

**Asher Arian**

**Israeli Public Opinion  
on National Security 1999**



## Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies (JCSS)

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Asher Arian

# Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 1999

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Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies

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## The National Security and Public Opinion Project

The Project, initiated in 1984, monitors Israeli public opinion on issues related to national security. Surveys undertaken and cited in this report were comprised of representative samples of the adult Jewish population of Israel including individuals from kibbutzim and from the territories. The percentage of error of the 1999 survey was 3 percent.

The survey presented here was carried out between January 25 to March 7, 1999. The decision had just been made to hold early elections. The 1999 elections were scheduled for May 17 with a possible run-off for the prime minister on June 1, 1999. The redeployment of Israel Defense Forces which had been agreed upon with the Palestinians at the Wye Plantation meetings was put on hold. The defense minister, Yitzhak Mordechai, decided to resign his position and join the Center party. Ultimately, he was selected to be candidate for prime minister from that party.

The dates of the project's surveys were: (1) June 1985; (2) January 1986; (3) December 9, 1987-January 4, 1988; (4) October 1988; (5) March-October 1990; (6) March 16-31, 1991; (7) June 1-21, 1992; (8) January 1-15, 1993; (9) January 11 - February 9, 1994; (10) January 4 - February 7, 1995, (11) February 1996, (12) February-March 1997, (13) January 26 - March 9, 1998; (14) January 25 - March 7, 1999.

Sample sizes were 1,171 in 1985; 1,172 in 1986; 1,116 in 1987; 873 in 1988; 1,251 in 1990; 1,131 in 1991; 1,192 in 1992; 1,139 in 1993; and 1,239 in 1994; 1,220 in 1995, 1,201 in 1996, 1,126 in 1997, 1,207 in 1998, and 1,203 in 1999.

All surveys were prepared, conducted and analyzed by the author; fieldwork through 1995 was done by the Dahaf Research Institute, in 1996 by Modi'in Ezrachi, and since 1997 by the Almidan/Mahshov Research Institute.

An additional survey discussed in this report was a May 1996 pre-election survey, supervised by Asher Arian and Michal Shamir, and conducted by the Modi'in Ezrachi Research Institute, with a sample size of 1,168. That survey was funded by the Israel Democracy Institute and the Pinhas Sapir Center for Development at Tel Aviv University.

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## Summary

As the 1999 election campaign began, support for the Oslo Accords was high, supported by 70 percent. There was evidence that negotiation and conciliation were the policies preferred by the public. Only 30 percent thought the condition of the country good or very good, and a third of the sample gave the government a positive evaluation.

Eighty percent reported enhanced feelings of personal security since the beginning of the peace process. The increased feeling of personal safety is credited to the peace process and not to the policies of a particular administration; 70 percent said that personal security had improved under the Netanyahu government compared with the Rabin-Peres period after the signing of the Oslo accords.

Two-thirds thought most Palestinians want peace. Only 19 percent, the lowest score reported in these surveys, thought all Palestinians have a negative orientation toward Israel. The percentage of those saying that Arabs aspired to destroy Israel and kill Jews was at an all-time low.

Two-thirds thought that the signing of peace agreements with appropriate security arrangements would mean the end of the Arab-Israel conflict. A high percentage compared to past surveys (69%) favored pursuing peace talks when forced to choose peace talks and strengthening military capacity.

More than two-thirds of Israelis Jews thought that the chances were good that peace would be sustained in the next three years, and almost half thought that there was a high probability of war between Israel and an Arab state in that period.

Fifty-eight percent thought the danger of confrontation with the Arab world had decreased since the beginning of the peace process, but 56 percent said it had increased since the ascension of the Netanyahu government compared with the Rabin-Peres period after the signing of the Oslo accords.

Willingness to return land for peace remained high; one in five supported the notion of ceasing the peace talks even if that resulted in war. In 1999, 59 percent thought that only through negotiations would terror attacks be curtailed, and 41 percent felt that negotiations should be stopped if there were terrorist attacks. In 1998, the sample was evenly split between these two positions.

Support for a Palestine state reached an unprecedented 57 percent. More than three-quarters thought there would be such a state in ten years.

Were the Palestine Authority to unilaterally declare the establishment of a Palestinian state, the reaction of the Israeli public was not extreme. Sixteen percent favored recognizing such a state, 20 percent thought that Israel should do nothing, 43 percent favored ceasing further negotiations with the Palestinians, 15 percent supported annexing the areas of the territories still under Israeli control, and 6 percent were for invading the territories and recapturing the territories.

More respondents than in the past were willing to discuss various issues with the Palestinians, and to return certain territories. Opinions had not changed about Jerusalem, however.

A small majority favored unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon, higher than recorded in the past. Some three out of four respondents agreed, with varying degrees of intensity, that it was possible to deal with the problems in Lebanon without leaving the Golan, that the security zone is not worth the lives of Israeli soldiers, that the zone is an important bargaining chip in future negotiations with Syria, that the security zone brings quiet to the north of the country, and that the price Israel pays in south Lebanon is due to that absence of negotiations with Syria. However, these majorities were composed of different respondents. That is, not all of the same people agreed with the same statements. It was this ambiguity that added to the leadership's difficulties in dealing with Lebanon.

Faith in the effectiveness of air strikes rose; hope for seeking a political solution did not. There was less than majority support for responding to the shelling of the northern settlements with an attack on the Syrians however.

Regarding a hypothetical unilateral withdrawal from the zone, more people felt it would enhance peace than in 1998. The sample anticipated a less positive impact on the terrorists than assessed in 1998. On the other hand, more respondents felt that the strength of the IDF and of Israeli democracy would be improved if a withdrawal would take place.

There was no parallel softening of position regarding Syria or the returning of the Golan Heights. Nonetheless, 54 percent thought that the Heights would be returned within 10 years.

The relationship between perceived threat and support for a Palestinian state held. Threat was down, support for a state up. The development of non-conventional weapons by Iran and Iraq was perceived as very threatening. Fifty-eight percent supported the immediate use of the Israel Defense Forces to prevent them developing such weapons.

Three out of four respondents thought that the Israeli authorities had done enough to protect the civilian population during the American and British air attack on Iraq in December. Positions regarding nuclear weapons and arms control were stable.

The sense of a weakening of the army was again observed. The size of the group willing to pay more taxes for security was at an all-time low. Very large majorities rejected the idea of a volunteer army or the exemption from army service of university or yeshiva students.

