shelter and train, regroup, and plan their next steps. The difficulties may stem from harsh topographical conditions, such as the Hindu Kush mountain range in northeast Afghanistan, but usually the safe haven is a country near the base area where those fighting the guerrilla forces cannot operate freely or at all. Thus the Vietcong found safe haven in Laos and Cambodia, and the FLN guerrillas found safe haven in Tunisia. The Taliban uses Pakistan as its safe haven and even gets help from elements within the Pakistani government as well as assistance from the local population of Afghani refugees.[17] The Pakistani regions adjacent to the Afghani border also serve as a base of sorts because there are many Afghani refugees who could join in the military efforts; similarly, the regions are home to Pashtuns who do not recognize the international border and have blood and familial ties to the Taliban fighters.

The Historical and Theoretical Record

What, then, are the ways to confront the complex reality facing the United States and its allies in Afghanistan, and facing any nation or regular army – including Israel – trying to fight irregular forces?

One of the most interesting aspects of the American confrontation with the Afghani challenge is the return to the study of theories written in the 1950s and 1960s about methods of operation against guerrillas, or counterinsurgency (COIN), as well as a relearning of the lessons from the wars fought by France (in Indochina and Algeria), Great Britain (in Malaya and Kenya), and the United States (in the Philippines and Vietnam). The American field guide dealing with counterinsurgency declares that only a learning organization can be effective with regard to COIN, and that one of the ways of developing such knowledge is studying the wars of the past.[18]

This approach is not unusual for the US Army. As early as the Vietnam War, it commissioned a number of studies dealing with the British

experience in Malaya, which it viewed as a successful attempt to suppress the Communist revolution there.[19] The most telling evidence of the fact that the Americans sought to learn from the British experience was the stationing of Sir Robert Thompson as a senior advisor to the US Army in Vietnam (1961-65) in order to implement the pacification programs that had proven their efficacy in Malaya.[20] The United States also studied the French failures in Vietnam and Algeria, in order to understand the errors of the French and avoid repeating them.[21] At the same time, French literature dealing with the lessons learned from the confrontations in Vietnam and Algeria, such as the book by Roger Trinquier, an experienced French officer who had served in Indochina and Algeria, was translated into English.[22] Trinquier's book is still considered one of the most important theoretical works in the field of COIN.

In the United States, alongside writing about COIN theory and practice, much research was published on the phenomenon of insurgency itself, with an emphasis on Mao Zedong's military philosophy and analysis of guerrilla warfare in Southeast Asia. Likewise, many essays discussing the topic were published in American army periodicals.[23] David Galula's book, published in 1964, represented one of the first systematic discussions of the ways to defeat guerrilla.[24] Analyzing a number of test cases and relying on personal experience as an advisor in China and an officer in Algeria, Galula lays out the strategy and tactics for successful COIN management. His key points are the need for total destruction of the revolutionary organization's political force and the need to gain the support of the civilian population, or at least deny it to the guerrillas or rebels.[25] Another important book on the topic is by Robert Thompson, who summarizes his experience in Malaya and Vietnam while noting the differences between the two confrontations. Thompson also deals with the political action the government must take in order to eliminate the revolutionary guerrilla.[26]

Galula's and Thompson's books may be classified as military philosophy based on operational experience. These books join the ranks of studies dealing with the phenomenon of guerrilla and the ways to fight it.[27] The American field guide on counterinsurgency, quoting Galula and Thompson, is evidence of the importance and relevance of the theories formulated in the 1960s and strengthens the thesis of this essay that it is possible to extract lessons for contemporary confrontations by means of historical analyses.[28]

After the Vietnam War, the US Army focused on reconstructing its force with a view to a future war with Warsaw Pact forces in central Europe and abandoned the preoccupation with COIN theory. A significant change in this trend occurred only after the end of the conventional stages of America's war in Afghanistan and Iraq during 2003. Since then there has been a revival of writing about COIN in military periodicals as well as in military doctrine. For example, *Military Review* published two special editions (in 2006 and 2008) devoted to both historical and contemporary essays published since 2004 on the topic of COIN.[29] Another important publication, by the History Department of the US Army, is a study dealing with America's experience with COIN in its broader definition from late World War II until the end of the Vietnam War.[30] This is further evidence of the American precept that studying the past is critical for understanding the present and creating modi operandi to deal with it. The latter source joins a series of theoretical and historical works prepared by the RAND Corporation for the US Department of Defense, all dealing with different aspects of COIN and the lessons that may be learned from various COIN campaigns, including Vietnam, and adapting them to contemporary reality.[31]

