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Periodicals
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Page 6 of 78 |
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The Importance of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START)
INSS Insight No. 172, April 11, 2010 |
| Malz-Ginzburg, Tamar |
| The new Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which the presidents of the United States and Russia signed a few days ago in a festive ceremony in the ancient castle in Prague, is a continuation of START I, signed between the United States and the former Soviet Union in July 1991. The treaty dealt with a reduction in the number of nuclear warheads and the means of launching nuclear weapons. This is likewise the stated purpose of the new treaty: to reduce the strategic nuclear arsenal of both countries. The treaty also allows the continuation of the attempt to control the proliferation of fissile material from Russia to hostile elements – one of the primary goals of the original START. |
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Can the US Contain a Nuclear Iran?
INSS Insight No. 171, March 24, 2010 |
| Landau, Emily B. |
| With any hope of a new round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran now postponed until June, and the understanding that if at all, these will be weak and ineffective measures, Obama's diplomatic initiative is slowly grinding to a halt. Taking into account Iran's steady progress in developing fissile material, its work on producing a nuclear warhead, and its ever-improving missile capabilities -- together with low expectations that anything in this dynamic will impress upon the Obama administration the need to ultimately take military action -- part of the discourse on this topic is changing track. Instead of focusing on the stinging failure to curb Iran's nuclear ambitions, some are arguing that it's now time to move on. They say that in the likely scenario that Iran becomes the next nuclear state, the US will simply resort to its ultimate strategy that has worked in other cases: it will contain a nuclear Iran. |
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The IDF and the Road to a More Professional Military,
Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 1, No. 3, December 2009 |
| Bazak, Yuval |
| The Second Lebanon War revealed a string of failures in the way that the
Israeli military operated against Hizbollah, with the result that the IDF
was unable to achieve its objectives fully. The results of the war obligated
the IDF to undertake a deep, thorough examination and draw conclusions
for practical assimilation and implementation in a long, ongoing process.
The Winograd Commission established by the government to investigate
the failures of the war found “fundamental flaws in the preparation
and execution of the war” and determined that “the army in its entirety,
especially through its senior command posts and ground forces, failed
in providing an adequate military response to the challenge it faced in
executing the war in Lebanon and did not supply the political echelon
with a proper military basis for political action.” |
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Hizbollah’s Force Buildup of 2006-2009: Foundations and Future Trends,
Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 1, No. 3, December 2009 |
| Aviad, Guy |
| On August 12, 2006, the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1701,
paving the way for the end of 34 days of warfare between Israel and
Hizbollah, a campaign later named the Second Lebanon War. Apart from
the immediate need to establish a ceasefire, the Security Council hoped
to change the security reality in southern Lebanon while neutralizing
the elements that were responsible for the escalation, and prevent the
repetition of another round of fighting between the sides. Accordingly,
certain security arrangements were put in place, among them the
deployment of the Lebanese army in southern Lebanon as well as an
increase in the UNIFIL force from about 2,500 soldiers to a maximum
of 15,000 to serve as a buffer between Israel and Hizbollah in the space
between the international border and the Litani River. Likewise, the
resolution forbade anyone other than the Lebanese army or UNIFIL
forces to carry weapons or lay the foundations for a military infrastructure
in the region, and the government in Beirut was called on to secure the
borders and act effectively in order to foil arms smuggling in the area. |
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Intelligence and the Challenges of High Trajectory Fire,
Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 1, No. 3, December 2009 |
| Kulick, Amir |
| Every state defines its basic self interests and what in its mind constitutes
existential threats. On the basis of these definitions, the state formulates
the relevant responses, whether military, diplomatic, economic, or other,
to events and developments. For years, the Israeli military response relied
on three basic principles: deterrence, warning, and decision. The three
principles implied that Israel must deter the Arab states from starting
wars. Should deterrence fail, then Israel’s intelligence must supply a
timely warning of an impending war in order to allow the army time to
prepare. Once the war has erupted, Israel must have the capability of
moving the fighting onto enemy territory and wrest a quick decision in
the campaign, given Israel’s lack of strategic depth and limited capacity
for endurance. |
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War and Victory,
Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 1, No. 3, December 2009 |
| Siboni, Gabriel |
| Before embarking on Operation Cast Lead, the IDF and the defense
establishment held many discussions about the need for military action
in the Gaza Strip and the strategic objective of such an action in the event
it would in fact occur. These discussions were held in light of the sharply
worded recommendations of the Winograd Commission. |
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Warfare against Insurgencies: The Theory behind the Practice,
Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 1, No. 3, December 2009 |
| Tovy, Tal |
| For most of its sixty years, the State of Israel has faced an ongoing
confrontation generated by guerilla/terrorist movements. After
World War II, it became customary to call this phenomenon a war of
revolution or insurgency, connoting confrontation launched by politicalrevolutionary
movements whose goal is to attain governance through
violent means and the politicization of the local population. This is not
guerilla or terrorist warfare in the classical sense, rather a war that in
the beginning uses guerilla tactics (rural or urban) and even terrorism,
at the same time that it attempts to persuade the local population of the
justness of the cause. |
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The US Military in Iraq and the IDF in Judea and Samaria,
Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 1, No. 3, December 2009 |
| Segal, Giora |
| In recent years the phenomenon of war has been commonly divided into
symmetrical warfare and asymmetrical warfare. Notwithstanding new
semantics, however, there is nothing new about this division,1 which
represents the two principal interrelated components of war2 and
therefore demands ongoing professional study.3 Confrontations between
countries are liable to develop into symmetrical conventional wars, and
at the same time or in their wake, a confrontation with asymmetrical
properties can ensue. The transition from fighting a conventional enemy
to fighting terror and guerilla tactics is a direct and natural transition. |
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Lack of Harmony within the Quartet
INSS Insight No. 170, March 25, 2010 |
| Magen, Zvi |
| On March 19, 2010, the Quartet, established in 2002 in Madrid as a mediating body whose decisions carry advisory status, met in Moscow. Present at the meeting were the foreign ministers of Russia, the United States, and the European Union, as well as the Secretary General of the United Nations and the Quartet’s envoy to the Middle East. The present meeting was the first time the Quartet met in a special session rather than as ancillary to international conferences; it took place at Russia’s behest. |
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Israel, the United States, and the Military Option against Iran,
INSS Insight No. 169, March 18, 2010 |
| Shalom, Zaki and Schachter, Jonathan |
| In a speech at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy on February 26, 2010, Defense Minister Ehud Barak made extensive reference to Iran, its attempts to obtain nuclear capabilities, and the policy ramifications for the major powers and Israel towards Iran. Despite a certain measure of opacity in his address, Barak did make some unequivocal statements of interest. These express the situation assessment prevalent in Israel regarding Iran’s nuclear goal and the gaps between Israel and the American administration and their implications from Israel’s perspective. |
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| Happy New Year |
1283726551.bmp) Best wishes from INSS for a happy and healthy new year, full of peace, security, and propsperity.
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