The overall pattern of credibility for the political leadership has been in a downward direction. There has been a 26 percentage point drop since the question was first asked in the 1986 survey.

Seen as especially harmful to security were lower levels of American aid, media coverage of security issues, and intervention by parents of soldiers in the army's affairs. Respondents also saw as harmful the effect of court decisions on operational matters.

The relations between political and military leaders divided the respondents as to whether this was beneficial or harmful by a 60:40 ratio. This was also the ratio of contribution/harm about the effects of having women in combat roles, and the Oslo accords. Only the military cooperation with the Palestinian Authority was clearly seen as much more positive than negative.


The Likud's image remained better than Labor's, but the perceived differences between the parties shrank dramatically. The rate of support for Arabs in the government coalition rose.

## I The Setting

The survey upon which this report is based was conducted between January 25-March 7, 1999. Elections had been called for May 17; the candidates for prime minister were positioning themselves and the parties were beginning to decide how to determine their lists for the Knesset elections. Implementation of the Wye Agreement, including additional redeployment of the IDF from territories on the West Bank, was suspended.


Support for the Oslo Accords was high; 70 percent supported (15% strong support, 55% support) while 30 percent opposed (23% opposed, 7% very opposed). There was evidence that negotiation and conciliation were the policies preferred by the public.

The public mood in February 1999 was tepid – and almost equally divided. When asked to evaluate the condition of the country, only 3 percent said it was very good, 27 percent answered good, 37 percent so-so, 22 percent replied bad, and 11 percent said very bad. That assessment was as low as the one recorded in 1995 (see Figure 1).



**Figure 1. Condition of the Country, 1994-1999**

When asked to assess the government's handling of the issues the country faced, a third (34%) gave the government a positive evaluation (5% very good and 29% good), and two-thirds (66%) a negative evaluation (22% very dissatisfied and 44% dissatisfied) with the government's performance (see Figure 2).



**Figure 2. Evaluation of the Government, 1994-1999**

The assessment for 1999 was similar to the relatively low rates of 1997 and 1998. The assessment of the government's performance in this series was best in 1996 (50% positive), with Shimon Peres as prime minister and before the series of suicide bombings, and worse in 1995 (29% positive) immediately before the Beit Lid bombing, with Yitzhak Rabin prime minister. In 1994, 40 percent gave the government a good rating.

## II Security, Peace, and War

**Feelings of Personal Security.** Israeli Jews in 1999 reported enhanced feelings of personal security since the peace process had begun; 80 percent felt better (8% much better, 72% better) compared with 20 percent reporting that personal security had become less secure (18% worse, 2% much worse). In 1998, in response to the same question about the state of personal security of Israelis since the peace process began, 64 percent reported that they had improved in comparison to the pre-peace period; in 1997, the figure was 73 percent.

When asked to compare the sense of personal safety of Israelis under the Netanyahu government compared with the Rabin-Peres period after the signing of the Oslo accords, 70 percent said they felt that they had improved (11% much better, 59% better) and 30 percent said worse (25% worse, and 5% much worse). In 1998, 62 percent said they felt that they had improved (15% much better, 47% better) and 38 percent said worse (31% worse, and 7% much worse). The feeling of increased feeling of personal safety is credited to the peace process and not to the policies of a particular administration.

The breakdown of the first question by demographic characteristics is presented at the end of this report (see Table 17). That breakdown shows how generalized these sentiments are. There are negligible differences by gender, age, education, and place of birth. The secular more than the religious feel enhanced security, as do those who served in the army. Those intending to vote for Begin for prime minister in 1999 report that personal security has become worse, those intending to vote for Barak think that it has become better.

Respondents again reported that they felt very worried about their personal safety, as they had in previous surveys. However, the rate of worry expressed that they or members of their family would be injured by terrorist action was the lowest for any of the surveys between 1993 through 1999. The data are presented in Table 1.

	1992	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Very worried	48%	48%	37%	46%	35%	31%	22%	13%
Worried	34	36	39	39	43	46	44	45
Not worried at all	14	13	18	13	17	18	26	34
Not worried	4	2	6	2	5	5	8	8

**Table 1. Concern for Personal Safety, 1993-1999**

The assessment about whether most Palestinians want peace changed over time as the talks between Israel and the Palestinian Authority continue. The rate of those who thought that most Palestinians want peace in 1999 was 64 percent. This was similar to the 1997 rate (65%), and ten percentage points higher than the 55 percent of 1998. In 1996, the rate was 40 percent.

Another indicator of the manner in which the public assesses the situation of the moment has to do with whether the Israeli Jews interviewed perceive all Palestinians sharing one orientation or whether there is a degree of differentiation in their perceptions. Specifically, the question asked is whether all Palestinians have one point of view regarding the relations they want with Israel or whether they hold a range of opinions. The more differentiation perceived, the better the general mood; in more tense times, more respondents view Palestinians as an undifferentiated enemy.

Table 2 shows the distribution to the question since 1995. The size of the group thinking all Palestinians have a negative orientation toward Israel was lowest in 1999 (19%); the size of the group perceiving mixed orientations among Palestinians was highest since this series began (76%).

	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Negative orientation	36%	25%	22%	33%	19%
Mixed orientations	60	71	73	63	76
Positive orientation	4	4	5	4	5

**Table 2. Assessment of Palestinian Orientations**

**Assessment of the Arabs.** The perceived security situation of the country impacts on the mood of the citizenry which also feeds into policy decisions. Respondents have been asked over the years to characterize their assessment of the aspirations of the Arabs. The response that the Arabs ultimately wanted to conquer Israel and to destroy a large portion of the Jewish population was a dominant one. In the mid-1990s that position began to erode.

In 1999, there was a further decline in the extreme response that the aspirations of the Arabs is to kill much of the Jewish population (see Figure 3). Of the thirteen surveys which contained the question, this was the lowest portion (19%) that said that the Arabs were out to destroy the state of Israel and to kill the Jews of the country, the same as in 1997. The highest rate for this response was in the 1991 survey at the time of the Gulf War in which 49 percent gave that response.





Figure 3. Arab Aspirations, 1986-1999

The largest response in 1999 was that the Arabs wanted to regain all the territories lost in the 1967 war: 35 percent chose that compared with 33 percent in 1998, 39 percent in 1997, 35 percent in 1996, 26 percent in 1995, and 33 percent in 1994. An additional 28 percent in 1999 (29% in 1998, 31% in 1997, 24% in 1996, 25% in 1995, and 23% in 1994) thought the Arabs "only" wanted to conquer Israel; 18 percent said that the Arabs wanted back some of the territories (12% in 1998, 11% in 1997, 13% in 1996, 12% in both 1994 and 1995).