The United States Army currently operates in Afghanistan according to procedures derived from COIN theories, especially with regard to strengthening government forces and gaining the support of the civilian population. These activities are carried out on two parallel levels: the first is an attempt to bring about both social and economic improvements in the population's standard of living, by rebuilding medical and health systems, investing in infrastructures, and providing assistance in agriculture; the second is constructing and strengthening the security forces (including their intelligence capabilities) to allow for confrontations with the guerrilla forces without external aid. Until these two processes are complete, the American army will continue with its routine military activities against Taliban and al-Qaeda forces, with occasional forays by coalition forces on large operations in the areas considered the Taliban's strongholds.

Conclusion

The history of Afghanistan since the 1980s demonstrates that the five elements listed above have helped – and continue to help – guerrilla groups operate effectively and damage the central government's ability to impose

its authority and attain political legitimacy in the country. The Taliban government (1995-2001) did not manage to control all of Afghanistan, the United States used the Northern Alliance as the opposition to topple the regime, and the new Afghani government has not yet established its rule over the whole country, especially in light of the renewed guerrilla efforts of the Taliban, which still enjoys the support of some of the local population as well as the safe haven located in Pakistan. As long as American forces operate in Afghanistan, the Taliban is clearly incapable of regaining its control of the government. However, should the United States leave Afghanistan before the country is politically and economically stable, the country will likely be drawn into a civil war once again, as was the case after the USSR withdrawal.

These five elements are relevant to the attempt to examine contemporary instances of a regular army confronting a guerrilla force. They represent a nexus that makes it very difficult to battle irregular forces united by a solid, clear ideology. Since the five derive from one another, eliminating one will perforce bring about the collapse, albeit not immediate, of the entire system that allows guerrillas to operate in a given arena.

An historical debate, relevant to this day, exists between two schools of thought about the ways to defeat guerrillas that are descended from or influenced by the political-military thought of Mao Zedong. One school of thought emphasizes the application of military force, whereas the other school of thought focuses on operating civilian programs, i.e., programs that will improve the socioeconomic situation of the population in the fields of education, healthcare, employment, agriculture, and so on, while improvements in security will be effected by continuing the fight against the guerrillas' military and political power. This debate was conducted in the United States before and during the war in Vietnam. Simplistically, one could say that the most effective way to fight a guerrilla movement with a firm ideological base is with a formula that stresses the civilian operations alongside the continuation of military operations.

The reasons for the instability in Afghanistan demand that most of the attention be focused on attaining legitimacy for the central government. This may be done by improving the internal security system and the socioeconomic situation of the various tribespeople in the country. Such improvements, which would be based on understanding the local centers of power and traditions, would generate the central government's gradual

acquisition of legitimacy. Such a mode of operation was undertaken in Malaya, Kenya, and the Philippines, where the gradual strengthening of the central government and consolidating popular legitimacy finally defeated the guerrilla. While it is impossible to project exactly this or any other historical example onto a contemporary reality, it is important to study the principles and examine which of them remain relevant, which methods need adjustment, and which operations are completely irrelevant.

The study of Afghanistan as a test case for regular forces waging warfare against guerrillas can be instructive in a number of ways, some of which are relevant also for Israel, especially in Judea and Samaria.[32] First, it is necessary to understand the history and culture of the specific region. Such understanding will facilitate the creation of relevant modi operandi for a given society, while giving attention to the special problems of that society. Second, it is necessary to identify the center of gravity of the enemy and operate against it. Although anti-guerrilla warfare entails fighting irregular forces, it is important to remember that such forces also have their strategic weaknesses. From an analysis of Mao's writings and a study of Afghanistan's history it is possible to identify two points representing the guerrilla's/terrorists' center of gravity: the civilian population and the bases or safe havens. Therefore, it is necessary to concentrate a significant portion of the effort on severing the link between the civilian population and the guerrillas.

Indeed, it would be a mistake to focus on the military aspect alone. Fundamentalist Islam, similar to Communist guerrillas, stems from an ideology with political, social, and economic potency. Such ideologies have always succeeded in attracting thousands of active supporters – the fighters; but they have also mobilized millions of passive supporters – the civilian population. It is impossible to eliminate the thousands of fighters, because new fighters are recruited all the time from the ranks of the millions. Therefore, it is necessary to damage the bridge that links the two groups: military operations, both defensive and offensive, must not be abandoned, but most of the effort must be centered on the civilian and political front. Severing the population from the guerrillas is possible by presenting political alternatives that will generate direct improvement to that society's socioeconomic reality. This is not an easy task, but the various examples from history demonstrate that it is possible.

