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Iran
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Iran's Late-Summer Display
INSS Insight No. 205, September 5, 2010 |
| Shapir, Yiftah |
| Every day for a full week beginning August 20, as part of the Government Achievement Week festivities, the Iranian media reported the unveiling of new weapon systems. That week Iran also celebrated the insertion of fuel rods into the nuclear power plant in Bushehr. In all probability, the events were reported at the same time to impress the world with Iran’s ability to progress and grow stronger in the fields it considers important despite the sanctions against it. |
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The Straits of Hormuz: Strategic Importance in Volatile Times
INSS Insight No. 204, September 3, 2010 |
| Guzansky, Yoel |
| Iran’s oft-sounded threats to close the Straits of Hormuz to international shipping and thereby stop the flow of Gulf oil seem to have increased in frequency and intensity, apparently in light of the decision to impose harsher sanctions against Iran. Senior Iranian officials have thus warned that “any act of aggression or adventure” – in practice this means inspections of cargoes of Iranian ships (a step included in the Security Council resolution on Iran) – would generate an “appropriate” Iranian response and turn the Straits into an unsafe place for Iran’s enemies. |
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Bushehr, After All
INSS Insight No. 202, August 25, 2010 |
| Magen, Zvi and Asculai, Ephraim |
| August 21, 2010 marked the official inauguration in Bushehr of Iran’s first nuclear power plant, which was built by Russia. It seems that this event finally put an end to the drawn-out ordeal, which in recent years has been used as leverage for international pressure on Iran and has been riddled with question marks. The plant's inauguration was marked by a celebratory ceremony attended by Iran’s vice president and head of its atomic energy organization, Ali Akbar Salehi, and the head of Russia’s atomic agency (ROSATOM), Sergei Kiriyenko. The operation of loading the 163 nuclear fuel rods from Russia began in advance of the ceremony, thereby launching the preparatory stage for the plant’s start-up, which is slated to take place in late September 2010. |
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Ten Questions for the Negotiators with Iran
INSS Insight No. 198, August 8, 2010 |
| Asculai, Ephraim |
| In view of the possibility of renewed talks between Iran and the “Vienna Group” (the US, France, Russia, and the IAEA) one cannot but wonder whether this will be “the real thing” or another Iranian time-buying ploy. Although at first Iran delayed the opening of talks, it later recommended to the Vienna Group not to delay the talks. Contrary to the talks that started with the P5+1 in Geneva on October 1, 2009 that were supposed to deal with the whole spectrum of issues between Iran and the rest of the world, the Vienna Group dealt only with the “swap” – the proposed deal whereby in exchange for 3.5% Iranian enriched uranium Iran would receive 20% enriched uranium in the form of nuclear fuel rods for its Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Iran first agreed to this deal, then opposed, then agreed to a more favorable (to Iran) deal brokered by Brazil and Turkey, but not accepted by the US. |
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Is the Military Option Back on the Table?