Another measure of the impact of the period's events on the public mood is the response to the question of whether the signing of peace agreements with appropriate security arrangements would mean the end of the Arab-Israel conflict. In 1999, 67 percent answered yes, compared with 55 percent in 1998, 65 percent in 1997, 49 percent in 1996, 41 percent in 1995, 53 percent in 1994 and 52 percent in 1993.

An indicator of the concerns of the public and the mood of the respondents is found in the replies to the question in which they are forced to choose between peace talks and strengthening military capacity in order to avoid war with Arab states (see Figure 4). The preference for choosing peace talks over military capacity was expressed by 69 percent, a percentage not observed since the surveys of the early 1990s. Only in 1995 did a majority of respondents prefer military capacity over peace talks.



**Figure 4. Military Power or Peace Talks, 1986-1999**

When asked whether one wanted to live in Israel in the long run, 87 percent answered in the affirmative. This very high level of desire to remain in Israel has been consistent over the years.

More than two-thirds of Israelis Jews in 1999 (68%) thought that the chances were good that peace would be sustained in the next three years, and almost half the sample (46%) reported a high level of probability that war would break out between Israel and an Arab state. In 1998, only 57 percent thought that there was a high or moderate probability

that peace would persist in the coming three years, compared to 76 percent in 1997 and 75 percent in 1996. Those who thought that there was a high or moderate probability of war in the next three years grew from 37 percent in 1996, to 47 percent in 1997, to 54 percent in 1998. Figure 5 presents the results for the two questions between 1986 and 1999.





Figure 5. War and Peace, 1986-1999

Focusing on the differences in the perceived probabilities of peace and war over the years indicates (1) that the respondents always assessed the chances of peace higher than the chances for war; and (2) that the difference between the two probabilities in 1999 increased again after being almost identical in 1998. A graphic representation of the differences in the perceived probabilities of peace and war is presented in Figure 6.

When asked if the danger of confrontation with the Arab world had increased or decreased since the beginning of the peace process, 58 percent replied decreased (52% decreased, 6% greatly decreased) and 42 percent increased (37% increased, 5% greatly increased). When asked to compare the danger of confrontation with the Arab world under the Netanyahu government compared with the Rabin-Peres period after the



**Figure 6. Differences between War and Peace, 1987-1999**

### III

## The Palestinian Authority and the Territories

**Land for peace and negotiations.** Willingness to return land for peace was high in the 1999 survey; the numbers were similar to the 1997 rates. In 1999, 47 percent agreed to such a plan with varying degrees of intensity, 28 percent rejected the notion, and 15 percent took a middle position. The numbers for 1996, 1997, and 1998 indicated weaker support favoring territories for peace (see Table 3).

	2/1996	5/1996	1997	1998	1999
Return	43%	43%	53%	44%	47%
Middle	16	15	14	14	15
Do not return	41	42	34	42	28

**Table 3. Land for Peace**


On the other hand, only one in five supported the notion of ceasing the peace talks even if that resulted in war (see Table 4). In the 1999 survey, 63 percent opposed the notion of stopping the peace talks.

	2/1996	5/1996	1997	1998	1999
Stop talks	18%	21%	13%	14%	20%
Middle	15	12	10	13	17
Do not stop talks	67	67	77	73	63

**Table 4. Stop Peace Talks**

There was further evidence of a more conciliatory mood than in 1998. In 1999, 59 percent thought that only through negotiations would terror attacks be curtailed, and 41 percent felt that negotiations should be stopped if there were terrorist attacks. In 1998, the sample was evenly split between these two positions. In 1997, the parallel numbers were 60/40, and in 1996 59/41.

**A Palestinian state.** When asked directly about the establishment of a Palestinian state, 57 percent agreed. This was much higher than the 44 percent that agreed in 1998, and reestablishes the steady growth of support for the idea (see Figure 7). In 1997, 51 percent supported it, compared to 48 percent in 1996, and 39 percent in 1995. The dip in the 1992 rate is explained by the support given by Palestinians to Iraq during the Gulf War. Opposition to the idea of a Palestinian state continued to contract. In 1999, 15 percent were very opposed, compared to 32 percent in 1998, 25 percent in 1997, 28 percent in 1996, and 41 percent very opposed in 1995.



**Figure 7. Palestinian State**


In addition to their personal preferences, respondents were also asked "Not taking into account your personal preference, do you estimate that within the next 10 years that a Palestinian state will be established?" The assessment that a Palestinian state would be established in the territories in the next decade remained strong, returning to 77 percent, after a dip to 66 percent in 1998. It had been 77 percent in 1997, and 75 percent in 1996. That assessment had doubled since 1990. In 1990, 37 percent thought a Palestinian state in the territories would eventually be established, in 1991, 48 percent, in 1994, 74 percent, and in 1995, 73 percent. Figure 7 presents the results over time regarding a Palestinian

state in terms of support for its establishment and the likelihood that it will be established.

Men were more likely to register extreme disagreement than women, although the overall rate of opposition by gender was of similar magnitude. Opposition was also related to age, with respondents below the age of thirty very opposed. Respondents with post-high school education and those born in Israel of European background were more likely to support the establishment of the Palestinian state.

Other categories of respondents more likely to support the establishment of a Palestinian state included secular respondents, and those who planned to vote for Barak and for the candidates of the Center party in the 1999 elections (see Table 18).

Were the Palestine Authority to unilaterally declare the establishment of a Palestinian state, the reaction of the Israeli public was not extreme. Sixteen percent favored recognizing such a state, 20 percent thought that Israel should do nothing, 43 percent favored ceasing further negotiations with the Palestinians, 15 percent supported annexing the areas of the territories still under Israeli control, and 6 percent were for invading the territories and recapturing the territories (see Figure 8).



**Figure 8. Were a Palestinian State Declared Unilaterally**

**The Future of the Negotiations.** What should be discussed in the negotiations with the Palestinians (see Table 5)? The samples were asked that question, in 1990, the period before any negotiations, in 1993, after the convening of the Madrid Conference, in 1994, after the Israel-PLO Oslo accord, in 1995 when the talks seemed stalled, in 1996 after the Oslo 2 accords, in 1997, with Prime Minister Netanyahu newly leading the negotiations, in 1998 after a year of stalled negotiations, and in 1999 after the Wye Plantation agreement. There was an increase in support for discussing topics with the Palestinians in 1999 compared with 1998. Only discussing the right of return remained very low. Other topics grew from previous levels.