Notes

1 For a discussion of the historical components that shaped modern day Afghanistan, see Larry P. Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*: *State Failure, Regional Politics, and the Rise of the Taliban* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2001), pp. 23-53.

2 C. Christine Fair, "Insurgency, Instability and the Security of Afghanistan," in Sumit Ganguly, Andrew Scobell, and Joseph Liow, eds., *Handbook of Asian Security Studies* (London: Routledge, 2010), p. 186.

3 As was the case in Malaya, Kenya and the Philippines in the 1950s. See Tal Tovy, *Like Eating Soup with a Knife* (Tel Aviv, 2006), pp. 54-65; and Tal Tovy, *Guerrilla and the War Against It* (Jerusalem, 2010), pp. 130-54.

4 For a discussion of the reasons for the weakness of the Afghani regime, see Antonio Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The Neo-Taliban Insurgency in Afghanistan 2002-2007* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2008), pp. 15-20.

5 For a survey of the ethnic fabric of Afghanistan, see Ralph H. Magnus and Eden Naby, *Afghanistan: Mullah, Marx and Mujahid* (Oxford: Westview, 2002), pp. 11-15; Martin Ewans, *Conflict in Afghanistan: Studies in Asymmetric Warfare* (London: Routledge), 2005, pp. 11-14; Deepali Gaur Singh, *Afghanistan: Challenges and Opportunities*, vol. 3 (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007), pp. 34-40. For ethnic diversity as a destabilizing factor in Afghanistan, see Amalendu Misra, *Afghanistan: The Labyrinth of Violence* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004), pp. 41-60; Burchard Brentjes and Helga Brentjes, *Taliban: A Shadow over Afghanistan* (Varanasi, India: Rishi Publications, 2000), pp. 40-48.

6 Ewans, *Conflict in Afghanistan*, p. 173.

7 Antonio Giustozzi, *War, Politics and Society in Afghanistan* (London: C. Hurst & Co., 2000), pp. 207-12. For more on the armed militias operating in Afghanistan, see Seth G. Jones, *Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), pp. 37-48.

8 Thomas X. Hammes, *The Sling and the Stone: On War in the 21st Century* (St. Paul, MN: Zenith Press, 2004), pp. 155-69.

9 For the political trends derived from the changing economic conditions, see Manmath N. Singh, "Ethnicity and Politics in Afghanistan," in K. Warikoo, ed., *Afghanistan: Challenges and* Opportunities, vol. 1 (New Delhi: Pentagon Press, 2007), pp. 33-42. In this context and as part of the discussion of the study of history for the sake of understanding reality, see also the 1927 anthropological study by Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, a British diplomat of Indian ancestry, which describes the political problems of the British in Afghanistan that stem, inter alia, from the complexity and great heterogeneity of Afghani society. See Sirdar Ikbal Ali Shah, *Afghanistan of the Afghans* (New Delhi: Bhvana Books, 2000), pp. 9-18.

10 The political reality in Iraq should also be analyzed on the basis of this model: the ethnic composition, although less complex than that of Afghanistan, and the armed militias there preclude political and social stability. See Bruce R. Pirnie and Edward O'Connell, *Counterinsurgency in Iraq 2003-2006* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2008), pp. 22-32.

11 Brentjes and Brentjes, *Taliban*, pp. 49-67; Goodson, *Afghanistan's Endless War*, pp. 133-66; Misra, *Afghanistan*, pp. 13-20.

12 Thomas Powers, *Intelligence Wars: American Secret History from Hitler to al-Qaeda* (New York: New York Review of Books, 2002), pp. 285-88.

13 Pakistan's involvement was – and continues to be – the result of its refusal to recognize Afghanistan as a sovereign state within the borders determined by the British in the late nineteenth century. Likewise, Pakistan has ambitions of becoming a major political factor in Central Asia. For more on this, see Amin Saikal, *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2004), pp. 219-25; Angelo Rasanayagan, *Afghanistan: A Modern History* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2005), pp. 177-90.

14 Clausewitz deals with the guerrilla phenomenon in Book 6 ("Defense"), chapter 26. See also Werner Hahlweg, "Clausewitz and Guerrilla Warfare," in Michael I. Handel, ed., *Clausewitz and Modern Strategy* (London: Frank Cass, 1986), pp. 130-32.