INSS Insight No. 197, August 9, 2010 |
| Kam, Ephraim |
| Over the course of July 2010, a few voices in the United States called for a reassessment of a military option against Iran. Some of these figures refused to identify themselves by name, suggesting that they are part of the security or political establishment. Some former senior officials, however, did identify themselves by name. Most notable among them was the former head of the CIA, General Michael Hayden, who explicitly stated in an interview with CNN that an attack on Iran’s nuclear facilities is not the United States' worst option. Hayden noted that when he served as the head of the CIA (until February 2009), the military option was at the bottom of the list, but it now seems more likely since all the steps by the United States have proven insufficient to stop Iran from continuing on its path towards a nuclear weapons capability. Hayden's remarks echoed former senators Daniel Coats and Charles Robb and General Charles Wald, former deputy commander of the United States European Command, who as early as September 2009 published a joint article that called for a strong approach towards Iran: if talks with Iran fail, it is incumbent upon the United States to abandon negotiations, prepare for military action in the Gulf area, consider the option of imposing a blockade on Iran, and as a last resort, consider a military strike on Iran, the inherent dangers notwithstanding. |
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Iran: The Course is Almost Run,
INSS Insight No. 193, July 18, 2010 |
| Asculai, Ephraim and Landau, Emily B. |
| The pattern of international efforts to confront Iran's nuclear program has become all too familiar. The West – first the EU-3, and later the US – leads “diplomatic processes” to nowhere; Russia and China go back and forth between Iran and the West, reluctant to take too harsh a stance against Iran's ongoing defiance, and agreeing only to belated and weak UN Security Council resolutions on sanctions; and the IAEA continues to pose questions to Iran about the military dimensions of its nuclear program that Iran avoids answering, while at the same time it continues to install and run additional uranium enrichment cascades. The Iranians are successfully playing for time, and time is on their side. All sides are hesitant to firmly pronounce the Iranian nuclear program as weapons-oriented, and Iran senses that its target is almost in sight. |
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The Iranian Challenge: Synchronizing the Political and Technological Clocks
INSS Insight No. 190, June 23, 2010 |
| Guzansky, Yoel |
| In a recent appearance before the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee, Meir Dagan, head of the Mossad, claimed that while the Iranians are still seeking nuclear capabilities as a strategic objective, "they have encountered far more difficulties than expected and failed to advance as they had hoped technologically." It is not clear whether Dagan was referring to technical difficulties at home or foreign difficulties, i.e., external intervention designed to affect the timetable for achieving a nuclear weapons capability. Gary Samore, Obama's advisor on arms control and proliferation, also claimed recently that there is "a significant delay in the uranium enrichment process, which is influencing Iran's ability to produce nuclear weapons." |
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The Fourth Round of Sanctions on Iran
INSS Insight No. 188, June 13, 2010 |
| Landau, Emily B. and Asculai, Ephraim |
| On June 9, 2010, the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1929, imposing a fourth round of sanctions on Iran. Twelve members of the Security Council voted in favor; Brazil and Turkey, as expected, opposed the decision; and Lebanon abstained. In the words of the resolution, the Security Council noted “with concern” that “Iran has not established full and sustained suspension of all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities and heavy water-related projects as set out in resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007) and 1803 (2008) nor resumed its cooperation with the IAEA under the Additional Protocol.” The council thus recognized the failure of all previous efforts, including three previous rounds of sanctions, to get Iran to halt its nuclear weapons development project and cooperate fully with the IAEA. |
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Russia-Iran Relations: Is There a Change?
INSS Insight No. 186, June 10, 2010 |
| Magen, Zvi |
| The May 17 signing of the agreement to transfer uranium between Iran, Turkey, and Brazil met with sweeping opposition on the part of the Security Council and aroused new international unrest. The day after the signing, the Security Council’s permanent members, including Russia and China – both of which were surprised by the development – signed a proposed resolution to impose sanctions against Iran. Since then, they have been working to curb the Turkish-Brazilian initiative. Iran, which was surprised by the speed and force of the reaction, responded with its normal shrill declarations, particularly towards Russia. Russia, finding itself in this situation for the first time, now faces two challenges: the effort to mollify Iran, and the desire to weaken the Turkish-Brazilian initiative, heralding – from Russia's perspective – an undesirable reversal on the international arena. |
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2010 NPT RevCon: Final Results and Implications for Israel
INSS Insight No. 185, June 3, 2010 |
| Landau, Emily B. |
| Egypt's campaign to pressure Israel on the nuclear issue, a firmly established dynamic in the weeks leading up to the NPT Review Conference (RevCon) and during the discussions that took place for close to four weeks in May, ended up overshadowing the RevCon final document. The final document, adopted by consensus, reflects Egypt's relatively successful campaign to force the US to accept its agenda for starting discussion on a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) and for singling out Israel in the nuclear realm. Egypt stood by its threat to block consensus on any final document of the RevCon if the US did not adhere to its demands. |
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| Happy New Year |
1283726551.bmp) Best wishes from INSS for a happy and healthy new year, full of peace, security, and propsperity.
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