	1990	1993	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
An independent Palestinian state	26%	30%	41%	44%	48%	52%	47%	61%
Removing Jewish settlements	32%	43%	50%	45%	49%	53%	47%	56%
East Jerusalem	13%	17%	14%	15%	17%	25%	21%	26%
The right of return	9%	12%	14%	12%	11%	17%	13%	13%

**Table 5. Support for Discussing... in Talks with Palestinians**

**Territories.** Which territories Israel will relinquish in the permanent settlement is a most divisive issue. The range of opinion is reported in Table 6; the rate of willingness to return territories was similar to the past, and in some cases higher than before. The ranking of the territories in terms of willingness to return them remained as it was in the past. In no case did a majority support returning the territory asked about.

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Western Samaria	30%	30%	38%	44%	39%	41%
Gush Etzion	14%	18%	20%	26%	26%	32%
Jordan Valley	18%	19%	20%	20%	23%	23%
East Jerusalem	10%	9%	12%	20%	17%	21%

**Table 6. Territories to be Returned in the Permanent Agreement**

**Jerusalem.** Respondents were asked about the establishment of the capital of the Palestinian state in Greater Jerusalem. This idea was soundly rejected by a margin of 86 to 14, as it was in 1998. Using a different wording in 1997, in which “East Jerusalem” was asked about, the rejection rate was also very high, 79 to 21. In 1996, only 14 percent agreed.


**The Settlers and the Settlements.** Responses regarding the settlements changed little compared to past surveys. In 1999, 29 percent of the respondents said that no Jewish settlements in the territories should be removed (32% in 1998, 27% in 1997, and 30% in 1996). Fourteen percent were ready to remove them all immediately (18% in 1998, 15% in 1997, and 17% in 1996). An additional 57 percent were willing to remove settlements with no military importance (50% in 1998, 58% in 1997, and 53% in 1996).

## IV Lebanon and Syria

The security situation in Lebanon again became a hot issue in 1999. Lebanon had been on the public agenda for two decades; occasionally the policy debate reached intense and vocal levels. That happened again in 1999.

The immediate focus of the debate was the presence of the IDF in the security zone in southern Lebanon, established in 1984 after the army withdrew from Lebanon following the 1982 "Peace for Galilee" operation. The broader context was Israel's relations with Syria and the future of the Golan Heights which Israel had taken from Syria in the 1967 Six Days war. The Israeli public adopted a more conciliatory position regarding the former, but maintained a militant one regarding the latter. The politicians, frustrated by the intractability of the problems and by the ambiguous messages the public seemed to generate, found it difficult to respond.

A majority in 1999 supported unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon (see Figure 9). The trend in that direction was clear, but this was the first



**Figure 9. Unilateral Withdrawal from Lebanon, 1997, 1998, 1999**

time in the Jaffee Center surveys that a more than half (55%) supported that position. It was up from 44 percent in 1998, and 41 percent in 1997. The breakdown shown in Table 7 indicates that the “definitely no” supporters decreased from about a third of the sample in 1997 and 1998 to a quarter of it in 1999.

Women supported withdrawal at a higher rate than men, and older people were more likely to be in favor of pulling out (see Table 19). Those from a European background were more in favor than those from an Asian or African background; the lowest rate of support was among Sephardi Jews born in Israel. The secular were more in favor than the religious, as were supporters of Barak. Those who served in the territories supported withdrawal at a lower rate than those who did not serve in the territories or those who were not in the army.

Questions have been asked about the rationale of the policy of the security zone. Between 1995 and 1998, a single question was asked about the role of the security zone. In general, there was a decline in the percentage of those agreeing that the security zone in Lebanon made a positive contribution to Israel's security and kept terror from northern settlements. In 1998, 64 percent agreed, in 1997 62 percent, in 1996 the figure was 72 percent, and 77 percent in 1995. The other 36 percent in 1998 (38% in 1997, 28% in 1996, and 23% in 1995) thought that the security zone was not effective in bringing quiet to the border and that its toll in terms of the lives of Israeli soldiers was too high.

In the 1999 survey, that single question was replaced by a more comprehensive series of questions. Respondents were asked to react to the following seven statements often heard in the public debate about the security zone. Table 7 contains the rates of agreement to the statements.

Some three out of four respondents agreed, with varying degrees of intensity, that it was possible to deal with the problems in Lebanon without leaving the Golan (70% agreement, adding together the “certainly agree” and “agree” categories), that the security zone is not worth the lives of Israeli soldiers (74%), that the zone is an important bargaining chip in future negotiations with Syria (72%), that the security zone brings quiet to the north of the country (71%), and that the price Israel pays in south Lebanon is due to that absence of negotiations with Syria (72%). About half favored unilateral withdrawal from Lebanon

(55%), and about a third thought Israel's policies were at the base of the disquiet in south Lebanon (36%).

The public was frustrated and ambivalent about policy in Lebanon. This was obvious from an exploratory statistical analysis regarding the responses to these statements. Although some three-quarters of the sample agreed with many of the statements, these majorities were composed of different respondents. That is, not all of the same people agreed with the same statements. It was that quality that made the issue of the future role of the IDF in south Lebanon such a difficult proposition for the politicians.

	certainly agree	agree	do not agree	certainly disagree
Israel should withdraw unilaterally from Lebanon.	17%	38	18	27
The problems in Lebanon can be solved without leaving the Golan Heights.	28%	42	20	10
The security zone is not worth the lives of Israeli soldiers.	44%	30	16	10
A great part of the disquiet in South Lebanon is due to Israel's policies.	9%	25	30	36
The security zone is an important bargaining chip if future negotiations with Syria.	27%	45	17	11
The security zone brings quiet to the north of the country.	36%	35	21	8
We are paying the price in South Lebanon for not negotiating with Syria.	30%	42	20	8

**Table 7. Policy in Lebanon, 1999**

The statements could be organized into three separate but interrelated dimensions: (1) a utilitarian dimension; (2) a political dimension; and

(3) a withdrawal dimension. The utilitarian dimension drew together the views that the security zone in south Lebanon brings quiet to the north and that it is important in future negotiations with Syria. The political dimension combined the view that it was possible to deal with Lebanon without leaving the Golan and those who rejected the notion that the price in Lebanon was due to the fact that there were no negotiations with Syria. The withdrawal dimension included unilateral withdrawal, the zone not being worth the lives of Israeli soldiers, and the view that the disquiet was due to Israeli policies.

