Kobi Michael

An examination of General Staff appointments over the past five decades reveals a frequent selection of individuals from the Paratroopers and Sayeret Matkal units for key positions. What are the implications of this—and what should the new chief of staff learn from it?

An analysis of the final statement in Arabic from the conference on formulating a framework for Gaza's “day after” presents a troubling picture, suggesting little change or understanding of the post-October 7 reality

Hamas, the Palestinian Authority, and the two-state solution: A new perspective on Palestinian public opinion in the West Bank, East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip

There are those who warn that the worsening economic situation in the Palestinian Authority is bringing it closer to the possibility of collapse—something that does not align with Israeli interests. How can a megaproject, such as the construction of new Palestinian cities, provide a solution to a series of failures of the PA, the challenges it faces, and the dilemmas they pose for Israel?

Bitter rivalry—attempts at reconciliation—and a new crisis: This is how the cycle of relations between Fatah and Hamas has looked for many years. It seems that this cycle will not be broken in the near future, which significantly reduces the possibility of the Palestinian Authority’s control of the Gaza Strip “the day after.” In the absence of another solution, that rivalry could pave the way for a temporary Israeli military rule in Gaza

After each round of violent clashes between Israel and Hamas, the issue of rehabilitating the Gaza Strip and improving its economic situation is raised once again. The accepted working assumption is that given suitable political conditions, and in the framework of a political process based on an attempt to promote the realization of the two-state paradigm, in which the Gaza Strip and the West Bank are considered one political and territorial unit under the control of the Palestinian Authority, it will be possible to rehabilitate the Strip. But it appears that nobody has ever asked if the Gaza Strip can indeed be rehabilitated. In this paper I will try to clarify the meaning of “rehabilitation” in the context of the Gaza Strip, and with the aid of a matrix of variables, those that facilitate rehabilitation and those that disrupt it, examine a number of basic questions dealing with the actual feasibility of rehabilitating the Gaza Strip under existing conditions. Following that, with reference to my conclusion regarding the absence of sufficient conditions for a successful rehabilitation process, I will describe the characteristics of this state of affairs and its ramifications, and propose a number of possible options for dealing with the emerging situation in the absence of rehabilitation, with an emphasis on the importance of adopting logical guidelines which do not currently exist but which are here deemed to be essential for the success of such a process. The conclusion of this paper is that leaving Hamas in the Gaza Strip as a ruling entity and with their commitment to the preservation of the idea of armed resistance, are both strongly disruptive variables, and both are endogenous to the Palestinian system. Therefore, without neutralizing these two variables, or at least weakening them very considerably, it is hard to imagine that the rehabilitation process will succeed.