15 For a discussion of Mao's revolutionary guerrilla philosophy, see Tovy, *Guerrilla and the War against It*, pp. 42-57. For Mao's influence on the mujahideen, see Barnett R. Rubin, *The Fragmentation of Afghanistan* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), pp. 78-79.

16 For the meaning of the concept "safe haven" in the Afghani context, see Abdulkader H. Simmo, *Organization at War in Afghanistan and Beyond* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2008), pp. 13-16.

17 Giustozzi, *Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop*, pp. 99-102.

18 Department of the Army, FM 3-24: *Counterinsurgency*, 2006, pp. 1-26. See also the theoretical overview in John A. Nagl, *Learning to Eat Soup with a Knife: Counterinsurgency Lessons from Malaya and Vietnam* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), pp. 3-11.

19 Riley Sunderland, *Antiguerrilla Intelligence in Malaya, 1948-1960* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1964); Riley Sunderland, *Winning the Hearts and Minds of the People: Malaya, 1948-1960* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1964); P. B. G. Waller, *The Evolution of Successful Counterinsurgency Operations in Malaya* (Menlo Park, CA: RAND, 1968).

20 Spencer C. Tucker, *Vietnam* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1999), p. 96; Douglas S. Blaufarb, *The Counterinsurgency Era: U.S. Doctrine and Performance* (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 47- 51; Rowland S. N. Mans, "Victory in Malaya," in: T. N. Greene, ed., *The Guerrilla and How to Fight Him* (New York: Praeger, 1962), pp. 115-43.

21 See Paul A. Jureidini, *Case Studies in Insurgency and Revolutionary Warfare: Algeria 1954-1962* (Washington, D.C.: American University, 1963);

Constantin Melnik, *The French Campaign against the FLN* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1967).

22 See. J. Croizat, *A Translation from the French: Lessons of the War in Indochina* (Santa Monica: RAND, 1967); Roger Trinquier, *Modern Warfare: A French View of Counterinsurgency* (New York: Praeger Security International, 1964; the book was published in France in 1961).

23 During the 1960s a selection of Communist literature presenting Mao's revolutionary strategy and its impact, especially on the confrontation in Vietnam, was translated into English. For example, in 1968 an anthology was put together that compiled a range of Communist writings about revolutionary guerrilla wars. See William J. Pomeroy, ed., *Guerrilla Warfare and Marxism* (New York: International Publishers, 1968). The military writings of Communist thinkers were required reading for US Military Academy cadets. See Andrew J. Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine 1942-1976* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Dept., Army, Center of Military History 2006), p. 261.

24 David Galula, *Counter-Insurgency: Theory and Practice* (New York: Praeger Security International, 1964).

25 Ibid., pp. 107-35.

26 Robert Thompson, *Defeating Communist Insurgency: Experiences from Malaya and Vietnam* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1966), pp. 51-58.

27 See., e.g., Peter Paret and John Shy, *Guerrillas in the 1960s* (New York: Praeger, 1965); John S. Pustay, *Counterinsurgency Warfare* (London: Free Press, 1965); Abdul Haris Nasution, *Fundamentals of Guerrilla Warfare* (London: Pall Mall Press, 1965); John J. McCuen, *The Art of Counter-Revolutionary War: The Strategy of Counter-Insurgency* (London: Stackpole Books, 1966).

28 Robert R. Tomes, "Relearning Counterinsurgency Warfare," *Parameters* 34, no. 1 (2004): 26.

29 Of the dozens of essays published since 2004, one essay in particular stands out as demonstrating the importance of the theories developed in the 1960s for the military reality in Afghanistan: Dale Kuehl, "Testing Galula in Ameriyah: The People are the Key," *Military Review* 99, no. 2 (2009): 72-80.

30 Birtle, *U.S. Army Counterinsurgency and Contingency Operations Doctrine*.

31 Angel Rabasa et al, *Money in the Bank: Lessons Learned from Past Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007); Daniel Byman, *Understanding Proto-Insurgencies* (Santa Monica: RAND, 2007); Austin Long, *Doctrine of Eternal Recurrence: The U.S. Military and Counterinsurgency Doctrine, 1960-1970 and 2003-2006* (Santa Monica: RAND), 2008. These studies are part of the RAND Counterinsurgency Study series.

32 This model is irrelevant with regard to Hizbollah in Lebanon and Hamas in the Gaza Strip, as Israel has no permanent military presence in those areas.