Some of the questions relevant in the late 1990s were asked in the first security survey in 1985, again in the 1987 survey, and then in 1998. Public opinion has clearly soured on the Lebanese experience, and does not see a high likelihood of invading Lebanon again (see Table 8). The percentage of those who see high chances of such an invasion again dropped from a third in 1985 to a fifth in 1999. Moreover, the percentage that perceived that the efforts in Lebanon have been a success dropped from 64 percent in 1998 to 53 percent in 1999.

Respondents were asked if it was likely that conditions would again warrant entry by a large-scale Israeli force into Lebanon. In 1999, 20 percent said that the chances of that happening were high, 61 percent said small probability, and 19 percent said no chance at all. In 1998, the corresponding numbers were 27 percent high chances, 65 percent small probability, and 8 percent said no chance at all. The numbers in 1985 were 32, 57, and 11.

Respondents were asked if the efforts in Lebanon by the Israeli army have been a success or not. Little more than half answered yes in 1999, compared with almost two-thirds in 1998. When asked in 1985, during the process of extricating the IDF from Lebanon after the 1982 war, 27 percent thought that the Lebanese war had been worth the price paid by Israel in manpower, material, and tarnished international image. Two years later, the percentage replying that the Lebanese war had been worth it jumped 10 points to 37.

Comparing responses of the hypothetical shelling by terrorists of settlements in the north shows how much has changed, and has not changed in Israeli public opinion. The plurality choices for dealing with such a development in 1998 and in 1999 stressed air strikes and bombardment. In 1985 and in 1987 the preferred solution was limited

	1985	1987	1998	1999
High chances of invading Lebanon again	32%	a	27%	20%
Lebanese war of 1982 was worth the price	27%	37%	a	a
Efforts in Lebanon have been a success	a	a	64%	53%
Response if terrorists shell settlements again:				
– Invade South Lebanon and hold territory	7%	7%	12%	7%
– Heavy artillery and air bombardment	24	18	30	37
– Limited military power to destroy bases	36	44	21	20
– Pinpoint air raids against terrorist bases	26	24	33	30
– Seek political solution	7	7	5	6

<sup>a</sup> Not asked.

**Table 8. Lebanon, 1985, 1987, 1998, and 1999**

military action to destroy terrorist bases. This land action, fraught with casualties and danger, was half as popular in 1998 as it was in 1987. Faith in the effectiveness of air strikes rose; hope for seeking a political solution did not.

There was less than majority support in 1999 for responding to the shelling of the northern settlements with an attack on the Syrians however. Forty-six percent agreed to such a proposal (14% to a great extent, 32 percent to a certain extent), compared with 54 percent who disagreed (23% strongly disagree, 30% disagree).

Another series of questions, asked in both 1999 and 1998 had to do with the results of a hypothetical unilateral withdrawal by Israel from the security zone in Lebanon. Respondents were asked to say whether conditions would be better, stay the same, or be worse (see Figures 10 and 11).

One striking feature of the 1999 survey compared with 1998 is the changed assessment regarding the impact of the pullout on the chances for peace. In 1998, 35 percent felt that such a move would enhance peace compared with 51 percent in 1999. There was also a subdued assessment about the likely harm involved in a withdrawal from Lebanon. Thus, 66 percent in 1998 thought that such a move would strengthen the terrorists and 55 percent said that it would be good for Syria. By 1999, with




Figure 11. Effects of an Israeli Withdrawal, 1998




Figure 10. Effects of an Israeli Withdrawal, 1999

withdrawal fever growing, the assessment that the terrorists would be benefited dropped to 53 percent, and 44 percent felt that way about Syria. On the other hand, more respondents felt that the strength of the IDF (from 22% in 1998 to 30% in 1999) and Israeli democracy (from 19% to 29%) would be improved if a withdrawal would take place.

Relations with Syria and the future of the Golan Heights were important components of any policy regarding Lebanon. This is why it is important to note that while willingness to leave Lebanon grew, the same cannot be said regarding the Golan Heights. In the 1999 survey the size of the group that rejected the return of the Golan Heights to Syria remained large. In 1999, 73 percent were willing to give back none or only a small part of the Golan. The absolutely no return percentage stood at 38 percent, lower than the 44 percent in 1998, but higher than the low 31 percent in 1997, and 35 percent in 1996.

In the past, the Golan Heights were considered non-negotiable property by most respondents. In surveys conducted by the Guttman Institute between 1968 and 1978, the span of rates rejecting the return of any of the Golan Heights ranged from 74 to 96 percent. In 1986, when asked if Israel should be willing to return the Heights to Syria in exchange for a peace treaty, 86 percent said no. Even in 1995, with talks between the Israelis and Syrians in the news, and frequent rumors about possible arrangements between the Rabin-Peres team and Assad, the rate of refusal to return any of the Golan to Syria remained about 50 percent. The rate of willingness to return "some" grew.

Figure 12 details the responses to a 4-choice question about returning the Golan Heights to Syria in conjunction with security arrangements acceptable to Israel. This question was used in a Dahaf survey in September 1992 ( $N = 582$ ), and in the surveys between 1993 and 1998.

In addition to their personal preferences, respondents were also asked "Not taking into account your personal preference, do you estimate that within the next 10 years Israel will give the Golan Heights to Syria?" That assessment was shared by 54 percent in 1999. The percentage of those who thought Israel would return the Golan Heights to Syria within 10 years was 48 in 1998, much lower than the 66 percent in 1997 and in 1996, or from the 61 percent in 1995 (see Figure 13).

There is a correlation between willingness to return the Golan and the assessment that Israel will give it up in the future. The strength of the correlation varies over time, from a low of .290 in 1995 to a high .460 in 1999. When there are signs that negotiations are getting serious the relationship seems to strengthen as it did in 1996. The coefficient then was .421.




Figure 12. Returning the Golan Heights





Figure 13. Return the Golan Heights and Likelihood of Return in 10 Years

Israeli public opinion understands the close connection between the issues in Lebanon and the problems the country faces with Syria. Yet, while opinion regarding Lebanon became more conciliatory and ambivalent in 1999, it retained its militant position regarding Syria. The difficulty in unraveling that knot makes the issue of Lebanon a perennial one in Israeli politics, and invites the attention of political leaders.

The basic contours of Israeli public opinion -- informed, interested, concerned, articulate, and relatively evenly balanced - provide the leadership with enormous latitude. Politicians are relatively free to do as they choose in such cases. Israeli political and security history provide many examples of this process, including Rabin and the Oslo accords and Netanyahu regarding Hebron and the Wye Plantation agreements. In these situations, elections are virtual lotteries because the two sides cancel each other out, and precisely because of this balanced division of public opinion regarding specific issues, the elite can do as it sees fit.


## V Security Threat

There appears to be a relationship between perception of threat felt by Israeli Jews (measured here by the aspirations of the Arabs discussed above) and support for a Palestinian state (see Figure 14). Support for a state grows as the assessment of Arab aspirations becomes more moderate, and for support rates fall with the growth of a sense of hostile intentions.



**Figure 14. Threat and Support for a Palestinian State**

Respondents were asked to report how threatened they felt about a number of items. Among them were the return of land for peace, the establishment of a Palestinian state, the development of non-conventional weapons by Iran and Iraq, and the separation of religion and state in Israel (see Figure 16). With some variation, three of the issues presented a rather level distribution indicating that the issues impact on different groups in different ways. The development of non-conventional weapons by Iran and Iraq, on the other hand, is greatly threatening to a very large portion of the Israeli population.




**Figure 15. Perceived Threat**

In a different set of questions, respondents were asked whether they would support immediate use of the Israel Defense Forces to prevent Iran and Iraq developing such non-conventional weapons. The results were that 58 percent agreed to such a plan with varying degrees of intensity, 28 percent rejected the notion, and 14 percent took a middle position. The numbers for 1998 were almost identical.

In December 1998, the American and British mounted a four-day air attack on Iraq and there was concern that SCUDs would again be sent against Israel by Iraq, as they were in 1991. Respondents were asked if they thought the authorities had done enough to protect the civilian population in Israel during this crisis. Three out of four respondents thought so.

The concern regarding non-conventional weapons was associated with the general acceptance of Israel's developing non-conventional weapons. Whether or not Israel has a nuclear capacity has never been acknowledged by the government; still, in 1999, 82 percent supported the idea that Israel should develop nuclear weapons, lower than the 92 percent in 1998 and the 91 percent in 1991, but larger than the 78 percent which supported the idea in 1987 (see Figure 16).



**Figure 16. Public Opinion on Nuclear Weapons, 1986-1999**

There was a large majority (73%) that supported keeping Israel’s nuclear capacity shrouded in secrecy. The conditions under which nuclear weapons might be used (if Israel has such weapons), generated patterns similar to the past and reported previously.

Israelis liked the idea of arms control regarding nonconventional weapons, but much less so regarding conventional armies. In 1999, 71 percent supported the plan to prohibit armies in the region, including Israel, from having nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. Only 54 percent agreed to the idea of reducing the size of armies of the countries of the region. More popular was the enlargement of demilitarized zones, with almost two-thirds supporting that idea. Sixty-three percent agreed to preventing all outside arms supply to nations of the area. These rates were very similar to the ones recorded in four previous surveys (see Table 9).

	<b>1991</b>	<b>1993</b>	<b>1996</b>	<b>1998</b>	<b>1999</b>
Prohibit non-conventional weapons to all nations of region	75%	71%	43%	82%	71%
Prevent outside arms supply to nations of region	64%	66%	57%	63%	63%
Enlarge demilitarized zones	60%	67%	65%	68%	63%
Reduce the size of armies	54%	56%	56%	56%	54%

**Table 9. Arms Control**

## VI

### The Israel Defense Forces

The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) have always been associated with Israeli might, pride, and independence. The army is often described as a major agency of integration and socialization for immigrants to the country.

Change, however, has questioned many of the old assumptions. The introduction of technological advances to warfare question the need for a large standing army. The army has been assigned many police functions in the territories, or has been faced with static situations as in Lebanon, tasks which do not lend themselves to daring, initiative, and swift victories. Although army service is compulsory for Jews, many yeshiva students do not serve, thus raising questions of universality, equity, and motivation.

**Assessing strength.** Since 1987, respondents have been asked whether the army is getting stronger or whether its strength is eroding. Figure 17 displays the array of responses over the years. Almost half of the samples regularly state that the IDF is becoming weaker or much weaker; between a third and 40 percent think things are staying about the same; only twenty percent or so think that the IDF is getting stronger. These remarkably stable figures seem to be little affected by the politics of the moment, by the party in power, or by the developments of the international scene. The sense of a weakening army is stable and long-term.

**The security budget and taxes.** The majority of respondents in past surveys have consistently thought that the security budget was appropriate; the size of the group which wanted it increased has been between three to six times the size of the group that wanted it reduced. This was true in 1999 as well: 31 percent wanted the security budget expanded, 10 percent wanted it cut, the remainder wanted it to remain the same. When asked if one was willing to pay more taxes to have greater security, about half the respondents agreed in the 1980s, 42 percent agreed in 1993, 29 percent agreed in 1998, and only 18 percent agreed in 1999 (see Figure 18).




Figure 17. Assessing the IDE, 1987-1999




Figure 18. Raise Taxes for Security Budget

**Compulsory service or a volunteer army?** Although most respondents were not ready to increase taxes for defense, they were very firm in their support for the form of compulsory conscription that exists today. The notion of a volunteer army was very unpopular. Almost nine out of ten respondents rejected the idea. Even under the hypothetical condition of peace, support for the idea only reached 24 percent (see Table 10).


	<b>Definitely volunteer</b>	<b>maybe volunteer</b>	<b>maybe conscription</b>	<b>definitely conscription</b>
Now	3%	10%	30%	57%
After peace	8%	16%	34%	42%

Table 10. Volunteer Army, Now and After Peace

When asked about compulsory national service (not necessarily in the military), almost three of every four respondents supported the proposition. The distribution of responses to the question, “To what extent do you agree to the proposal to make national service compulsory for everyone?” was:

<b>Definitely agree</b>	<b>agree</b>	<b>disagree</b>	<b>definitely disagree</b>
38%	35%	20%	7%

The debate in Israel has increasingly focused on the lack of army service of yeshiva students. Lately, university students have demanded similar exemptions. Public opinion did not take this argument seriously at all. Eighty-five percent thought that university students should not be exempt, and 78 percent felt that way about yeshiva students. The sample was almost evenly split about religious Jewish women. More lenient positions were taken regarding Arabs (see Figure 19).



**Figure 19. Support for Exempting from Army Service**

The credibility of the leadership is a crucial factor in any political system, and certainly in a democracy. The heads of the security organizations enjoy levels of credibility higher than the political leaders of the country. In 1999, they enjoyed a 23 point difference in credibility compared to political leaders (see Table 11).

	<b>Security</b>	<b>Political</b>
Strongly rely	23%	10%
Rely	56%	46%
Do not rely	18%	36%
Definitely not	3%	8%

**Table 11. Reliance on Statements of Security and Political Leaders, 1999**

The overall pattern of credibility for the political leadership has been in a downward direction. There has been a 26 percentage point drop since the question was first asked in the 1986 survey (see Table 12).

	1986	1987	1996	1997	1998	1999
Strongly rely	13%	10%	9%	8%	12%	10%
Rely	69	59	51	57	53	46
Do not rely	17	26	31	28	28	36
Definitely not	2	5	9	7	7	8

**Table 12. Reliance on Statements of Political Leaders**

The public was asked whether a number of things was likely to contribute to or was likely to harm Israel's security (see Figure 20). The role of many of these topics was debated during the year as a result of incidents which brought them to public attention.

The idea of having lower levels of American aid was seen as especially harmful. Media coverage of security issues, followed closely by the intervention by parents of soldiers in the army's affairs were also seen as harmful. Respondents also saw as harmful the effect of court decisions on operational matters.

The relations between political and military leaders divided the respondents as to whether this was beneficial or harmful by a 60:40 ratio. This was also the ratio of contribution/harm about the effects of having women in combat roles, and the Oslo accords. Only the military cooperation with the Palestinian Authority was clearly seen as much more positive than negative.

**Civil war.** The assessed probability of civil war resulting from political decisions regarding the future of the territories remained at about a third of the samples. The size of the groups which assessed civil war as being very likely and that it was very unlikely shrank over the years (see Table 13).




Figure 20. Contribution and Harm to Israeli Security, 1999

	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999
Very likely	9%	8%	6%	3%	5%	5%
Likely	24	22	30	29	29	30
Unlikely	34	35	33	45	43	48
Very unlikely	33	36	32	24	24	18

Table 13. Likelihood of Civil War

## VII Political Parties

The Likud was perceived as better able than Labor to know how to negotiate forcefully for land and peace (54% to 23%), to secure a Jewish majority (50% to 15%), and to handle the threat of terror (48% to 18%). In selecting the party that could bring Israel a true peace with the Arabs, both parties received almost the same support (37% and 36% respectively). Regarding the issue of lessening the cleavages, neither party had an advantage (28% for Labor, 25% for the Likud). Labor was seen as better able to secure Israel's democracy (26% for the Likud, 36% for Labor), although "both parties" had the highest rate on that question (see Figure 21).




Figure 21. Party Images 1999

**Differences between major parties.** The public sensed a dramatic change in the political map in Israel in 1999. In every category, perceived differences between the major parties plummeted compared to previous years. This was especially evident for policies regarding peace and territories; the rate of perceived differences dropped by 30 percentage points between 1998 and 1999. The same pattern was evident for differences for each of the topics (see Table 14).

Rhetoric aside, the public seemed to be aware that many of the policies of the Netanyahu cabinet were much more moderate than its ideology, and Ehud Barak, Labor's candidate for prime minister, was probably less conciliatory than many of his fellow party members. Two of the leaders of the new Center Party, Yitzhak Mordechai and Amnon Lipkin-Shahak, were also former generals, and hence, likely to be cautious in the policies they pursued.

	5/1996	1997	1998	1999
Peace and territories	79%	57%	72%	42%
Lebanon	a	a	46%	25%
Economics	30%	28%	39%	25%
Fighting terror	60%	29%	34%	25%
Security policy	a	36%	47%	18%
Jerusalem	54%	41%	41%	18%

<sup>a</sup> Not asked.

**Table 14. "Very Great" and "Great" Differences between Major Parties**

**Arab parties in the coalition.** Half the sample accepted the notion of including Arab parties in the government coalition, while half was opposed. This was the highest rate of support since the question was first asked in 1993 (see Table 15).

	1993	1994	1996	1997	1998	1999
Strongly support	10%	12%	10%	13%	9%	17%
Support	23	27	35	26	29	33
Oppose	21	21	28	24	23	29
Strongly oppose	47	41	28	37	40	21

**Table 15. Arab Parties in the Coalition**

**טבלה 16. האם לדעתך מצב הביטחון האישי של תושבי ישראל הוא היום טוב יותר או רע יותר מאשר לפני שהתחיל תהליך השלום? (באחוזים)**  
**Table 16. In your opinion, is the personal security of Israel's citizens better or worse since the beginning of the peace process? (in %)**

Group <sup>2</sup> - קבוצה <sup>1</sup>	יותר טוב Better	יותר גרוע Worse	הרבה יותר טוב Much better	הרבה יותר גרוע Much worse
Total - הכל	72	18	8	3
Gender - מין				
Female - נקבה	74	17	7	2
Male - זכר	70	18	9	4
Age - גיל				
18-29	68	21	8	3
30-54	73	16	8	3
+55	77	17	5	1
Education - השכלה				
עד 8 שנים - thru 8 years	70	27	3	0
9-12 שנים	71	18	8	2
+12 שנים	74	16	7	4
Place of birth - מקום לידה				
1. יליד הארץ, אב יליד הארץ	70	21	7	3
2. יליד הארץ, אב יליד אסיה/אפריקה	69	19	9	2
3. יליד הארץ, אב יליד אירופה/אמריקה	76	14	7	3
4. יליד אסיה/אפריקה	66	17	13	4
5. יליד אירופה/אמריקה	81	12	5	2
Extent of religious observance - דתיות				
שומר הכל - Observe all	56	31	7	6
שומר הרבה - Observe most	62	25	9	4
שומר במקצת - Observe some	75	16	7	1
לא שומר חילוני - Observe none	77	11	8	4
Army service in territories - שירות צבאי בשטחים				
כן - Yes	73	14	9	4
לא - No	72	18	8	3
לא שירת בצבא - No army service	70	23	4	3
Choice for Prime Minister 1999 - ראש הממשלה 1999				
נתניהו - Netanyahu	67	21	11	2
ברק - Barak	80	11	7	2
מועמד המרכז - Center Party Candidate	72	21	4	4
בגין - Begin	36	40	4	20
לא החלטתי - No decision	77	16	5	3

1. התפלגות נתוני הרקע נמצאת בלוח 19.

2. The distribution of demographic characteristics is found in Table 19.

3. 1=Israel, father Israel; 2=Israel, father Asia or Africa; 3=Israel, father Europe or America; 4=Asia or Africa; 5=Europe or America.

טבלה 17. האם על ישראל להסכים או לא להסכים להקמת מדינה פלסטינית ביהודה, שומרון וחבל עזה במסגרת הסכם הקבע? (באחוזים)

Table 17. Should Israel agree to the establishment of a Palestinian state in the territories as part of the permanent agreement? (in %)

בהחלט לא Definitely	לא Yes	כן No	בהחלט כן Definitely not	קבוצה <sup>1</sup> - Group <sup>2</sup>
15	28	42	15	סך הכל - Total
				מין - Gender
11	30	44	16	נקבה - Female
19	27	40	14	זכר - Male
				גיל - Age
20	30	37	13	18-29
13	28	42	16	30-54
10	25	50	16	+55
				השכלה - Education
7	39	29	26	עד 8 שנים - thru 8 years
15	32	41	12	9-12 שנים
16	21	44	19	+12 שנים
				מקום לידה - Place of birth
15	28	40	17	1. יליד הארץ, אב יליד הארץ
20	33	35	11	2. יליד הארץ, אב יליד אסיה/אפריקה
12	22	43	22	3. יליד הארץ, אב יליד אירופה/אמריקה
18	33	38	11	4. יליד אסיה/אפריקה
9	21	57	13	5. יליד אירופה/אמריקה
				דתיות - Extent of religious observance
47	35	11	6	שומר הכל - Observe all
22	43	29	6	שומר הרבה - Observe most
11	27	47	15	שומר במקצת - Observe some
7	18	52	23	לא שומר חילוני - Observe none
				שירות צבאי בשטחים - Army service in territories
38	25	44	15	כן - Yes
23	31	43	16	לא - No
41	28	37	12	לא שירת בצבא - No army service
				ראש הממשלה 1999 - Choice for Prime Minister 1999
27	43	27	4	נתניהו - Netanyahu
2	6	57	35	ברק - Barak
9	26	52	13	מועמד המרכז - Center Party Candidate
42	27	31	0	בגין - Begin
9	27	49	15	לא החלטתי - No decision

4. התפלגות נתוני הרקע נמצאת בלוח 19.

5. The distribution of demographic characteristics is found in Table 19.

6. 1=Israel, father Israel; 2=Israel, father Asia or Africa; 3=Israel, father Europe or America; 4=Asia or Africa; 5=Europe or America.

**טבלה 18. באיזו מידה אתה מסכים או לא מסכים לדעה שישראל צריכה לסגת מלבנון מיד באופן חד-צדדי? (באחוזים)**

**Table 18. To what extent do you agree or disagree that Israel should unilaterally withdraw immediately from Lebanon? (in %)**

בהחלט לא Not at all	לא Limited extent	כן Certain extent	בהחלט כן Great extent	קבוצה <sup>1</sup> - Group <sup>2</sup>
27	18	38	17	Total - סך הכל
				Gender - מין
17	21	43	19	Female - נקבה
37	16	32	16	Male - זכר
				Age - גיל
31	19	33	17	18-29
26	18	39	17	30-54
22	17	40	21	+55
				Education - השכלה
18	21	27	33	עד 8 שנים - thru 8 years
27	18	38	16	9-12 שנים
28	19	35	19	+12 שנים
				Place of birth מקום לידה
26	21	37	16	1. יליד הארץ, אב יליד הארץ
36	18	32	14	2. יליד הארץ, אב יליד אסיה/אפריקה
27	15	37	21	3. יליד הארץ, אב יליד אירופה/אמריקה
25	19	41	16	4. יליד אסיה/אפריקה
20	14	43	23	5. יליד אירופה/אמריקה
				Extent of religious observance דתיות
58	14	20	9	Observe all שומר הכל
33	16	33	18	Observe most שומר הרבה
23	20	39	18	Observe some שומר במקצת
21	16	44	19	Observe none לא שומר חילוני
				Army service in territories שירות צבאי בשטחים
34	18	31	17	Yes כן
22	19	41	18	No לא
29	16	37	19	No army service לא שירת בצבא
				Choice for Prime Minister 1999 ראש הממשלה 1999
36	19	34	11	Netanyahu - נתניהו
15	15	43	27	Barak - ברק
27	20	34	20	Center Party Candidate - מועמד המרכז
48	8	24	20	Begin - בגין
20	20	42	19	No decision לא החלטתי

7. התפלגות נתוני הרקע נמצאת בלוח 19.

8. The distribution of demographic characteristics is found in Table 19.

9. 1=Israel, father Israel; 2=Israel, father Asia or Africa; 3=Israel, father Europe or America; 4=Asia or Africa; 5=Europe or America.

## טבלה 19. נתוני רקע של המדגם

Table 19. Demographic Characteristics of the Sample

N	%	
		Gender - מין
605	50.4	נקבה - Female
595	49.6	זכר - Male
		Age - גיל
474	40.1	18-29
511	43.2	30-54
198	16.5	+55
		Education - השכלה
33	3.9	עד 8 שנים - thru 8 years
673	57.3	9-12 שנים years
456	38.8	+13 שנים years
		Place of birth מקום לידה
286	24.6	1. יליד הארץ, אב יליד הארץ
297	25.5	2. יליד הארץ, אב יליד אסיה/אפריקה
236	20.3	3. יליד הארץ, אב יליד אירופה/אמריקה
136	11.7	4. יליד אסיה/אפריקה
208	17.9	5. יליד אירופה/אמריקה
		Extent of religious observance דתיות
118	10.2	Observe all שומר הכל
191	16.5	Observe most שומר הרבה
526	45.4	Observe some שומר במקצת
323	27.9	Observe none לא שומר חילוני
		Army service in territories שירות צבאי בשטחים
377	32.4	Yes כן
564	48.5	No לא
221	19.0	No army service לא שירת בצבא

10. 1=Israel, father Israel; 2=Israel, father Asia or Africa; 3=Israel, father Europe or America; 4=Asia or Africa; 5=Europe or America.

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No. 48 July 1997	Anat Kurz with Nachman Tal, <i>Hamas: Radical Islam in a National Struggle</i> (English)
No. 49 July 1998	Asher Arian, <i>Israeli Public Opinion on National Security 1998</i> , (English)
No. 50 <i>August 1998</i>	Shmuel Even, <i>Trends in the World Oil Market: Strategic Implications for Israel</i> (Hebrew)
No. 51 July 1998	Aharon Levran, <i>Iraq's Strategic Arena</i> (Hebrew)
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